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This thesis explores the effects of political change on
Greek security policy during the period 1974 to 1984. This
period encompasses significant change in Greece's foreign
relations including those with the United States. The
central question is: Are the elements of Greek security
policy based on long-term basic interests which find consis-
tent expression, or are they a function of domestic polit-
ical factors, more ideologically motivated and therefore
variable according to the governing political party? The
fundamental issues include; relations with the Eastern
Bloc, Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, relations with NATO, and U.S.
military installations in Greece. These issues are analyzed
for three periods: the 1974-1981 New Democracy Governments,
the 1974-1981 opposition policies of PASOK, and the
1974-present PASOK government. Although some expected a
radical departure in policies with the 1981 change to a.
socialist government, practical policies have shown very
little change. The basic requirements of a developing and
maturing country influenced by the conditions of its
regional environment and general world conditions seem to
lend consistency and rationality to Greek security policy
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I. INTRO DDCTION
A. PERSPECTIVE
In recent years considerable concern has been expressed
about the future viability of the Atlantic Alliance as a
cooperative security venture. Numerous authors have pointed
to the many divergences which have been straining the alli-
ance for years and which seen to be worsening. Changes
within the global strategic environment as well as within
various regions and individual states seem to increase the
difficulty of gaining commonality of purpose and consensus
in action among the Western allies. These changes have beer-
interpreted both pessimistically and optimistically , but
most observers seem to agree that a careful reconsideration
of the basics of the alliance seems in order. Central to
this consideration has been the observation that certain
elements within the alliance leadership seea to take a
conservative approach to the security arrangement, seeing
its success over the past 34 years as evidence of its
viability and an argument against change. One tendency,
then, may be to partially overlook the changes which have
taken place on many levels within the Western sphere and
resort to past generalities to form policy for the alliance.
Other optimists will say that it is the very strength ox the
alliance which has allowed it to survive the numerous
"crises" and shifts which have occurred since its founding,
and that it is the .fundamental assumptions which have
carried the alliance through these rough times. However,
there are pessimists who see growing and multiplying polit-
ical, economic and military problems as an indication of
future collapse if new arrangements and outlooks are not
adopted. Pierre Hassner has put it quite succinctly:
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In sum. the traditional problems of NATO are all still
present. but they are exacerbated by much more serious
external situations, both military and economic, and by
more difficult domestic situations, particularly in
countries ... in which, for a long time, domestic divi-
sions did not affect foreign policy. The economic and
the military crises coincide with the so-called govern-
ability crises of Western societies, and the postwar
national and alliance consensus is now being increas-
ingly challenged- [Ref. 1: p. 378]
It is therefore a combination of factors in increasing
complexity which adds new dimensions to alliance problems.
Generational shifts in Europe and the United States which
have brought significant new domestic and international
political and security perceptions. This has added new
elements to be taken into consideration during policy forma-
tion for the Alliance and for the United States. The
perceived strength of the monolithic Soviet challenge has
diminished in many countries. Increasing East-West connec-
tions have had significant effects, especially in some
Western European countries, on Western perceptions of the
East-West relationship. Political, cultural and economic
connections developed during the detente era have sometimes
tended to obfuscate the formerly clear- cut security policy
goals. With the addition of what some call a strategic
East-West stalemate and the worsening economic realities of
the past several years, it has tecome increasingly difficult
to identify common security interests among the allies.
Instead, policy formation within most European countries has
become a balancing act between national interests, regional
interests and larger community interests. In a 1982 report
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which dealt
with the growing problems in the Atlantic Alliance, it was
stated that:
The challenge for American policy makers who want to
ensure the future of the alliance is to adopt policies
which respond to today's security problems ana which
have sufficient credibility to attract the support of
future generations of Europeans. [Ref. 2: p. 27]
Hassner pointed out that the starting point for any revalu-
ation of alliance policy should te a thorough understanding
of the "overriding issue of domestic priorities versus NATO
priorities." He continued to explain that this can only be
obtained through a detailed case-by-case analysis which can
differentiate among the various forces affecting the alli-
ance relationship. It is this type of analysis which forms
evidence of new realities which may have been covered up by
old generalizations. [Ref. 1: p. 389]
This thesis examines one of these cases, that of Greece.
This analysis may serve as a basis for further comparisons
and contrasts to form a set of raalistic assumptions upon
which policy formation or readjustment could be based.
Considerations brought out by this study could be applied in
other similar situations in other regions or states.
B. PURPOSES
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship
between Greek security policy and Greek politics as it has
developed since the critical events of 1974. There is no
doubt that security in this region has taken on increased
importance during this period. With the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the fall of Iran to the anti-U.S. Islamic
fundamentalists, the increasing strategic importance of the
Middle East and the greater presence of the Soviets in the
Eastern Mediterranean region demonstrated by the growing
strength and activity of the Soviet Mediterranean naval
squadron, security analysts have shown increasing concern
over the viability of security arrangements in the NATO
"southern flank." Added to this concern are the various
regional problems which complicate intra-alliance relation-
ships. Finally, specific developments within Greece,
starting from the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the withdrawal of the
10
Greek forces from the integrated military structure of NATO,
and the recent change of government with a heretofore
unknown shift to the left in Greek politics have all served
to place former Western and United States security interests
and arrangements in question. An example of this concern
was voiced by F. S. Larrabee, shortly after the Greek
national elections of 1981:
[The] election ... raises troubling doubts about
Greece's future, particularly its ties to the West. Is
Greece headed toward neutralism? Fhat impact will
Pa^andreou's election have en Greece's ties to NATO?
Will his victory give new impetus to the wave of paci-
fism and neutralism sweeping Western Europe? What
impact will Papandreou's election have on relations with
the United States and the future of U.S. bases in
Greece? [Eef. 3: p. 158]
These questions can only be adequately answered ty a
detailed examination of political events and policy evidence
during the period in question.
C. THE QUESTION AND STRUCTURE
The general question explored in this thesis is: Are the
elements of Greek security policy based on long-term basic
interests which find consistent expression, or are they a
function of domestic political factors, more ideologically
motivated, and therefore variable according to the governing
political party? The question, further distilled, asks
whether the specific Greek situation determines Greek policy
regardless of the ideological orientation of the party in
power or whether the ideology cf the party in power deter-
mines Greek policy. The answer to this question has impor-
tant implications for policy makers and for the future of
Greek relations with the West.
To answer this question and to further clarify the real-
ities of the Greek-West relationship (specifically with the
1 1
NATO and the U.S.) this study will be structured around
three segments of post-1974 political developments which
have had an important influence on Greek policy-making:
1. Policies under the prime ministership of
Konstantinos Karamanlis and the leadership of the
New Democracy party from 1974 to 1980, continued
under Prime Minister George Rallis from 1980 to
1981.
2. The evolution of policies during the development of
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASCK) opposi-
tion party from 1974 to 198 1, under the leadership
of Andreas Papandreou.
3. The policies which have been developed by the PASOK
government following the 1981 election under the
leadership of the present Prime Minister, Andreas
Papandreou.
For each of these segments, particular attention will be
placed on the nature of the political developments and their
relationship to specific Greek security interests. The focus
is on three important Greek security concerns: the Cyprus
problem; the issues involving primarily Greek-Turkish
disputes in the Aegean Sea region and their implications for
NATO military command and control arrangements in the area;
and issues concerning the O.S./NAIO military facilities in
Greece. These three issue areas along with other basic
Greek security concerns are examined as they impinge on
Greek-NATO integration and the guality and nature of
Greek-U.S. security relations. Finally, by analyzing and
comparing the findings from these three periods, certain




In limiting the time period for study, the year 1974 was
chosen for the beginning, because, as acknowledged by most
authors writing about recent developments in Greece, it
marks a critical juncture in almost every aspect of GreeK
development. The catalytic events of 1974— the abortive
summer coup engineered by the Greek military junta in asso-
ciation with the Greek Cypriot militia against the Makarios
regime in Cyprus and the ensuing Turkish invasion and occu-
pation of a portion of the island--has led to significant
change in most phases of Greek public life. A period of
readjustment and reexamination of both the internal issues
of Greece and the rcle of Greece in the West has followed.
The resulting changes in Greece's political system and its
foreign and security policies have been cause for both worry
and relief in the West. Extending the period to the present
covers the apparently dramatic political changes evident in
the rise of the left in Greece and the eventual socialist
victory of PASOK in the 1981 national elections.
The three issues chosen for particular
attention— Cyprus, the Aegean and U.S. bases—are important
in that they represent points of convergence between
specific Greek national security interests, overlapping and
often conflicting security interests of the regional actors
and the more strategic security interests of the United
States and NATO. Each of these issues involves NATO in a
specific way. They all affect the force structuring and
defense planning for the area, they affect the use of facil-
ities during NATO exercises and contingencies, they directly
affect command and control planning and structuring in the
area, and they affect the internal cohesion of the alliance
and the strength of its southern flank, since they represent
divisive issues between two NATO partners. These issues
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also have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the region.
The military support facilities located in Greece have been
put under reexamination and their former basis as well as
their very existence has been questioned. Regional
security, especially with relation to the adjoining Middle
East, has become an important interest in U. S. security
planning; and although it has been demonstrated adequately
in the past that the U.S. cannot expect a great deal of
support from the countries of the region for any U.S. oper-
ations outside of the NATO area, the continuation of a
Western orientation in the region is a significant contribu-
tion to the American interest cf increased stability in the
region. Also, because the U.S. is the major military equip-
ment supplier to the region, the continuation of
Greek-Turkish friction has increasingly complicated U.S.
attempts to strengthen both countries militarily. Finally,
the unsolved regional problems, in damaging relations among
the regional allies, seriously constrains U.S. regional
security considerations and arrangements.
E. SCOPE AND CAVEATS
For purely practical reasons and for reasons of clarity,
the scope of this study is limited to the examination of the
issues from the. Greek perspective; that is, the perspective
presented through reported views and statements of the
political figures representing the two parties which are to
be compared. Although the author has tried to refer mainly
to sources as close to the original as possible in
describing policies and developments during each of the
three major segments, it is freely acknowledged tnat
constraints of space and resource availability may have
caused certain simplifications of the extremely complex
issues involved.
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A further assumption of this study was that the two
major political parties studied represented, at various
times, the general consensus of the views of their constitu-
encies and therefore could be considered representative of
some major trends in post-1974 Greek politics. This assump-
tion, however, does not disregard the existence of other
political parties or even divergent views among voters who
supported the two parties under consideration here.
Evidence of this fact is that the number of actual party
members is considerably smaller than the number of votes
cast for a particular party.
Finally, in limiting this study to the various Greek
points of view, the fact that some of the issues surveyed
are disputed, requires one to acknowledge that there are
opposing viewpoints held by other regional actors. The
purpose of this study is to probe in detail the outstanding
Greek security issues and their relation to political devel-
opments in Greece as well as their role in forming partic-
ular Greek perceptions of security interests. It is not
intended to make a judgement as to the ultimate .validity of
specific Greek perceptions. It is the intention of the
author to present a limited case study which can be used for
further comparison and consideration when establishing
parameters for general policy formation. It is believed
that certain similarities can be found among the policies
of other NATO countries which could perhaps be generalized
to form a realistic view of the security situation within
the West. Through this more realistic viewpoint, it is
suggested that the challenge of strengthening the security
of all the Western allies might be approached more effec-
tively. The Congressional study quoted above indicated that
the basis of much of the intra-alliance friction is found in
the differing attitudes held by various allies with respect
to major security issues. This friction is compounded by
15
sometimes faulty perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic
as to the intent of the other. Thus it is of ultimate
importance that some basis of understanding be established
to supplant growing misapprehension about and misrepresenta-
tion of interests and intentions. This study serves as an
example of an alternate approach to policy formation which
grounds itself in the assumption that multiple interests
must be balanced to form a policy which will have optimum
benefit for all concerned. Thus, a detailed understanding
of these multiple interests is necessary at the outset, one
which should be based as much as possible on reality and
divorced from ideological over generalization.
16
II. BACKG5 0DND
Since the object of this thesis is to survey particular
Greek security concerns within the context of a changing
domestic political environment, some background is necessary
to place these concerns into perspective and show how they
relate to one another, to the internal interests of Greece,
to regional interests generated from outside the Greek
state, and to the political development of the country.
This background section is designed to briefly cover some of
the general and historical considerations which contribute
to Greek security policy. General Greek security considera-
tions are discussed first. Following this, a short back-
ground of the main security issues which are of primary
concern for this thesis is presented. The linkage between
the primary Greek interests and the broader regional western
security interests (particularly of the United States and
NATO) is briefly explored.
A. GREEK SECURITY: SOME GENEBAI CONSIDERATIONS
The broad term "security" has been subject to many uses
and misuses in the justification of a diverse range of
national policies. For purposes of this study, however, a
limited and clear definition is necessar y--one which will
apply specifically to the post-World War II Greek security
environment. Within this context, the term is used to apply
only tc those issues and considerations, policies, or atti-
tudes which concern the preservation of the Greek state from
perceived threat. Although this threat is generally consid-
ered to be external, an internal dimension is also recog-
nized for purposes of this thesis. The latter is included
17
since, especially for smaller countries, the internal
strength of the country and its institutions very often
influence the nature as well as the intensity of the
external threat. Thus security, simply defined for purposes
here, is the protection, by whatever means available, of
Greek national interests from perceived internal and
external threat. Of course, the treatment of this subject
in its broadest sense would reach far beyond the limits of
this thesis. Certain key issues have therefore been chosen
to be surveyed, within a limited time frame and from
specific political points of view, to present examples of
general security policy formaticn trends and influences.
1 • Defence and Sovereignty
In considering the general nature of Greek security,
an initial distinction must be made between two general
alternatives in pursuit of national interests; between an
offensive or a defensive policy. (Normally this distinction
is superfluous when discussing "security" policy, however,
in certain cases and especially when the policy exists in an
atmosphere of regional accusations and counter-accusations,
this distinction can become elemental.) It is the position
of this thesis that particularly in this post- World War II
period, Greek security policy has been limited to a strictly
defensive context. Certain events have conspired to make
this so, although historically this was not always the case.
In the early 1S00 f s Greek policy was based on two
major concerns: the protection of the Macedonian sections of
the country from encroachment and the irredentist policy of
reclaiming primarily Greek-inhabited territories in the
Anatolian region from Ottoman Turkish control. The latter
was referred to as the "Megali Idea" (great idea), and was
the source of several attempts, wnen conditions were
considered favorable, to secure areas within the
18
degenerating Ottoman Empire for Greece. with the end of
World War I, the issue of control in the area was brought to
the fore, mainly within the context of great power maneu-
vering for influence and protection of interests. It was in
this unsettled environment that Greece chose to pursue its
irredentist goals in Thrace and Asia Minor. This initially
attracted the interest of the Eritish and tha United States
in seeing friendly Greek influence in the Smyrna region as
an effective counterbalance to growing Italian influence in
the area. However, with the numerous changes taking place
in the region and with the signing of several treaties which
began to more clearly delineate interests and control in the
area, support for the Greek cause waned and the Greek
campaign, pursued in earnest in 1921, fell quite disas-
trously before Turkish nationalist forces in the fall of
1922. The ensuing 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which officially
ended the hostilities, can be seen as the turning point in
Greek security policy. At the most general level, and in
light of the new realities within the region, it signified
the effective Qnd of Greek irredentist aspirations. The
effects of this .treaty have important implications for the
development of security concepts and issues today.
Among the provisions of the treaty, the most far-
reaching was the massive compulsory ethnic population
transfer which was prescribed. Approximately 1.5 million
ethnic Greeks were evacuated to Greece from Asia Minor and
Eastern Thrace. Correspondingly, about .5 million Muslims
from Epirus, Macedonia and Crete went the opposite direc-
tion. The result of this transfer along with other treaty
arrangements effectively consolidated the modern Greek state
both territorially and demographically. l The outcome of this
*In the area of Greek Macedonia and Thrace, the consoli-
dation was aided by the voluntary exodus of the Slavs from
the region from 1920 to 1922, undertaken under the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) concerning the recip-
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transfer was a changed Greek security policy outlook from
that of pursuing redemption of territories for the Greek
homeland to the protection of a consolidated Greek state.
The treaty had provided a new definition of Greek sover-
eignty and protection of the newly defined status guo became
the primary security issue. Regional realities had been
redefined and the new realities became Greek security policy
bases.
This is not to say the the Lausanne Treaty had
resolved the persistently disputed • issues of Balkan security
once and for all. More realistically, it represented some
of the issues which are still relevant for regional
security. First, although an attempt was made through the
treaty to settle the issue of Greek claims in the region,
the fact that the irredentist policy had had such a priority
in Greek policy for so many years could not be easily
forgotten by other regional actors; nistorical sources for
security perceptions are not easily changed by diplomatic
arrangements. Additionally, certain provisions of the
treaty
.
became manifestations of future problems in the
region.
.
Some of the specific issues should be pointed out:
1. The Greek minorities of Istanbul and the islands of
Imvros and Tenedos as well as the Greek-Thracian
Turkish minority, were exempted from the exchange.
The treatment of these remaining minorities became a
persistent point of contention between Greece and
Turkey
.
2. The island of Cyprus was officially ceded to
Britain. This was to become the subject of Greek
concern over the rights of the Greek majority on the
island. It led to the gradually expanding Greek
rocal emigration of national minorities. Also, many of the
Greek emigres from Turkey settled in this region, which
further served to consolidate the Greek position in the
area
.
desire for union of the island with Greece (enosis)
,
the increasing involvement of Turkey in the issue
(to whom the British turned to attempt to partially
counterbalance Greek claims) , and the explosive
events of the 1950's which created serious interna-
tional tension and the eventual establishment of the
independent state of Cyprus in 19 60. This hurried
solution later proved ineffective in completely
resolving the conflicting desires of those involved.
3. The Dodecanese were ceded to Italy, with the excep-
tion of Rhodes. In later maneuvering over the
control of the islands especially within the context
of World War II, conflicting interests were again to
become influential in creating Greek-Turkish
friction.
The events of the early 1920's were to have some
further general outcomes which are important to this discus-
sion, first, the disastrous consequences of the military
losses, coupled with the strain and expense of the settle-
ment of one and one half millicn refugees in a country with
a total population of only abcut five million, severely
weakened the country in many respects, especially economi-
cally. However, the influx of the large number of unat-
tached people onto the urban areas greatly increased the
work force, which was to contribute to social and demo-
graphic changes contributing tc later economic and indus-
trial growth. This represented the beginning of the 20th
Century trend toward modernization accompanied by continuing
urban growth and depletion of the agricultural work force—
a
significant departure from the previous agrarian economy.
This general change in social and economic character brought
about new social demands and had significant political
impact. The period brought abcut an era of instability--
political, economic and social— which was to set a new
21
character for Greek public life. All these influences
contributed to the beginning of a transformation typical to
the largely agrarian and heavily dependent smaller states of
the time. This transformation was the beginning of a guest
for independence and maturity fcr the Greek, state, which was
to bring with it several decades of political polarity and
tension.
The events of the inter-war period, accompanied by
the devastating experience of the occupation during World
War II and the ensuing destruction of the Greek Civil War
(1944-1949), all served to ensure that Greece, for the near
future, was not to have the power to pursue an expansionist
or irredentist policy. The highest priority remained the
preservation of the status que and the attempt to codify
this through treaty arrangements and agreements which would
attract the support of at least one of the great powers,
lacking sufficient resources to accomplish this militarily,
it was necessary for Greece to turn to diplomatic means for
support. The result was that Greece had very little control
over its policy formation, and hecanue increasingly dependent
on its supporting powers, especially Britain before World
War II and after 19 47 the United States. A polarization
resulted within the country which still persists to a lesser
extent today--the polarization between those supporting
dependence on external powers and those desiring severance
of these relationships and a more independent course for
Greece. The need for external support was to frustrate the
modernization process, which was often subordinated to
outside interests.
Thus two important general aspects of the nature of
Greek security were well established. Greek security was to
be purely defensive and was to a large extent shown to be
dependent on external factors and external support.
22
2 - Threat Perception
Traditionally/ the Greeks have had to deal with two
major external threats to their security interests. The
first came from the North, from Balkan Slavic expansionism
later translated to Soviet expansionism through the Warsaw
Pact. The second threat is seen as coming from the East,
from perceived Turkish expansionism. Both of these threats
are grounded in long histories of give and take between
Greece and the countries of these two regions. 3oth involve
the basic security interest of preservation of the territo-
rial integrity of the Greek sovereign state. Both have also
involved, since the turn of the century, periods of both
cooperation and confrontation. The at times limited capa-
bilities of Greece to deal with these threats, especially
simultaneously, with military power has led to continuing
efforts toward diplomatic solutions. The periodic Balkan
cooperation initiatives are representative of this as are
the Venizelos-Ataturk accords of 1930 with Turkey. Although
the two threats are mutually exclusive, they have tended to
have an indirect effect on one another. Thus, when the
Eastern Threat looms large, Greece has seen fit to increase
contact with the Balkan countries. Conversely, when the
threat from the North seems more serious (as it did at the
end of the second World War), Greek-Turkish confrontation
seems to diminish. Neither of these external threats has
had a consistent weight in forming Greek security percep-
tions. Instead, they seem to vary in intensity largely due
to factors beyond the control of the Greeks.
The evolution of external threat perception has been
seen guite vividly since the end of tforld War II. It was
the threat from the North which was connected to the Greek
communist uprising and the Civil War, and it was the further
fear of Soviet expansionism which brought Greece and Turkey
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into NATO on the same day in 1952. However, with growing
prosperity and the security provided by the western associa-
tion, perceptions of a threat from the North began to
subside. The continued resistance to Soviet domination by
Yugoslavia contributed to increasingly better Greek-Yugoslav
relations. With limitations of Soviet influence in the
other Balkan countries of Albania and Rumania the northern
threat was further reduced. Finally, with the East-Pest
thaw and detente, the Greek perception of the northern
threat followed a pattern similar to many of the European
states and continued to diminish. Increasing diplomatic,
economic and cultural contacts with the northern neighbors
under the umbrella of Western alliance protection have
helped neutralize some of the outstanding issues between the
countries and have caused the perceived threat from the
north to largely subside, although relations with eastern
bloc countries and with the Soviet Union remain cautious.
Conversely, no longer united by an overriding
Soviet threat and both pursuing their own form of
"Ostpolitik" with the Soviet Onion to enhance their posi-
tions, the relations between Greece and Turkey have become
more conflictual, the threat frcm the East looming larger in
Greek security considerations. The Greek interpretation of
Turkish action in Cyprus and the Aegean, of Turkish demo-
graphic trends, and of Turkish relations with the United
States, NATO and even the Soviet Union led to increased
worry about the protection of Greek interests. The Greeks
have generally taken an increasingly pessimistic view of
Turkish intentions, a pessimism which has been increased by
a growing lack of confidence in the protective capabilities
of its Western allies. Within this environment the threat
from the East has received increasing priority recently.
Finally, another fundamental threat should be added
to the two external threats mentioned above (which is not
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normally included by most authors as such)
.
It is the
internal threat--the threat of internal political upheaval,
destabilization or collapse. This threat is manifested in
the history of Greek instability, external penetration,
internal polarization and schism, frequent military inter-
vention and civil war. Indeed, some recent authors, taking
a quite different view from that surrounding the Truman
Doctrine interpretation of the Greek Civil War, have seen
that destructive struggle as an internal matter. According
to this interpretation, it was an expression of the radical-
ization of politics resulting from years of foreign influ-
ence in Greek affairs which supported the clienteiistic
right wing political establish nent and effectively elimi-
nated the political center. The results of internal insta-
bility, no matter what the cause, inevitably lead to
security weakness and vulnerability and the detrimental
difficulty in pursuing Greek interests. The 1967-74 junta
government has become a vivid symbol ox the threat from
internal instability and has become an important considera-
tion in rec.ent policy formation. Political weakness has led
to external, penetration and the subordination of Greek
interests to those of external forces. Through a strong
stable, government Greek interests can be protected and
pursued and the "damaging influence" of external interven-
tion can be prevented. This is another security considera-
tion which has firm support in the Greek historical
experience.
3 . Security A r r angemen t
s
Achieving adequate security in light of Greece's
unique circumstances has historically been a fundamental
problem for Greece. Regardless of the nature of Greek
security policy, due to circumstances, resources and other
limiting factors, Greece has neither been able to provide
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for its own security completely independently nor has it
been able to secure its interests completely militarily.
Therefore, a consistent characteristic of Greek security has
been its reliance on political arrangements to secure
external support. It has been necessary for Greece to rely
on a "great power" benefactor for this support.
Consequently, Greece security policy and foreign policy has
been constrained by the necessity of securing this support.
This dependence is complicated by three factors:
1. At times the "great powers" have simply intervened
to pursue their own interests irrespective of Greek
desires.
2. At times, support from an external power has been
solicited by a particular faction in Greece to
further its own political power.
3. At times the supporting power has had to balance
Greek interests with conflicting interests of other
allies.
Support has generally come from the "West" (Great
Britain, France and most recently the United States). This
too .is not so much a matter of choice for Greece but a func-
tion of the nature of the global power structure and its
influence on the area. The support has generally led to
external involvement in influencing the course of Greek
politics. It has been noted that the primary purpose for
the arming of Greece and the initial force posturing after
the accession of Greece to NATO was to deal with the
internal threat, to ensure proper, Western- oriented
internal political arrangements. Greek domestic support for
external intervention has generally been identified with the
political right, the royalists and the military.
A particular difficulty for Greece has arisen in the
attempt to rationalize its dependency with national inter-
ests. Dependency has had some adverse effects. It has been
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seen as reinforcing the political patronage system, as
spreading to economic dependency and exploitation, polariza-
tion of society, and general loss of control over Greek
affairs. The enthusiasm with which the foreign powers have
taken on their responsibilities has not only reinforced
Greek dependency and raised Greek expectations, but has put
these powers in a position to receive some blame for the
ills which may befall Greece. The positive effects of this
external support are critical, however. It has provided for
the basic survival of the Greek state (although some would
argue that Turkish domination was exchanged for domination
from other powers)
.
The reality of partial Greek dependency on foreign
powers for its security has created a fundamental dilemma:
it has been in the interest of Greece to seek external
support for security, but the support has not necessarily
been rendered in deference to Greek interests. While the
support has contributed to the basic survival of Greece
particularly during times when due to many factors Greece
was weakened and therefore vulnerable, it has been seen by a
broad section of public opinioc as an inhibiting influence
on general Greek progress, modernization and independence.
Wrestling with this dilemma has become a permanent feature
of Greek security policy format ion--the problem has been to
strike a balance between Greek desires and internal and
external realities.
Geopolitical reality has to a large extent deter-
mined the character of Greek security arrangements. The
orientation and security of Greece have been seen as periph-
eral or supporting interests within the larger complex of
regional strategic interests of the great powers. Greece
has therefore often been seen as providing either an element
of counterbalance or continuity for the powers controlling
the region. This has further been mainly associated with
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the control of influence in the Mediterranean, the Balkans
or the Middle East, often all simultaneously. The decisive
element of influence for Greece has been the role of
Mediterranean naval power, predominated for many years by
the British and later taken over by the United States. For
these powers the maintenance of a favorable alignment of
Greece, among other things, might strategically be seen as a
counterbalancing of land-power extension into the region and
prevention of the establishment of regional power bases by
an opposing force which could threaten regional influence
and the strategic situation. For Greece, the predominance
of a single-power or alliance in the region has in some ways
limited the options for Greek security arrangements and
given them a single-source nature. This in turn could lead
to greater dependence and vulnerability for the Greek state.
Finally, internal political affairs have been
affected by this external ingredient of Greek security
policy. The large interest in foreign affairs issues has
become an assumption of Greek politics for generations.
Additionally, political parties have in the past been iden-
tified with the nature of their external relations and
support from certain foreign
.
elements. Many political
battles have been fought over the issue of foreign affairs
—
that is, support and alignment—causing at times deep polit-
ical splits within the country. Most notably, the "Great
Schism" was to a large extent a result of a division of
opinion as to which side of the European power split the
country would align with during the period around the First
World War. The Greek civil war of the 19U0's can also be
seen to a large extent revolving around this question. And
finally, the alignment policies during the 1967-1974 junta
have had serious political and foreign policy implications
for the present external relations of Greece. Thus, to a
large extent, Greek politics and external relations have
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been closely interconnected, generally centering on basic
security issues. This has had not only a significant effect
on internal Greek development but has been an important
determinant of foreign relations with Greece, important for
purposes here. It is also indicative of a situation present
in most developing countries which intersect strategic
interests of great powers, for which Greece, in addition to
having seme unique problems, may serve as a generalized
example.
B. SECUEITY ISSUES
Within the framework of these general security consider-
ations, specific issues have teen chosen as focal points:
Cyprus; the Aegean disputes, particularly as they relate to
NATO military control in the area; and the United
States/NATO facilities in Greece. These issues represent the
intersection of a number of the general characteristics of
Greek security. They all have to do rfith the protection of
some aspect of Greek sovereignty from a perceived threat.
They all intersect with the security of other nations who
pursue their own interests in the region, and they all have
had a significant domestic political importance in Greece.
Specifically, during the time period under consideration,
from 1974 to 1984, they have involved both Greek interests
of alignment and support, independence and modernization as
well as security. Additionally, they affect the Western
alliance (and particularly the United States) interests in
the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the security of
the Southern Flank of NATO and the protection of the
regional status quo from alteration, especially by the
Warsaw Pact. These connections and their background will be
discussed in this section.
Greek security also cannot be discussed without consid-
eration of the "northern threat." This is also of some
importance here as it represents the fundamental rationale
for th€ Greek association with NATO, and has been one of the
primary regional concerns of the United States. Therefore,
this issue has also been briefly discussed in this thesis as
it interrelates with Greek/Western security concerns in
general.
1 . Balkan Security Issues
Owing to the destruction of the Second World War and
ensuing instability, the nature of Balkan security was dras-
tically altered. 2 The Balkans hecame a region split by the
cold war division established on the northern border of
Greece and further divided by the efforts of communist
factions maneuvering for power under increased pressure from
the Soviet Union. It was a combination of the post-war
Stalinist assertiveness and the vacuum of power in Greece
threatened by the British retreat from regional influence
which brought on the active intervention in the chaotic
post-war Greek situation by the United States, and it was
the perceived threat of Soviet regional expansion which
brought Greece and Turkey into NATO. This polarization of
the Balkan region was to provide only temporary stability to
the area and a brief hiatus in the normal character of
Balkan relations. However, it created new requirements and
constraints in these relations. F. S. Larrabee summed up
the direction of Balkan politics and security as follows:
2 See F. Stephen larrabee. Balkan Security., (Adelphi
Papers No. 135), International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1977, and Veremis, ThaDOS, Greek Security : Issues
and Politics, (Adelphi Papers No. T75) , Internationalinstitute For Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 6-9, for gooddiscussions on Greek-Balkan issues.
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he polarization of the Balkans produced a certain
t afcij.it y in the area, however artificial. For a while
any of the region's traditional tensions were subordi-
T
St.
m x n g:
nated to the strictures of 'tight bipolarity' and bloc
politics. With the onset of detente- however, many of
the old patterns of Balkan politics have begun to reas-
sert themselves, and the region has once again become
the object of international attention. [Hef 2; p. 2]
Several factors have contributed to the increase of
interest in the region. Major powers have been motivated
primarily by the strategic proximity of the Balkans to the
Middle East and the usefulness of the area for supply and
support in any future Middle East contingencies.
Furthermore, recent complication of Balkan-Soviet relations
fcrought on by the Chinese Communist interest in the area,
the death of Tito and the guestion of the future of
Yugoslavia, and the further assertiveness of other states,
particularly Rumania and Albania, have brought in guestion
the nature of future Soviet intentions in the region.
Finally, the growing reassertion of Balkan nationalism,
never fully suppressed by bloc politics and the relaxation
of tension between the superpowers has fostered a revival of
regional associations and conflicts. These factors combined
with recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland have
increased Western concerns. In addition, the loss of Iran
as an ally has made the United States more aware of the
importance of especially Greece and Turkey to its security
interests in the area. Thus, the issue of collective
security in the region still has significant meaning to the
West.
For Greece, on the other hand, a number of concerns
have become important. First, historically, the Balkan
countries have periodically sought cooperation both bilater-
ally and multilaterally to secure common interests from
external intervention. This has been reflected in the
attempts at 3alkan union over the years, at times sponsored
by outside powers and at times generated internally.
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Secondly, disputes between Greece and her neighbors
have complicated attempts at cooperation. For example, the
question of Macedonia (control cr independence) has been a
perpetual issue between Greece, Yugoslavia and Eulgaria.
Greece's interest since the Second World War has generally
been the preservation of the status quo. 3 Relations with
Albania are another example of local complications to Balkan
relations, revolving around the disputed area of Northern
Epirus and the status of the Greek minority (estimated
anywhere from 40 to 80,000). [Eef. 1: pp. 43-44] Within the
context of Western alignment of Greece and the Soviet influ-
ence interest in other Balkan countries, open conflict or
excessive demands have teen avoided. Instead, relations
between Greece and its northern neighbors have been prog-
ressing step by step on the bilateral level and the
outstanding problems have been taken up within this
framework.
Thirdly, although the facts of the various issues
which separate the Northern Greek security concerns from the
Eastern ones seem to be guite distinct, the realities of
Greek security indicate intricate links between Balkan
issues and other security concerns. Thus, the relaxed
atmosphere in the North makes jossible a greater concentra-
tion on the Eastern issues. It also affects the strength of
the ties between Greece and the Atlantic Alliance, since
the Soviet threat for Greece is articulated through the
Balkan region. Any improvement in Greek-Balkan relations
reduces the perceived necessity for a strong NATO tie. The
relaxation of tensions in this region also has led to
3 This issue has at times been a liabilitv for the
Communist Party in Greece and a reason for its lack of popu-
larity, since it has in the past taken the position that an
independent Macedonia should be created. This was in the
interest of Moscow but would have meant loss of territory




greater desire for independence in both Turkey and Greece
and has created an atmosphere in which the overriding neces-
sity fcr cooperation has been reduced and the importance of
individual issues has expanded. Conversely, the search for
support and security in the face of other, perceived more
pressing issues, has led to increased attempts at
Greek-Balkan cooperation. This has been especially true
since shortly after the end of World War II, where both
sides have sought the support of the other in various
contexts in order to pursue other interests.
Finally, Greek-Balkan relations cannot be separated
from the changing international situation and are limited by
the realities of Greece's position within it. Thus the
interests of collective security still temper relations
between Greece and the Balkan states. They have limited the
possibilities for cooperation from both siies, neither
superpower being willing to allow the Balkan region to
pursue its own collective course independently. However,
within a limited latitude, the bipolar arrangement has
allowed the countries to exert a certain amount of indepen-
dence from their superpower mentors which is reinforced
through bilateral support. Thus the independence of
Yugoslavia has been partially linked to the presence of
strong Western influence in Greece. This has become repre-
sentative of Western resolve to counter stronger Soviet
presence in the area. This is also true for Rumania, to a
lesser degree. Similarly, the recent Greek reassessment of
its NATO and U.S. relations would be to a large degree
unthinkable without a corresponding improvement in
Greek-Balkan relations reducing the northern threat.
Ultimately, however, increased Greek diplomatic
efforts to ease tensions in the area have been contingent on
external forces. It has been in the interest of the super-
powers to allow them to progress. However, it has been also
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their prerogative to limit them when necessary as seen in
the early post-war period where Western interests prevented
extensive contact between Greece and the Balkans while fear
of any Balkan cooperative arrangements have caused the
Soviets, mainly through their Eulgarian contacts, to limit
these efforts. In this same vein, it is interesting to note
that Greco-Yugoslav relations have been greatly affected by
Soviet policies. Where the Soviets have been more
demanding, Yugoslav relations with Greece have improved.
And when Greek- Western relations have degenerated, Greek
contacts and diplomatic efforts with the Balkan countries
have increased.
In summary, although Greek Northern security issues
may be separated from others in content, they cannot be
totally divorced frcm general considerations of Greek
security, since they impact not only the Greek security
relationship with the West but are important co-determinants
of Greek Eastern and even domestic security policy.
2 . Cyprus
a. General Background
The overriding interest of Greece in Cyprus is
rooted in the ethnic, cultural and religious ties between
the Greek-Cypriot majority (estimated to be about 80%. of the
approximately 640,000 population) and the Greek mainland. 4
However, in the late 19th Century, British strategic
Mediterranean interests overrode those of Greece, and Cyprus
was occupied by the British (1878) and later became a
British colony (1925). Even though Greek irredentist poli-
cies of the early 1900 's would have logically advocated
*Kourvetaris [Hef. 7] in a 1978 article surveys six
other. essays dealing with the interpretation of the Cyprus
conflict and gives an excellent 7-page bibliography on the
subject. * y J t i
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annexation of Cyprus to Greece, British interests and the
degree of Greek dependence on Britain kept this from
happening. The situation had changed by 1950 and the cause
of enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) gained ever
increasing support within the Greek-Cypriot community and in
Greece. A plebiscite in the Greek-Cypriot community in that
year returned 96% of the votes in favor of enosis with
Greece [Ref. 3: p. 10] In support of its side and to count-
erbalance Greek influence in the increasingly violent anti-
colonial struggle being waged in Cyprus, Britain enlisted
the support of Turkey, which up until this time had not
taken a very active interest in the Cyprus situation. It
was during this period that Turkey assumed responsibility
for the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriots and the Cyprus issue
became increasingly one of Greek-Turkish confrontation.
Pressed by severely deteriorating problems in
regional and U.S. /British relations growing out of the
enosis policy, Greece was forced to amend its goals and seek
a guick solution. In 1959 Greek Prime Minister Karamaniis
and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes drafted an agreement
(known later as the London-Zurich Agreements) which was
presented to and approved by leaders of the two Cypriot
communities and Britain. The arrangements allowed for
sovereign British military bases within an newly created
independent republic of Cyprus (formally declared on August
16, 1960) which was to be run under a delicately apportioned
mixture of Greek- and Turkish-C jpriot control. A treaty of
guarantee was included among the agreements. Britain,
Greece, and Turkey undertook to recognize and maintain the
independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus.
Each of these countries was empowered to act either singly
or collectively to maintain the independent integral status
of Cyprus. Enosis and partition of the island were offi-
cially proscribed. [ Bef . 4: p. 13]
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The government had ruiit-in elements which were
soon to bring it to a stalemate when trying to produce
legislation to run the country. Growing assertiveness and
sensitivity of the Turkish minority and its mainland spon-
sors as well as the feeling within portions of the Greek
community that Turkish influence in the control of the
government was disproportionate to the size of the
Turkish-Cypriot minority increased intercommunal friction.
The following were to become important ingredi-
ents of the issue from the onset and persistent sources of
later Cyprus problems:
1. A truly independent state was not really estab-
lished; the new republic was still formally under
the watchful influence of the three external
guarantor powers. Theoretically/ therefore,
external Turkish and Greek interests in Cyprus were
legitimized by the 1959 agreements.
2. The agreement was essentially imposed from without
and was based not solely on internal Cypriot
interest. This increased mutual suspicions as to
the intentions of the two most involved external
powers— Greece and Turkey—which spread to large
segments of the two communities on the island and
were reinforced by the continuing presence of both
Turkish and Greek political and military influence
in Cyprus.
3. lingering among the Greek and Greek-Cypriot communi-
ties was the belief that the partitionist aims of
the Turks had not really been suppressed. The
growing militancy of Turkey over Cyprus issues,
which probably stemmed largely from Turkish domestic
political considerations, combined with Turkish
actions against the Greek communities in Turkey,
especially in Istanbul [ Ref . 3: p. 10], and
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reinforced this perception of Turkish anti-Hellenist
tendencies.
4. The Turks and the Tur kish-Cypriots, on the other
hand, still suspected that the Greeks and the
Greek-Cypriots had not totally given up their
desires for enosis. The Turkish community therefore
tended to interpret attempts by President Makarios
(the acknowledged political and spiritual leader of
the Greek community vho had during the 1950's
expressed enosis desires) to amend the unworkable
governmental arrangements as a desire to limit the
influence of the Turkish community. Further Greek
actions during the 1960's only confirmed tneir
suspicions.
These characteristics of the newly formed Cyprus
state, which had apparently failed to provide for a workable
form of intercommunal cooperation and had failed to rid the
Republic of the confounding influence of external forces,
led rapidly to governmental deadlock and increasing crisis
during the 1960's. In 1963 Makarios proposed thirteen
amendments to the constitution which would have broken the
deadlock but also diminished Turkish governmental influence.
This was rejected by the Turks and fighting between the two
communities broke out. The situation was finally settled in
1964. The threat of Turkish invasion and Greco-Turkish
conflict was averted through strong U.S. diplomatic pressure
on the Turkish government and the insertion of a United
Nations peacekeeping force. 5
However, the issue was not settled permanently
and further violence erupted in 1967. In this year, General
Grivas, leader of the pro-enosis, anti-communist guerilla
5 0n the progressive role played by the UN force in
Cyprus see Ref.b which also contains good bibliographical
material on opposing viewpoints surrounding the Cyprus
issue.
37
forces of the EOKA movement during the anti-British efforts
of 1955 to 1959, had maneuvered himself into the position of
Commander of the Greek-Cy priot ailitia forces. Between 1964
and 1967 r Grivas had managed to secretly mass a force of
perhaps as many as 10,000 Greek officers and NCO's on the
island to support his pro- enosis movement. [Ref. 5: p. 48]
New attacks on Turkish-Cypriot villages renewed the crisis
and the threat of Turkish invasion. Again, forceful
American and NATO diplomacy deterred Turkish intervention
and led to the removal of the excessive Greek forces from
the island. [Ref 3: p. 11] Intercommunal negotiations were
initiated in 1968 but were undermined by continuing internal
frictions, the destabilizing influence of Grivas (who
secretly returned to the island in 1971) and his newly
founded EOKA-B, and continuing external involvement, partic-
ularly by the 1967-74 Greek junta government.
It was the legacy of fifteen years of
Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus based on mutual suspi-
cions, raisperceived intentions, historical antagonisms, and
failures of intercommunal cooperation spawned in a large
degree by outside pressure which finally led to the disas-
trous events of 1974. 6 Misreading U.S. interests in the
area and hoping to rescue his faltering government, junta
strong-man Ioannides supported a Greek-Cypriot coup against
Makarios on 15 July 1974. In Ankara, this was perceived as
a step toward a Greek solution to the Cyprus issue which
would effectively lead to enosis. Five days later, after
attempts to enlist the support of Britain to intervene,
acting ostensibly as guarantor of the Cypriot Republic and
6 For a provocative treatment of U.S. involvement in
Greece and the Cyprus affair from 1967-74 see Stern, 1.
,
"Bitter lessons: How we Failed in Cyprus,'' Foreign Poli cy ,
v. 19, pp. 34-78, Summer 1975: and his laf/er book on fhe
same subject, The Wrong Horse, Times Books, 1977. For a
study of the Greek role in "Ehe 1974 Cyprus events, see 3ell,
J.B., "Violence at a Distance: Greece and the Cyprus
Crisis," Crbis, v. 18, pp. 791-808, December 1980.
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as protector of Turkish-Cyprict minority interests, and
seeing a military opportunity to force a solution more
amenable to Turkish interests, Turkish forces landed on the
island. Unsupported and unable to mount a credible military
response, the Greek irilitary government collapsed, and after
mounting a relatively tenacious resistance, the
Greek-Cypriot forces were subdued. Having the upper hand,
Turkey increased its demands for its Turkish-Cypriot commu-
nity. After peace talks collapsed, there arrived a second
wave of Turkish forces (14 August) on the island which
proceeded to consolidate and strengthen its military posi-
tion on the island. The result is the situation which still
exists tcday— Turkish occupation of approximately 36% of the
island maintained by approximately 20,000 Turkish troops
(reduced from the original 40,000 strong invasion force).
The events of 1974 have had tragic results for
Cyprus. Cyprus remains a divided state with little interc-
ourse between the communities. 7 The economy of the island
was devastated, and has only partially recovered in the
Greek zone while the Turkish zcne, although having most of
the valuable commercial assets cf the island, has not really
recovered and continues to rely on large amounts of Turkish
aid for its survival. The plight of the approximately
180,000 Greek-Cypriot and about 30,000 Turkish-Cypriot refu-
gees who lost everything during their flight from their
respective zones has not yet been solved. Continuing
attempts at bilateral negotiation under United Nations aegis
have not produced meaningful headway. The repeated calls
for a solution by the UN have been ineffective. And the
continuing problem has initiated a serious period of
7 The "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" was proclaimed
on 13 February 1975 but has never been recognized except by
Turkey. The" Republic of Cyprus continues to exist on the
Greek 2/3 of the island and is still the officially recog-
nized government and member of the UN.
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Greek-Turkish tension which has spread to other regional
issues.
b. Greece and the Cyprus Issue
Some commentators have seen the Gr eek"enosist"
policies which have contributed to the past problems and
present situation in Cyprus as the last vestige of Greek
irredentism. As Veremis has pointed out, the struggle which
arose out of a "mixture of traditional irredentism with
contemporary anti-colonialism," has, through the course of
events, "gradually developed into a confrontation between
Greek and Turk." [Ref.3: p. 10-11] This has moved it into
the realm of one of the primary Greek security concerns— the
threat from the East. The realities of the present regional
context stripped the concept cf enosis of any practical
meaning for Greek policy or politics today. Instead, Cyprus
has taken on a more generalized security importance for the
region and for Greece.
Larrabee has titled the Cyprus issue catalytic.
He states that:
..-.in terms of security in the Eastern Mediterranean,
the [Cyprus] situation produced three important results:
it led' to sharp deterioration of relations between
Greece and Turkey* it intensified differences between
both countries and the United States and gave them a
strong emotional edge; and it contributed to a polariza-
tion of domestic politics and an increase in domestic
instability. [Ref. 2: p. 17]
For Greece, having apparently not seriously considered a
military option since 1974 and having repeatedly called for
support of a UN solution and the restoration of the indepen-
dent and unified republic, Cyprus has taken on a more
symbolic security significance.
Primarily, the Cyprus situation represents a
Greek perception of Turkish military and expansionist
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designs in the region. It could be perceived by some as an
example of Turkish disregard for the norms of international
behavior in thwarting both the provisions of the
London-Zurich agreements and the repeated UN General
Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Although Greece
does not claim any sovereign territorial interests in
Cyprus, the invasion and occupation of the island can be
seen as a threat to established international order and
Greece's legal position as well as an infringement of the
ethnic and cultural sovereignty and rights of the greater
Hellenic state. This view might easily be translated into
apprehension over the future cf Sreek insular territories
off the Anatolian coast, which came under Greek control as a
result of international agreements but are equally vulner-
able due to their proximity to Turkey.
On a second level, the Cyprus conflict necessi-
tates, for the Greeks, a reappraisal of former security
arrangements. The inability cf Greece's security partners,
in particular NATO and the United States, to forestall the
use by another ally of military power for other than NATO
purposes and against Greek interests, could, in some minds,
call into question the real ability or desire of Greece's
allies to protect Greek interests. 8 NATO in general is
implicated by some observers for several reasons. Primary
is the fact that Turkey is a NATO ally and used "NATO equip-
ment" for the Cyprus operation. Secondly, NATO failed to
put sufficient pressure on Turkey or take sufficient sanc-
tions to curb Turkish actions and resolve the situation--
actions which NATO has considered in the case of aggressive
moves by the Soviets. Further, NATO is often seen as an
8 This position tends to overlook the successful efforts
of the U.S. during the 60 ' s Id preventing similar actions,
to the detriment of U.S. relations in the area. It also does
not recognize the "no-win" nature of the situation for the
U.S. during periods of Greek- Turkish friction.
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extension of the United States in the region, which, to
some, had failed to exercise its power and influence in
deference to Turkish wishes.
U.S. -Greek security arrangements have come into
question also. The inability cf the American government to
prevent Turkish invasion as it had in 1964 and 1967 was
interpreted by some as a conscious U.S. policy shift toward
Turkey and against Greece. The perception was that the U.S.
could have done more, as it had in decisively responding to
other Middle East crises, to prevent the Cyprus situation.
These views, of course, fail to take into consideration the
many pressures and serious concerns and limitations facing
the United States during that particular time.
Finally, the Cyprus situation and Greek policy
has extremely serious domestic political implication. Out
of the events of 1974 and having established the Cyprus
issue as a symbolic rallying point used for political
consolidation, continuing political propaganda Las virtually
locked Greek security policy to the Cyprus issue. Any move-
ment on this issue would not only be politically very
dangerous for the survival of the party effecting such a
change but would risk disruption of Greek political
stability. Furthermore, it could, in the Greek view, send a
signal to Ankara which could touch off more serious threats
to Greek sovereign interests.
It must be pointed cut that there are alternate
interpretations of the meaning cf the 1974 Cyprus crisis and
the events leading up to it. These often opposing view-
points are no less real to their holders nor are they any
less grounded in reality as it is selectively seen. Indeed,
it is precisely these varying interpretations of facts,
circumstances and intentions that have contributed to the
difficulty in finding a solution. As time passes without a
solution to the Cyprus guestion / the longevity of the
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varying positions alone makes them more pervasive within
each country. Also, since both Athens and Ankara have made
considerable domestic political investment in their side of
the issue, neither side is politically able to freely change
their policy without serious internal political
conseguences.
c. NATO, the U.S. and the Cyprus Issue
The immediate and cbvious effect of the recent
Cyprus crises culminating in the Turkish operations of 1974
has been the complication of NATO security arrangements in
the area. Cyprus, as the most visible representation of
Greek-Turkish disputes, has- had serious consequences for
NATO regional security interests. While open conflict
between the two allies (a very real possibility over the
Cyprus situation in the 1960*s) and its devastating effects
for the region has for the present been avoided, complete
cooperation with and solidarity of NATO regional security
arrangements cannot be anticipated witnout a full and equi-
table solution. It is therefore in NATO's interest to aid in
seeking a resolution.
While NATO, by its very nature, is not equipped
to deal with such issues as Cyprus, the problem has directly
affected alliance strength, at least during peacetime. The
1974 crisis resulted in a rift in Greek-NATO military ties
which has yet to be fully repaired. It also has weakened
Turkish military capabilities through the U.S. Congress's
Turkish arms embargo which is only slowly being remedied.
The dispute has caused both countries to turn their atten-
tion from the common NATO threat and to direct a portion of
their security and defense efforts toward one another.
Perceptions within both countries have severely eroded
public support for NATO. This nas led them to look else-
where for support, primarily in new contacts with the
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Eastern bloc. Also, the conflict and its consequences have
placed the future of NATO/U.S. facilities in both countries
in question. The final result has been a general weakening
of NATO strength and credibility in the area, according to
many observers.
As the major alliance representative in the
region and having strategic interests of its own, the U.S.
position has been most severely affected by the Cyprus situ-
ation. U.S. interests have supported the continuing
viability and strength of a unified (if non-aligned) Cyprus.
The continuing partition of the island works against this
interest not only by placing it in the difficult, often
untenable position of being the primary defensive ally to
both major adversaries, but by the resultant increasing
strength of the far left, more pro-Moscow political elements
in Cyprus. While as yet no permanent damage has been done
and Cyprus remains favorably disposed to the West, the
continuing shift in Cypriot politics could lead to a disad-
vantageous position for the West in the future.
The most serious legacy of the last two decadej5
of Cyprus conflict has been the continued deterioration of
U. S. -Greek-Turkish relations. From the U.S. interventions
in 1964 and 1967 and the arms embargo of 1975-78,
U.S. -Turkish relations have been damaged. The events have
been perceived by many Turks as a J.S. "tilt" toward Greece
and lack of support for Turkish interests. This has
possibly contributed to Turkish militancy in the situation.
On the other hand, while the U.S. was able to restrain
Turkey in Cyprus during the crises of the 1960 's, the
inability of in Washington to do so in 1974 combined with
the continued Presidential and State Department efforts
against the Turkish arms embargo, the lifting of the embargo
without a Cyprus settlement, and the massive predominantly
military aid proposed for Turkey, have been perceived in
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Greece as a U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey. This has been looked
on by seme in Greece as de facte acceptance of the situation
in Cyprus and approval of Turkish claims. O.S. military aid
to Turkey without the additioc of appropriate concessions
from the Turks is seen by some Greeks as a U.S. contribution
to the primary security threat perceived by many. The
persistence of the Cyprus problem can therefore be looked on
as a possible source of deterioration of the U.S. strategic
position in the region, a position becoming more critical
with the increasing tension in the adjoining Middle East.
C. AEGEAH ISSUES
1 . General
While the Cyprus issue has been important as a
representative of Greek-Turkish friction and was an impor-
tant catalyst in the worsening relations between the two
countries, Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean have become
potentially more serious. Although the control of the
Aegean Sea region, its islands and its adjoining land masses
has been disputed since ancient times, new elements begin-
ning in 1973 have refueled the old controversies and have
added some new ones. These include the issues of the
control of "continental shelf" regions, territorial waters,
Airspace control, the regional balance of military power and
the command and control of NATO forces in the area.
Andrew Wilson [Ref. 8] has produced a very detailed
and comprehensive study of the Greek-Turkish issues
revolving around the Aegean which includes background infor-
mation and an appraisal of the Greek and Turkish views on
the various issues. This work need not be repeated here.
Instead, a general survey of the points to be covered in the
following chapters is in order along with a general
appraisal of the issues from the standpoint of general Greek
security considerations.
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The primary security issue for Greece in the region
has become the protection of the status quo of the territo-
rial arrangements which , since World War II, have progres-
sively defined what Greece has come to regard as sovereign
Greek territory. Particularly vulnerable are the numerous
Greek islands near the coast of Turkey whose formal posses-
sion has been ceded to Greece through the Treaty of
Lausanne, signed in 1923, which not only set the northern
and Thracian Greek borders but also (as recognized by Turkey
as co-signator) gave Greece possession of the islands of
Limnos, Lesbos, Chios Samos and Icaria. In return, Greece
gave up claims to territory in Anatolia. The final arrange-
ment was further strengthened by the massive transfer of
minority populations to create a relative ethnic homoge-
neity. The Dodecanese islands, under Italian control since
1912 were ceded to Greece by the 1947 Treaty of Paris, in
recognition for Greece's sacrifices for the allied cause in
the Second World War. (Turkey had remained neutral and did
not have a place in the settlements of former Italian
possessions.) [Eef.8: pp. 2-3] Concern for the security of
the eastern insular frontier is intensified in the Greek
view by several facts:
1. The Greeks realize that the islands vere not always
under Greek control. In fact for nearly the first
100 years of the existence of the modern Greek state
(until the 1910 f s and 20* s) they came under Ottoman
Turkish control. Thus, should any of the later
agreements be questioned, Turkey could possibly
assert historical claims in the region.
2. Quantitatively, at least, Greece is at a demographic
and military disadvantage in the region. A
burgeoning Turkish population as well as the Turkish
military flexibility created by East-West detente
has increased the perceived vulnerability of the
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islands to a theoretical scenario of Turkish expan-
sion to the West.
The overriding concern for Greek security is there-
fore the deterrence of any future actions by Turkey to alter
the status quo. Any change in the territorial arrangements
of the Aegean would throw into question the whole Greek
eastern frontier. Thus while Greece itself cannot legiti-
mately attempt to alter these agreements by asserting any
further claims (which would also negate treaty arrange-
ments) , it cannot afford to be at all flexible as to what it
considers sovereign territory. Since about 30% of the Greek
population lives on the islands or border regions of the
Aegean (as opposed to 12.5% of the Turkish population on the
Turkish coast) [Ref. 0: p. 3 ], control of the region is
tantamount to control of the economic, military and communi-
cation links which unite Greek territory. Anj degradation
of this control can be seen by Greece as a threat to Greek
territorial integrity. Thus, from a security standpoint the
entire region is extremely sensitive to the Greeks.
2 . Con ti n en tal Shelf
The Greek discovery of possible oil deposits in the
Thassos region in 1973 raised the question of control of the
"continental shelf" in the Aegean Sea. On 1 November 1973,
Turkey responded to Greek exploration activities in the
region by issuing mineral exploration rights of its own in
areas claimed by the Greeks. Turkey also published an offi-
cial map delimiting the Turkish continental shelf west of
the eastern Greek islands, reflecting basically a median
line division in the Aegean for continental shelf purposes.
In addition, Turkey has sent exploration ships into the
disputed areas, the most notable and controversial have been
the voyages of the Candalaria in 1974 and the Sismik I (the
Ho.r_§_) in 1976. The details cf developments from 1973 to
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1979 are covered well by Wilson [Rsf. 8: pp.4f f
.
]. These
actions and Turkish claims have been perceived as extremely
provocative by the Greeks and have led them to appeal to
both the International Court of Justice and the UN for
restraint of the Turks. 9
The Greeks base their continental shelf claims on
the Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf (29 April
1958, entered into force 10 June 1964 and supported by
further conventions of 1968 and similar cases concerning the
North Sea region). Article 1a gives islands the same rights
to continental shelf areas as other land masses, barring
other arrangements [ Eef . 8: p-4}. Turkey, on the other
hand, not having signed the convention, claims that a
median- line arrangement is more equitable and cites the
"special circumstances" paragraph of the 1958 convention for
support.
While Greece has been adamant that the legal provi-
sions uphold its claims and that any arrangements concerning
Turkish rights be based on a strict legal interpretation of
the Geneva Convention, security perceptions have played a
large role in the Greek outlook. Some of these are:
1. Greece cannot allow areas of Turkish control to
surround its island territories. This would repre-
sent a break in the continuity of the Eastern
islands with the Greek mainland an-d would bring into
question other issues cf control in the area. In
the Greek view, this would infringe on the territo-
rial integrity of Greece and could eventually lead
Turkey to question Greek control of the islands
themselves.
9 For a complete coverage of these issues and their
outcomes see References 9, 1 (J and 11.
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2. Any bilateral arrangements would constitute capitu-
lation of "legal sovereign rights" to the areas
surrounding the Greek islands. Thus, only a judge-
ment by an international body (e.g. the ICJ) has the
power to alter the status of the continental shelf
in the Aegean.
3. Until such time as further legal definitions are
established, Greece cannot allow adverse precedents
to be established by unilateral concessions on what
it sees as its legitimate claims.
Thus, the continental shelf issue has taken impor-
tant security implications in addition to economic ones. In
198 1 Thassos wells were -brought into production and their
yield has been much smaller than originally anticipated.
Thus the economic aspects of the dispute have taken on a
lesser importance. However, security and sovereignty issues
will continue to play an important role in any search for a
modus vivendi concerning the continental shelf.
3 . Territorial Waters
In 1958 the First United Nations Conference on the
law of the Sea provided a new legal definition as the basis
for establishing territorial waters— extending the previous
convention of 6 miles to a new optional and acceptable 12
mile limit. Should Greece at some time decide to extend the
limits around all its Aegean territories, its control of
seaspace in the Aegean would increase to 63.9/?, leaving only
26.1* of the sea as international waters [Ref. 8: p. 37].
This would effectively block the entire western Anatolian
coast from free transit and would effectively set up a theo-
retical barrier to North-South sea transportation in the
Aegean. Although Greece has reserved the right to exercise
this option, the consequences of such a move would be
extremely serious. Turkey has openly stated that this would
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be cause for war. However, Greece has used the possible
extension of territorial waters as a coercive point, espe-
cially during more heated periods of the continental shelf
dispute, airspace disputes and the 1974 Cyprus crisis.
4 • Aegean Airspace
The control of Aegean airspace has become an issue
since 1974 in a manner similar to that of the continental
shelf. The precipitating event was the 1974 Cyprus Crisis.
Alleging security considerations Turkey published Notice to
Airmen (NCTAM) 714 which required aircraft travelling from
Eest to East with international destinations to report to
Turkey at the mad point of the Aegean while still in the
Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) . This, in the eyes
of the Greeks during a period of severe Greek-Turkish
tension was seen as an attempt to alter the status of the
FIR and the control of the region in general. The FIR was
originally established in 1958 under the auspices of the
•International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to facili-
tate the movement of civil air traffic in the region outside
of national airspace. The eastern border of the area for
which Greece was assigned responsibility was set on a median
line between the eastern Greek islands and the coast of
Turkey. It has taken on a special meaning for Greece,
however, in that it effectively encompasses all of Greek
territory under a single point of Greek control, and it came
to be largely coterminous with pre- 1974 NATO military air
control responsibility delineation. The Greeks have viewed
control of the Aegean airspace from the standpoint of terri-
torial contiguity and, unfortunately for ICAO, the FIR
happens to correspond to these views. Thus, NOTAM 7 14 could
be seen as an attempt by Turkey to create a break in commu-
nication between the Greek mainland and the territorial
airspace of the islands (set unilaterally by Athens as 10
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miles surrounding its islands in 1931). Greece, citing
possible confusion arising from conflicting control proce-
dures, published NOTAfl 1157 (September 1974) which declared
the Aegean airspace unsafe for civil air traffic. Until
1980, when both NOTAMS were cancelled, international air
traffic ceased in the Aegean region.
Although the initial issues have since died down,
the principles of the dispute have remained important for
general Greek security perceptions. In the light of
perceived Turkish expansionist desires, any redrawing of the
airspace control responsibilities is seen as an attempt to
isolate the eastern islands and change the status of control
in the region. As Wilson has pointed out, "Although mili-
tary security considerations may have been a factor in the
airspace dispute-
.
.the dispute appears rather to be about
national status which has come to be identified with the
FIR's." [F.ef. 8: p-12] In a similar manner, the corollary
issues of the Greek 10-mile airspace limit and the extension
of the control zone around the island of Limnos have been
matters of Greek-Turkish friction. All these issues have
brought a continuous series of charges and countercharges
over alleged violations, provocations and harassment by the
two countries.
5. Aegean Balance of Power
In the light of Greek perceptions of the "Eastern
Threat," the important Greek security interest in defense of
the regional status guo and in the increasing distrust in
the ability of former security arrangements to provide for
all of Greece's security needs, Greece has seen the need to
increase its own defense capabilities. As the threat
perception has recently evolved from the 1950's and in light
of a perceived increase in Turkish aggressiveness in the
region, Greece has undertaken to build up its military
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strength to a point where it believes it can deter a hypo-
thetical "next move" by Turkey similar to the 1974 Turkish
Cyprus operations.
This policy of Aegean deterrence has taken two
paths. The first consideration has been to strengthen the
immediate defense of the eastern border regions. This has
included the strengthening of the military defenses of some
of the Greek islands off the coast of Turkey. While Turkey
has viewed this as provocative and in contravention of
existing treaties, Greece has countered by pointing out the
offensive nature of the so-called Turkish "Aegean Army" and
has cited overriding defensive security considerations in
its actions. [See Ref. 8: pp. 16-17 for details.]
The second, more long-term action has been to keep a
watchful eye on military aid and arms going to Turkey
(primarily from the United States but also from other coun-
tries such as Germany) , and to try to keep that coming to
Greece at a commensurate, albeit lower, level. The goal is
to balance the Greek defensive capability with the perceived
military potential of Turkey. This has involved the United
States arms transfer and military aid levels primarily.
Greece, in attempting to maintain the balance, has linked
the issue to numerous other issues which affect U.S. inter-
ests in the area. In essence, as both countries admit, a
small and costly arms race has developed on the two sides of
the Aegean.
6 . NATO Command and Control
The issue of control of NATO military forces in the
Aegean region has come to incorporate and essentially repre-
sent the other disputes between the two regional allies. In
the attempt to reintegrate Greece into the military arm of
NATO, Greek-Turkish disputed issues have been at the heart
of some of the difficulties encountered. It is this issue
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(a particular problem since the 1974 Greek, withdrawal and
the beginning of efforts to find a plan of reintegration
since 1975) in which interests of Greece, Turkey and the
Alliance coincide and sometimes conflict. The events of
1974 have complicated the issue and have led to serious
difficulties in the establishment of smooth continuity of
control. These difficulties, even with the reentry of
Greece to "full" NATO participation in 1980, have yet to be
fully overcome. They can be seen as a direct result of the
unresolved basic Greek-Turkish regional disputes.
Prior to 1974, NATO regional air forces were under
the local control of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (6
ATAF) located in Izmir, Turkey. Within this arrangement
Greek and Turkish officers coordinated air operations in the
area under allied supervision. Essentially, Greek officers
had responsibility for most of the Aegean Sea region from a
line running approximately along the eastern border of the
Athens FIR (about half way between the eastern Greek islands
and the Turkish coast) and extending to the west. A coordi-
nation zone was established either side of the line in which
military air operations information would be mutually
reported. After the 1974 .withdrawal of Greek forces from
NATO, this arrangement was no longer valid and while Greek
forces were placed under autonomous Greek control, NATO
forces were, in 1977, placed under the control of Turkish
Generals with American advisors. This gave Turkey tacit
control of allied air security operations in areas
surrounding Greek territory.
Pre-1974 control of allied Aegean naval forces
suffered similarly, previously being coordinated under the
command of a Greek admiral. After 1974, various plans have
been tried, including the "task force" concept, in which the
allied commander possessing the majority of naval forces in
the region at the time of a contingency would be assigned
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control of all area allied naval forces regardless of
nationality.
The Greek position on the issue of the reestablish-
ment of allied military control arrangements in the area has
paralleled and been linked to their other positions in the
area. Greece, for security reasons which extend beyond the
NATO threat perception, has not seen it possible to submit
to any arrangements which would expand even the hint of
Turkish control or responsibility for military defense of
the areas in, on, or around any of its territories. Turkish
military control in the Aegean would be seen as an altera-
tion of the status of Greek sovereignty in the area and even
the sharing of intelligence could be, in some Greek percep-
tions, misused against Greek interests. The extension of
any Turkish control over the defensive arrangements for the
eastern Greek islands and their surrounding areas would
bring into question Greek control of the islands themselves.
D. U.S./HATO MILITARY FACILITIES IN GREECE
Since the end of World War II, the United States has
established or helped develop a large number of defense-
related facilities in the Mediterranean. As of 1979, 199 of
these were actively maintained by the United States, 24 of
which are located in Greece. [ Eef . 12; P-47] In times of
war, these facilities are designed to support the NATO mili-
tary effort. In times of peace they are almost all operated
by the United States, solely or in conjunction with the host
country, to serve both allied and U.S. defense interests and
support.
The authority for the establishment of the U.S. instal-
lations came originally from Article 3 of the NATO Charter,
which authorized NATO members to make bilateral arrangements
to enhance the defenses of the alliance. A little over a
tr 4
year after Greece acceded to NATO (15 February 1952) an
agreement was concluded which provided the general basis for
the establishment of U.S. /NATO facilities in the country. 10
Implementing this agreement, numerous technical agreements
have been concluded which regulate the U.S. military activi-
ties at the bases and deal with such items as force deploy-
ments, exercises, status of forces, intelligence activities,
and operations plans. Nearly all of these agreements are
classified.
Under the auspices of these agreements, the major
installations created were:
1. The Souda Bay (Crete) facility, providing a large
airfield and extensive port facilities primarily
important for the storage of fuel and ammunition for
the U.S. and NATO naval forces in the area and as a
staging base for Allied air missions. Sufficient
anchorage is available to accommodate the entire
U.S. 6th Fleet. In addition the NATO missile firing
range nearby (NAMFI) is important for the training
and exercise cf NATO forces.
2. Iraklion Air Station (Crete) is primarily important
for reconnaissance and electronic surveillance
facilities which monitor Soviet military activities
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Hellenikon Air Base (at Athenai airport in Athens)
is primarily an administrative center and logistics
support base.
4. Nea Makri communications center (near Marathon) is a
major link in the U.S. Defense Communication System.
10The official title is "Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Greece Concerning
Military Facilities" which entered into force on 12 October
1953. [F.ef. 13: pp. 85-86 contains a copy.]
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Several other important communication sites serve
the 6th Fleet and NATO Mediterranean communications
networks
.
5. Five NADGE {NATO Air Defense Ground Environment)
early warning sites are located at dispersed points
in northern Greece to monitor Warsaw Pact military
activity.
All these facilities are still operational. While at the
outset mainly operated solely by the United States, they are
now generally Greek- administered facilities with U.S. units
operating as tenants.
In 1976 an agreement was initialled which was to amend
the 1953 agreement and bring it more in line with the
changed strategic environment and Greek interests [see Ref.
13: p. 87], This was also tied to a military aid package and
was to provide closer Greek control of the U.S. operations
in Greece. The agreement paralleled an earlier U.S. -Turkish
agreement of the same year. These agreements were never
implemented, however, and according to most observers the
original agreements remain in effect. Since the original
agreement was very vague, the actual operational status of
the U.S. facilities has been modified over the years through
amendment of technical agreements. At this writing a new
agreement has been initialled but has not yet been placed in
force.
Nuclear weapons in Greece and their associated support
facilities come under separate agreements. As the agreement
points out, they are tied to allied defense considerations:
Considering that [The U.S. and Greece] are both partici-
pating together in an international arrangement pursuant
to which they are making substantial and material
contributions to their mutual defense and
security ...[ and] considering that their mutual security
and defense require that they be prepared to meet the
contingencies of nuclear warfare.... [Ref. 14: p. 37]
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This treaty went into force on 11 august 1959, and provides
for the existence of NATO defense related nuclear weapons in
Greece. It also provided for the transfer of non-nuclear
parts, training, security ani cooperation concerning
U. S. -produced weapons systems in Greece. It is the exact
duplicate of an agreement sigred with Turkey less than a
month prior. Since the existence of nuclear weapons in
Greece has recently become a prominent political issue, it
is important to note here that this issue, by virtue of
these separate agreements, in not necessarily formally
connected with any of the other military facilities agree-
ments mentioned above.
In general, the issue of the U.S. facilities in Greece
is basically separate from the Greek-Turkish issues and is
only indirectly related to NATO. Primarily it involves
direct security relations between Greece and the United
States. As the environment within which these arrangements
operate has changed from the days of the Korean war to the
days of the Harmel report, the NAI0/U.5. facilities issue in
Greece has also evolved. It has become symptomatic of
larger changes which have taken place due to a variety of
changes in the Greek security environment, the realm of
bilateral relations and relations with NATO. The evolution
has also been sensitive to changes in the larger global
security environment. Established originally as an inte-
grated part of the perception cf the Soviet threat and the
needs of mutual or collective defense, the Greek view of the
bases has evolved as the Greek security perceptions have
changed. Characteristically, while the U.S. strategic
interests in the region have remained relatively consistent
(the bases being established to support these interests
among others), Greek interests have tended to diverge from
those conceived in the early post-war period.
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In the Greek perception, the bases have taken on not
only a security significance tut have become associated also
with the legacy of certain historical political liabilities.
Some see the bases as no lcnger representing the true
security picture in Greece, as a vulnerability in the face
of a perceived Turkish threat, a political liability in the
area of divergent U.S. -Greek policies toward the Middle
East, and a representation of former dependency relation-
ships which are presently being reevaluated. If the rela-
tionship and purposes of the bases cannot be changed to
better serve perceived Greek needs, then they remain merely
visible representations of of the infringement of foreign
powers on Greek internal sovereignty and former arrangements
which have, to some, become discredited in the last couple
of decades. Thus, they become symbols of foreign interfer-
ence in the evolution of a more independently secure and
maturing Greece. As the perception of the Soviet threat has
diminished, so the meaning of the bases in defense of the
new Greek concerns which have taken its place has changed.
It is interesting to note that the development of the
bases issue in Greece closely parallels that in Turkey.
Three reasons might be brought out for this. The obvious
one is that they were established for the same reasons. The
second is that more recently they have become in both coun-
tries to be viewed more as instruments of U.S. policy and
serving only U. S. interests and have been tied to other
country interests such as U.S. military aid. Thirdly, the
bases issue has come to represent a general trend in similar
arrangements especially noticeable in the Mediterranean
area. There is a general drive toward more independence,
modernization and reassessment of security needs which nas
generally meant the erosion of former dependent relation-
ships of the earlier, post- World War II cold-war monochro-
matic era.
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III. NEW DEMOCRACY AND GREEK SECURITY POLICY 1974 TO 198 J.
A. IHTRCDOCTIOH
Some of the basic connections between issues of internal
politics, external politics and security in Greece have
already been indicated. It remains to be seen how these
connections actually work out in forming the bases and char-
acter of Greek security policy in the specific programs of
the two major parties (PASOK and New Democracy) as they
developed since 1974. This chapter explores the issues from
the point of view of one of the two major political forces
which developed during the 1974-198 1 period— New Democracy
(ND) .
This chapter deals with the evolution of the New
Democracy program under the guidance of Konstantinos
Karamanlis (during his tenure as Prime Minister from
November 1974 to May 1980) and the follow-on government of
George Rallis (1980-1981). The basic security policies of
the New Democracy government will be viewed through the
prism of the three basic security concerns as elaborated in
the background section of this work (Chapter 2). Initially,
internal security and the threat from the "North" will be
handled briefly. Then the focus will be turned to the
"Eastern Threat" (Greek-Turkish) issues--Cyprus, and the
Aegean Sea disputes. Finally the NATO connection and U.S.
military bases in Greece will be discussed as they apply to
New Democracy policies.
ND and PASOK were, of course, not the only active polit-
ical forces in Greece during this time. Indeed, while ND
seemed to dominate the political picture (albeit with dimin-
ishing majorities) until 1931 it was not until the elections
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of November, 1.977, that PASOK actually became the legitimate
opposition party. The results cf the 1974 national election
gave the party of George Mavros, the Center Union New Forces
(EK-ND), considerable strength. As it turned out, however,
EK-ND policies were only minimally distinguishable from
those of ND in the realm of foreign and security policy
(although some minor divergences occurred in some internal
issues). This and the EK-ND's ultimate defeat under the new
title of EDIK (Union of the Democratic Left) in the
elections of 1977, make it of secondary importance for this
study's purposes. A number of smaller parties have competed
in elections but with little success. (In November, 1974, a
total of 8 identified parties participated, and in 1977 the
number had risen to 14. These included factions of the
newly legalized communist parties) [Ref. 1: Appendix B].
Additionally, the smaller parties have tended to have a
reduced influence in the Greek Vouli (Parliament) due to the
system of "reinforced proportional representation." Under
this system, the parties polling over 17% are augmented with
representatives according to a complicated proportional
formula. This system tends to enlarge the power of the
larger parties in parliament while it tends to give smaller
parties less representation than their actual polling
percentages would suggest. 11 As can be seen, however, this
system has the effect of stabilizing the fragmenting effects
of a strictly proportional representation system.
It is from the historical perspective that the conti-
nuity of the ND party and the rapid rise of the "novel"
PASOK party are of interest. Concern from this research
1J An example from the November 17 elections of 1974
shows that while PASOK received 13% of the vote, a respect-
able showing, it only received 12 out of 300 total seats in
the Vouli while ND received 54.4% of the vote and 220 seats.
While P"A"SOK received only 7% fewer votes than the number two
contender, EK-ND, it received 48 fewer seats) [Ref. 1:
p. 202 ].
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perspective and the perspective of most policy makers
interested in Greece and Western interests in the Southeast
NATO region, has dictated the comparison of these two
parties as representatives of Greek political trends.
B. HEW DEMOCRACY AND GREEK SECURITY, 1974-1981
1. Emergence of New Democracy and its Policies
a- The Interim Government of Karamanlis.
At 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of July 22, 1974,
the political and military leaders of Greece assembled in
the former Greek parliament building. Most of the personal-
ities represented the perpetuation of the Greek military
regime which had controlled Greece since the 1967 Greek
military coup. Although some of the original faces were
missing, these people had been influential in carrying out
the 7-year regime's suppression of Greek democracy, which on
this day had simply collapsed. Faced with the effects of
one of the most humiliating political disasters ever perpe-
trated in Greece, the abortive coup against President
Makarios of Cyprus; faced with the invasion of the island by
Turkey, the island they had dreams of annexing to the
Hellenic motherland; faced with a military completely inca-
pacitated by seven years of politicization and purges; faced
with a collapsing economy and increasingly open and less
controllable popular dissent; faced with outrage from a
large number of their Greek brothers in Cyprus and almost
universal world condemnation, this group had to finally face
reality. Their adventure was over. The President, Phaidon
Gizikis, had taken it upon himself to relinquish control of
the government back to the civilians, and after some delib-
eration and bargaining (especially by a close colleague of
Karamanlis, Mr. Evangelos Averoff) , the call went to Paris,
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where Konstantinos Kararaanlis was in self-imposed exile.
Stepping out onto Greek soil on July 23 for the first time
in 1 1 years, it appeared that Karamanlis had done some soul-
searching and had also kept at least one finger on the
public pulse of Greece. In his first words, he declared
himself "at the disposal of the nation to restore normality
and achieve national reconciliation." [Eef.1 ] In this
simple statement, Karamanlis' perceptions of Greek internal
needs were clear. No fiery rhetoric about attacking Turks
and avenging Hellenism, or the like, was heard; instead he
saw his mission and major challenge as the metamorphosis of
Greek political culture toward democratic stability. To
guell the centrifugal internal forces which had caused him
to resign the premiership over an argument with the former
king and caused him deep disillusionment with Greek politics
on more than one occasion, the forces which brought the
unmanageability of the feuding parties in the mid- 1 960' s and
finally led to the 1967 military coup, Karamanlis was now
resolved to apply a steady hand of political discipline,
moderation, and maturity. Given the multitude of problems
besetting the nation at that point, this was no easy task.
For a number of reasons, political levelheadedness and firm
resolve were the only qualities which could bring the pieces
back together. The contemporaneous Portuguese example was a
lesson well taken and the Greek army's tanks were still on
the outskirts of Athens. As one official put it, "any
relapse of the anomaly [junta] would lead tiie nation to
disaster." [Kef. 3]
This basic threat to Greek security, the threat
of internal collapse, .became the focus of Karamanlis'
efforts in the early days after his return. The unprece-
dented manner in which the junta had collapsed provided a
unigue environment to advance the aims of Karamanlis'
interim "Government of National Unity," established on July
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24. The junta had not been overthrown by an opposing force,
but had ignominiously crumbled under the weight of its own
ineptitude. This meant that no one faction could claim
primacy over another for having "saved" the nation. Indeed,
demands from within the army and government itself had
created pressure for a return to civilian government [Ref.
4: p. 338].
The personal credentials of Karaiaanlis also
served him well in this respect. At the time, he was a
well-known and apparently broadly well-liked figure.
Premier of Greece from 1955 to 1963, he presided over an
unprecedented period of stable conservative government which
brought a degree of prosperity to Greece. 12 His resignation
in 1963 as a result of disagreement with the King marked him
as a person of independent integrity, against foreign inter-
vention, which to many, the King had represented. He had
openly criticized the government of the coup on several
occasions and had always been irritated by the typical radi-
calism and confrontations of Greek politics. In his own
rather forceful style, Karamanlis pointed this out prior to
the 1974 elections by lecturing to the opposition that, an
irresponsible political "mentality has led to the downfall
of democracy before.... Democracy is not only threatened by
tanks. It is threatened even more by the demagogy which
leads to the tanks." [P.ef. 5] To support him in his
efforts, Karamanlis filled his cabinet with like-minded
ministers with impeccable anti-junta and centrist conserva-
tive credentials, among them prominent political figures
from former governments.
12Loulis points out that "between 1922 and 1936 Greece
had experienced 22 major cabinet changes and 17 changes in
effective executive; between 1946 and 1951 9... changes had
occurred and between 1955 and 1962 only 3...." [Ref 1: p. 55 ]
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While the Cyprus problem was externally the most
pressing, and other Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean
Sea issues were menacing, Karamanlis realized that he could
not attack these issues without a stabilized and unified
political base at home. The junta brought discredit among
European allies and isolation and humiliation in the world
political arena, and only a stable democratic government
could garner the support needed from other nations in
Greece's time of trouble. He therefore took immediate steps
to secure political stability at home. Some of these
included
:
1. Freeing all political prisoners and reinstating the
citizenship of dissidents exiled by the junta.
2. Reinstating freedom of the press (while urging
moderation)
.
3. legalizing the Communist parties (outlawed since
1947) and allowing them to publish their newspapers.
4. Depriving the ESA (the Greek military police) of
most of its powers.
5. Replacing nearly all junta-installed local district
prelates with their former civilian counterparts.
Karamanlis made it clear, however, that it was
not open season for radicalism. While the Cyprus crisis was
a major external security concern to be dealt with, it did
provide the interim government opportunities to check seme
problems associated with the return to democracy. One
example of this is that Karamanlis was able to maintain
order under martial law while advocating democracy. This
was justified outwardly by the exigencies of the Cyprus
crisis and the fear of possible direct confrontation with
Turkey. Privately, however, there was no doubt that he
intended to maintain strict public order and move guickly to
quell any violence with "merciless severity.
"
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A second example was the general military mobi-
lization called in order to face any possible Turkish
threat. Among other effects, the mobilization moved much of
the Third Army Corps from the Athens area toward the
Thracian border. This not only removed the "tanks," a
symbol of the fallen junta regime, from the Athens area, but
preoccupied an otherwise possitly volatile segment of the
Army officer corps, whose insecurity arising, from the
removal of most of their top commanders in mid-August, was a
potential source of military reaction. The "national
crisis" of Cyprus made it easier to retain firm control over
the populace and the army, and to facilitate a smoother
transition to democratic government [Ref. 6: p. 38].
It was also for purposes of national political
unity that Karamanlis decided to pull Greek forces out of
the integrated NATO command. (This will be discussed in
greater detail later.) Faced with an untenable situation in
Cyprus (a Greek military response would most certainly be a
disaster, and capitulation wcuid be political suicide)
,
Karamanlis chose to channel Greek feelings of humiliation
and frustration toward a scapegoat and restore Greek pride.
Capitalizing on the growing anti-Americanism, which could be
easily translated to "anti-NATCism, " he formally notified
the alliance that Greek forces would no longer participate
in the integrated military command of NATO. In one decisive
move he undercut the more vocal left opposition who had been
whipping up public opinion against the U.S. for its support
of the former junta, its failure to act to prevent the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus and its perceived pro-Turkish
tilt./ This action also allayed and transferred any feelings
of guilt to an external bogeyman and consolidated a broad
spectrum of public opinion behind an apparently assertive,
nationalistic unifying governmental force.
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Four steps remained for Karamanlis in his
program for political stability. First, he had to form a
legitimate democratic government. In October free elections
were called for, held on November 17. Second, the perennial
problem which had deeply polarized Greek society and had
been the source of instability at least since the "great
schism" of the early 20th century— the question of the Greek
Monarchy—had to be finally and resolutely solved. A
national referendum was to be scheduled not later than 45
days after the national elections. It was held on December
8, returning 6 9.2% of the votes for a republic and only
30.8/S for the monarchy [Ref- 1: p. 63]. This was seen as an
unmistakable signpost for the future direction of Greek
political development. Third, a new constitution had to be
drafted to replace the 1952 constitution (in effect since
the fall of the junta). Karamanlis envisioned this document
as strengthening the authority of the government while
ensuring a strong democracy. This was effected in 1975.
Finally, to strengthen Greek democratic ties to Europe and
help insure the perpetuation of Western democracy in Greece,
Karamanlis immediately reactivated Greek association with
the European Economic Community, seeking full membership,
not only as a potential economic benefit, bat a political
maneuver to achieve greater voice in European affairs and to
supplant "superpower" (U.S.) domination with a viable
Western alternative of support.
Thus through various decisive maneuvers,
Karamanlis and his deputies of the interim government of
national unity laid the foundation for a potentially more
stable and secure democratic government in Greece. Combined
with the remarkable degree of political restraint and
maturity demonstrated by the Greek populace during the tran-
sition, and Karamanlis' carefully measured delicacy in
removing the threat of reaction within the military, which
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could "bring back the tanks," the new Greek state had appar-
ently passed a milestone on the road to political maturity.
b. Formation of New Democracy (ND) : General
Policies
.
On September 26, 1974, acting Prime Minister
Konstantinos Karamanlis formed the New Democracy Party,
after decreeing the resumption of political activity.
Emphasis was placed at the outset on the "newness" of the
party, intending to imply that the party was not simply a
reincarnation of Karamanlis* broad right conservative
National Radical Union (ERE) of the 1950's. New Democracy
was to be a party shifted to the center (left of the conser-
vative spectrum) , and indeed it was perceived as such both
in its later policies and ir the fact that many far-
rightists chose to oppose the party in the 1974 and 1977
elections. Although the party had no clear or specific
platform, Karamanlis listed the pressing problems which had
to be dealt with: (1) to reorganize the administration of
the country, which was in chaos after the fall of the junta,
(2) to bolster the economy, (3) to seek a solution to the
Cyprus problem, (4) to contain Turkish aggressiveness, and
(5) to restore discipline to the army [Ref . 5]. It is note-
worthy that three out of the five major problems deal essen-
tially with internal problems, while only two have to do
with external threats. This is perhaps a key to under-
standing Karamanlis 1 view of Greek security. No matter how
serious Greece's external problems were made to seem, his
program reflected the fact that internal stability was a
critical support for dealing with the external threat and
overcoming the previous turbulence in Greek political life.
Hinging on this was the drive for independence from direct
foreign influences, which could not be realized unless some
sort of internal stability and security were achieved. The
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argument was that Greek political culture had allowed
foreign penetration through its divisive and paternalistic
character. In summing up the New Democracy program, C.
Sulzberger outlines the apparent goals of its leader after
the 1974 election by listing seven points, only one of which
deals with the external problem of Cyprus. The rest under-
take to calm political passions and modernize political and
social life, draft a constitution with a strong execative
and strong central democratic government, reorganize admin-
istrative and educational systems, take drastic, perhaps
unpopular economic measures to relieve economic problems,
and hold a referendum to begin a new political life
featuring a more progressive attitude [Ref . 7],
From a new position of national strength,
Karamanlis 1 foreign pclicy was to be grounded in the ideas
of (1) national independence, (2) security, and (3) dignity.
This was also to be supported by a strong army. Karamanlis'
credentials in the first element were established through
his assertive withdrawal of Greece from NATO and his ques-
tioning of U.S. military bases on Greek soil; in the second
by his uncompromising attitude en issues such as the sover-
eignty of the Aegean islands; and the third by his desire to
become a participating and "equal" member of international
organizations such as the European Community (EC) and his
support of the (J.N. and the International Court in resolu-
tion of disputes. However, a military buildup was necessary
to insure the credibility of Greek foreign policy and allow
a more independent security policy to succeed. He therefore
showed restraint in purging the army to allay its fears of
political retribution and essentially absolved the general
mass of the officer corps from any wrongdoing.
With these goals, New Democracy recorded a
considerable victory in the November 1974 national
elections. It received a comfortable majority of the seats,
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210 out of 300, which would allow it to proceed with its
programs virtually unrestricted. The elections coming
quickly after the junta's fall/ the myriad of problems which
Karamanlis had tackled with sone apparent initial success,
along with the confident and charismatic assertiveness of
his leadership— all served to muffle the opposition. The
major opponents often found themselves agreeing with many of
the New Democracy programs. The more radical leftist
parties, being split and weak, barely registered. The only
really new arrival on the Greek political scene, PASOK, had
little time to organize and consolidate any formidable
support. The vote for Karamanlis, while it represented a
vote for the charismatic leader who had steadied the country
during a hypercritical transitional period, was also gener-
ally a vote for prudence and moderation in the face of
multiple perceived threats, including the possible return of
the Greek military dictatorship and Turkish aggression. It
was also a well-distributed vote indicating widespread
support. Grasping this mandate and the even more decisive
mandate for a republican government in the December 8 refer-
endum, Karamanlis proceeded to build up the country's
internal strength through aggressive economic policies,
sweeping "de- j untif ication" of the civil service and educa-
tion, labor reforms, nationalizations of certain industries
and constitutional reform. All these measures were designed
to once and for all secure Greece as a stable democracy,
able to assert itself confidently and with some degree of
independence on the international scene.
The four main objectives of the Mew Democracy
party after 1974 were to be: "to tackle the 'national'
crisis [Cyprus], to re-establish and solidify democratic
rule, to give the country a strong government, and to make a
powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics." [Ref. 1:
p. 59] It is also significant that Karamanlis had abandoned
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the passionate anti-communism of his former years. This
worked to his favor in three ways: it represented a modern
attitude of detente, and allowed him to pursue a more
vigorous and independent foreign policy; it showed the
government not afraid to "embrace all Greeks" including the
Greek Communists within its modern democratic structure; and
it avoided the shopworn appelation to the cold-war "commu-
nist threat" which the junta had so frequently misused. New
Democracy, during its first three years, "concentrated its
attention on four fronts; strengthening democracy, achieving
socio-economic progress, changing the basic structures of
the educational system and tackling foreign policy issues."
[Ref. 1; p. 54 ] In assessing the accomplishments in the
first three of these areas, Marios Evriviades sums up the
rather impressive results for the first three years of the
New Democracy:
...[the] government's domestic record was positive.
Under his rKaramanlis' J leadership, the army was depoli-
ticized ana the foundations for parliamentary rale were
re-established with the passage or the new Greek consti-
tution. The life of the average Greek had also improved
considerably. The rate of inflation had been reduced
from 80% to about 14%, average wages were doubled
through a bold incomes policy; and there was full
employment and booming consumer demand. There was.
finally, an atmosphere of unprecedented personal
freedom. [Eef. 8: p. 164]
With internal security steadily improving in this manner,
Greece could attend more confidently to its foreign policy
concerns, the fourth front listed above.
In foreign policy, Karamanlis sought mainly to
free Greece from over-dependence on a single power, espe-
cially the United States. Rather, diversity became the key
and a multilateral policy was the way in which to avoid
possible foreign penetration and interference which had
become a permanent negative mythology in Greece. This
mythology allowed Greeks to transfer some of Greece's own
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problems to the shoulders of the "great powers." It also
reinforced the beliefs (probably partly substantiable) that
the problems of Greece were in a large part due to its over-
dependence on a patron power which handicapped its relations
with others, did net support Greece in time of need, and
generally seemed to frustrate Greek national interests. 13
Karamanlis, while still remaining firmly
oriented to the West, was determined to lead his adolescent
Greek state to political "equality" with other states. Ke
turned toward Europe with the vision of participating in the
formation of some new assertive European arrangement free
from superpower domination. Karamanlis stated, in conjunc-
tion with his efforts to achieve Greek acceptance as a full
member of EC, that he wanted to belong to a "united,
Atlantic Europe, sovereign and independent, which would
cooperate with the United States on an equal footing." [Eef.
9] Karamanlis' foreign policy meant exploring and developing
other ties as well, notably with Greece's Mideastern neigh-
bors. Eastern Europe and the
.
Soviet Union. Finally, the
crucial element in Karamanlis' foreign policy was, of
course, to deal with the threat from the East, specific
aspects of which will be dealt with individually later.
Apparent general satisfaction with the New
Democracy programs returned Karamanlis to power in the
national elections of 1977, albeit with a reduced majority
in the parliament. That his support had begun to erode
indicated growing trends of discontent from the far right
and the left. 1 * In 1977, the flew Democracy party received
only 41.85!£ of the votes, which reduced its seats to 173 (a
13It is also noted on this point by many authors that
the Greek politicians had often "invited" this external
support to further their own designs.
!*For a thorough analysis of the political issues
surrounding and precipatated by the 1977 elections, see Ref.
1 appropriate sections, Sef. 10 and Ref. 8.
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loss of 42 seats) . PASOK came out as the largest opposition
party with 25.33% and 92 seats (a gain of 77)
.
The
Democratic Center Onion (EDIK--formerly the Center
Union— New Forces) was the real fatality of the election.
It received only approximately 12% of the vote and 15 seats.
(The communist parties made slight gains.) The consequent
breakup of the political center was touted by some as a
return to polarization in Greek politics. However, a posi-
tive aspect may be seen in that the other major parties
would be expected to make a grab for the center vote which
possibly would prevent ND and PASOK from drifting further to
the right or left respectively.
Karamanlis called the 1977 elections one year
before they were constitutionally due because, as Karamanlis
stated, "I want a renewed popular mandate so the government
can have increased prestige and negotiating power.' 1 [Ref.
11] The prestige and power was "needed" for a stepped up
program for dealing with external concerns, notably Aegean
and Cyprus issues, NATO, and the EEC. These issues were to
increasingly occupy the center stage in the Greek foreign
policy debate and became the focus of Karamanlis' ND govern-
ment after 1977. They culminated with Karamanlis' opening
to detente with his 1979 visit to Moscow, the 1980 reentry
into the military structure of NATO and the accession on
January 1, 1981 of Greece to full membership in the EC [Ref.
12].
The political security of the republic appar-
ently was on firm ground, despite considerable criticism
from the opposition. Evidence for this is the uncharacter-
istic political stability shown in the orderly conduct of
the elections since 1974. A crucial test was seen when it
came time for Karamanlis to relinquish his Prime
Ministership. This shift occurred in 1930, amid dire
predictions of political des tabiiization. However, the
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transition went smoothly. Karamanlis, unopposed, was elected
President on the third vote in parliament, and George Raliis
took control of ND and was asked to form the government,
albeit on a close vote within the party. Averoff, the main
contender, lost by a very small margin. That Averoff threw
his support behind Raliis indicates another aspect of
increasing stability in Greece. Time, if nothing else, was
bound to take its toll on the support of ND. Forces bound
to erode ND support were pointed out by Mario Modiano:
....the loss of the charisnatic leadership that Mr.
Karamanlis had given the party. ..has perceptibly weak-
ened [ND's] pscychological appeal. The government
party must also pay for the sins of ommission and
commission- for all the grudges that have piled up, for
all the anti-western feelings its opponents have wnipped
up. Especially it will suffer from the pocketbook
impact of inflation ...Finally there is the traditional
or presumed Greek yearning for... change with a capital
»C»...£Ref. 13]
An additional factor of impending weakness for
ND was its apparent inability to modernize its party struc-
ture and extend its base down to the electorate. The char-
ismatic leadership of Karamanlis could not carry it
indefinitely in the face of the modern, well-organized FASOK
political machine. As the left became stronger, issues
became more hotly debated.
The EC accession debate is representative. In a
1981 article, George Coats reported in the Economist that
there was a feeling that Greece was at a turning point in
its modernization:
EC entry is seen both as a symbol and a symptom of this
feeling but for others it represents exactly the
opposite— an attempt by the entrenched. .. forces to
prolong their domination. For the government... the
accession represents a step not only toward moderniza-
tion but is a guarantee of stability and an acceptance
of Greece as an equal member of the community of civi-
lized European nations rather than as a backward and
volatile Balkan state. [Ref. 14: p-6]
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On this basis, entry into the EC became an obsession in ND
politics. Coats also points out that the debate on EC entry
took on a "metaphysical" character in Greece, the opposition
not focusing entirely on the economic balance sheet, but on
issues of sovereignty and Greek independence as well. To
them it would be seen as a serious compromise and
backsliding. [Eef. 14]
While important internal security accomplish-
ments were registered by the Karamanlis— Rallis ND regime,
one must consider the other two thirds of the Greek security
triangle— the Northern threats and the Eastern threats.
2 . Karama nlis and the N or t hern Threa
t
for Greece, there is no escaping the threat from the
North. In earlier years it was the prime consideration. The
fear of communist aggression frcm the north led Greece into
NATO, and Greek defense was defined in terms of securing
Greece from northern aggression and internal communist
infiltration. The events of 1974, however, marked a turning
point in Greece's northern relations and threat perceptions,
the seriousness of which is often overlooked. It is perhaps
only in the context of detente between the superpowers that
Greek-Turkish disputes could have reached today's propor-
tions. And it was the fall of the junta and the foreign
policy of Karamanlis which allowed detente to come belatedly
to Greece. (Initial contacts were, however, made by the
junta with Greece's Balkan neighbors, in an effort to seek
foreign contacts after receiving effective diplomatic ostra-
cism from Western European countries.) Greece could not
ignore the Balkan portion of its heritage, a heritage of
conflict vacillating from time to time toward cooperation.
Numerous outstanding security issues within the Balkan
neighborhood, including the Macedonian question involving
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece, the Northern Epirus and
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minorities issues with Albania, Eastern Yugoslavia and
Western Bulgarian commercial access, and the traditional
Bulgarian desires in Thrace (which they have from time to
time realized) — all are examples of issues which could
possibly be ameliorated through diplomatic efforts. The
resolution or defusing of some of these issues would have
important benefits for Greek security.
The Balkan efforts cannot be seen outside the
context of the Western alignment of Greece. That the whole
issue of security in the Balkan countries is related in part
to Greece's NATO orientation was recalled by George Mavros,
Foreign Minister in the interim 1974 government. He
reflected that "the first complaints we got after we pulled
out of NATO were from Rumania and Red China" [Pef. 15] Tito
is also known to have been concerned lest Greece guit its
relationship with the West [Ref. 16]. Anti-Western devel-
opments in Sreece definitely have repercussions on the
future relations of countries such as Rumania, Yugoslavia,
and Albania with the Soviet Union. A Greece not firmly
aligned to the West would definitely decrease the bargaining
power of Balkan Communist countries trying to maintain their
semi-independent status. For Greece, too, an active Balkan
policy without the ultimate security guarantee of the U.S.
and NATO would certainly cause a reassessment of Balkan
policy in Moscow, to the detriment of Greek national
independence.
Iwo of Karamanlis* three tenets of Greek external
relations, national independence and national security, were
well served by what has been dubbed Greece's "Nordpolitik.
"
Karamanlis' Balkan efforts also "bore the stamp of the Greek
Prime Minister's own diplomatic style. It is essentially
personalized, high level, and aims at improvement of the
political climate in the region" [Ref. 1 7 ]. It is with
these considerations in mind that one can view Karamanlis'
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bilateral and multilateral Balkan efforts- Beginning in
1975 Karamanlis traveled to all the Balkan countries (except
Turkey) to establish relationships [Eef. 17: p. 161]. These
visits have since been reciprocated. The culmination of
bilateralism with the "North" was the Karamanlis-Brezhnev
meeting in Moscow in 1979. Throughout this period, recip-
rocal visits have fostered bilateral initiatives with all'
Greece's Balkan neighbors and with the Soviet Union.
Multilateralism was a decidedly more elusive goal for
Karamanlis. However, with his typical aggressive statesman-
ship, he managed to convene two Balkan conferences; the
first in Athens in 1978, the second in Ankara in 1979. The
growing uncertainties as to Soviet intentions as a result of
several incidents, most notably the then extremely important
guestion of Yugoslavia after Tito, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and the Polish crisis,
seemed to cool Balkan multilateral efforts [Eef- 18].
However, persistent efforts throughout the 1974-198 1 period
resulted in the achievement of many bilateral contacts and
took many of Greece's northern security issues off the crit-
ical list.
The effects of this policy on Greek security are
most notable. Through Karamanlis 1 own "bridgebuilding"
policy, many economic, cultural, and political links were
created with Balkan neighbors. They have even resulted in
some limited defense-related agreements with Yugoslavia
£Ref . 19]. The objective was stated by the Greek Prime
Minister: "My vision is of a Balkan penninsula that will be
an area of permanent peace. The network of friendly Balkan
relations will create a system of Balkan cooperation " [Ref
.
17: p. 162]. The logical security benefit of this policy is
the reduction, by political and diplomatic means, of
Northern threat.
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The existence of a credible security threat from
some external source has been "the midwife of intra-Balkan
cooperation." For Yugoslavia, for example, the increase of
Soviet aggressiveness toward that country has historically
led to a corresponding warmth in Yugoslav approaches to
Greece. For Greece, the increased threat from the Turks has
made a diminished northern threat imperative: 15
....the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations prob-
ably remains a big factor influencing the state of
Balkan af fairs. .. .The Greek Prime Minister told
Tito. . .' Turkey is threatening the peace enjoyed by the
Balkans for the past 30 years.' One can argue that in
this instance of regional cooperation, the external
'threat 1 remains a key incentive, at least as far as
Greece is concerned, [Ref. 16: p. 162]
In summary then, the following security objectives can be
seen in Karamanlis' northern policy:
1. To reduce the threat from the North.
2. To resolve bilateral disputes or issues peacefully
through. continuously expanding diplomatic and
economic ties.
3. To allow Greece to concentrate defense efforts
toward the "Eastern threat."
4. To reduce independence en NATO for security.
5. To achieve at least the non-involvement of other
Balkan states in the event of a Greece-Turkish
conflict.
Collateral political benefits have accrued from
Karamanlis* Balkan initiatives. The quest for a "new rela-
tionship" with NATO following Greece's partial exit in 1974
would be unthinkable without a relaxation of tensions to the
North. They have also come to symbolize Greece's emergence,
diplomatically, as a modern nation with an independent
15The converse is also true: with a diminished Northern
threat, the Turkish threat has become important.
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status equal to other European powers. They have
characterized, especially to the Greek public, Greece's
increasing independence from the U.S. and NATO domination.
The favorable impression on public opinion created by his
Balkan policy, gave Karamanlis widespread political support
from a broad spectrum of political shades in Greece.
Balkan ties within the context of the ultimate
Western security guarantee and the East-West strategic
stalemate gave ND the flexibility to pursue a modern diver-
sified foreign policy, while enhancing security and allowing
Greece to divert its attention to the Turkish Threat.
3 . Karamanlis and the Cy_p_r us Issue
Karamanlis had a reputation as a firm believer in
Greece's Western orientation. The dramatic rise of the
far left vote was in part the rasult of the disunity of
the central parties- in part the result of growing
disenchantment with the attitude of Greece's NATO allies
over the Cyprus issue, which made neutralism. .. more
attractive to the Greek electorate, [fief. 20: pp. 172-3]
The real historic tragedy of the 1974 Cyprus debacle
and its particular connection to the new Karamanlis govern-
ment becomes glaringly clear in the above statement, for it
was written not about the Karamanlis government of the
seventies, but about Premier Karamanlis and his EKE govern-
ment of 1955-1963. It was Karamanlis who in February 1959
negotiated a quick settlement of the then serious Cyprus
crisis and settled, he hoped, the question of British impe-
rialism, the enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) lovement
growing in both Greece and Cyprus, and pushed by the exiled
Makarios, and growing Turkish militancy about the
Turkish-Cypriot minority (spurred on by the British). It
was his attempt to settle the dispute within the NATO
security system which brought hioa criticism within Greece
for "betraying the cause of Hellenism in the interests of
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NATO and the Americans" [Ref. 20: p. 175]. It was his
Cyprus settlement plan, negotiated in Zurich and London in
1959 (the oft-guoted London- Zurich agreement), which set up
Britain, Turkey, and Greece as guarantors of the security of
a new Cypriot Republic, to be governed by what was to prove
in the 1960's an unworkable compromise system which caused
serious Cyprus crises in 1963 and 1967, and gave pretext to
the July 15, 1974 Turkish invasion. Finally, it was same
Karamanlis—leaving Greece for Paris in 1963 after three
turbulent final years, frustrated by attempts to unite the
Greek political center, "resentful of the prerogatives of
the Monarchy... (and) disillusionei with the Greek political
system in general, believing that the 1952 constitution
favored parliament at the expense of government" [Ref. 20:
p. 179]— who returned eleven years later in the midst of a
second installment of the same problems in Greece, only this
time they were probably even more serious. It is in light
of this historical bit of irony that some of Karamanlis'
Cyprus policies become clear.
When Karamanlis returned to Athens and accepted the
interim Prime Ministership, he was faced with the Turkish
fait accompli in Cyprus. In a sense, the Greek and Turkish
options had been played, and while the Turks still had
reserves, the Greek options had been played out. Lacking
even the hint of support from Britain, the other guarantor,
the Greek military position was untenable. Without any form
of air cover, an invasion force could not possibly succeed
in the face of Turkish regional air superiority. A feeble
attempt at military reinforcement had been launched on July
21, with 14 antiquated Nor-Atlas aircraft, but the mission
was doomed from the start [Ref. 21]. Although some contem-
poraries feared that Greece might launch a punitive strike
against Turkey along the Thracian border:
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what deterred the Greeks from crossing the Evros river
in the North into Turkey now is the disparity of the
40,000 fighting Greeks facing 90,000 TurKish "soldiers
across this frontier in Thrace. The Turks have amassed
as many troops, tanks and armored cars in Thrace as
Greece possesses in total. [Eef. 22]
Thus, faced with the equipment inadequacies of the
Greek military, compounded by the adverse effects of the
junta regime, Karamanlis was fast running out of options.
However, and perhaps more important, to capitulate or accept
any sort of bargain with the Turks would have created a
political disaster in Greece which would wreck completely
his chances to pull Greece out of its internal problems
intact. The best he could do was to remain firm, not accept
any sort of division of Cyprus, and attempt to sway, in
time, opinion through diplomatic means. Greece accepted the
cease fire called for by the ON Security Council on July 20
and agreed to enter negotiations with the Turks and the
British. On July 30 the three parties signed a declaration
to end Turkish advances and establish a buffer zone along
the Turkish lines. The Geneva talks which produced this
solution were hardly a triumph cf Greek diplomacy:"
but the newspapers and politicians are determined to
maintain unity and support the government. . .B esides,
after the disastrous adventure in Cyprus, most Greeks
are in a grimly realistic mood... a typical editorial
praised the agreement. Under especially difficult
circumstances- ... Greece managed to get the maximum,
perhaps, of what was possible. The talks. ..will exclude
the options of partitioning the island or of unifying it
with Greece or Turkey. [Ref. 23]
Initially, Karamanlis, anxious to avoid the problems
of the past, sought support from Greece's allies to pressure
Turkey into withdrawal of all troops and to support inter-
communal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He
pledged to support whatever agreements they aight come up
with. He remained adamantly against the Turkish proposals
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for a "bi-communal federation" which would essentially split
Cyprus into separate Turkish and Sreek "mini-nations." But,
in the light of the second wave of invasions by "urkey on
August 14, the inability of NATC or the U.S. to persuade the
Turks to exercise restraint, and the apparent lack of good
faith demonstrated by the Turks , Greece shifted its poli-
cies. Greece now intended to press for international
involvement through the U.N. and resort to more dramatic
tactics of their own. The Greek positions and aims were set
out clearly by George Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister:
[Mavros] said the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the
united Nations General Assembly would be a test case.
'If the United Nations cannot save Cyprus. ..we cannot
see what reason it has to exist.' ...The problem of
Cyprus could be settled by the island's two communities
negotiating freely, not under the threat of 40,000
troops, 300 tanks, or the unbearable pressure of the
tragedy of 200,000 refugees. ...The Greek government is
against gnosis. $e are for the independence, sover-
eignty and" ~ territorial integrity of the island. '
...Greece was in favor of full demilitarization of the
Cypriot republic— 'not one Turkish, not one Greek
soldier should remain.' [Eef. 24]
On August 14, to demonstrate its outrage at the
apparent inability of NATO to forestall the second,
completely unwarranted (in Greek and in most other interna-
tional opinion) Turkish attack on Cyprus, Karamanlis
announced withdrawal of Greek troops from the military
structure of NATO. The preceeding points cut some of the
basics of the Karamanlis ND policy on Cyprus, which remained
fairly consistent throughout the period of 1974-1981.
Karamanlis has consistently maintained that "the
Greek side would not give in to the faits accompli which the
Turks were trying to create in Cyprus" [ Ref - 25]. He
further stated that it was time the U.N. showed its worth by
showing that it could render justice in the Cyprus situ-
ation. He asserted that Greece will continue to refuse to
recognize any form of autonomous Turkish state in Cyprus (a
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reference to the p reclamation of the "Turkish Federated
State of Cyprus" in 1975). Karananlis justified Greek
interests in two ways:
• Greece "reserves its rights under existing international
treaties" [Ref. 25 ], referring particularly to the
London-Zurich agreements and Greece's position as
Cyprus' guarantor.
• Greece "reserves its rights to defend the inviolable
rights of Hellenism" [Ref. 26].
However, in light of the Turkish military power on
Cyprus which had "created facts" in a somewhat forceful
style, any use of overt force in Cyprus would be counterpro-
ductive for Greece. Greece laid blame on Turkey for perpetu-
ating the problems of Cyprus. "It is Turkey, not Greece,
that seeks to alter the legal status... in Cyprus" [Ref. 27].
Greece therefore has sought an internationalized solution to
the problem, taking its complaints to, and mainly seeking
support from, the U. N. within the framework of intercommunal
talks. Consistently for the New Democracy, Turkish action
in Cyprus;
was considered morally reprehensible and logically inad-
missible. Hence, Greece supported efrorts toward
settlement through talks between the two Cypriot commu-
nities held under the U.N. auspices. Responsibility for
reaching an acceptable agreement, of course, ultimately
rested with the government of Cyprus. Greece, in other
words, did not wish to dictate terms to the government
of an independent country. [Ref. 28: p-177]
This by no means indicated that Greece would accept a solu-
tion which would be prejudicial to the Greek-Cypriot
majority, accomplished under the threat of Turkish arms.
The ND government had done three things to prevent this from
happening:
1. It had thrown full supcort toward compromise solu-
tions proposed by Greek-Gy priot negotiators which
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would acknowledge the existence of the two communi-
ties, place them under some sort of strong central
federal arrangement, and would seek a territorial
arrangement with the Turkish community more propor-
tional to the demographic split in Cyprus.
2. It had sought support wherever it could, especially
from the superpowers, to use their influence with
Turkey as a counter balance to Turkish military
power. (The support of the USSR obtained through the
U.N. Security Council and the Greek NATO withdrawal
can be seen in this light.)
3. Finally, it had been willing to meet with Turkish
leaders, when conditions were right, to attempt to
improve a supportive atmosphere for the intercom-
raunal talks.
The most forceful actior. that Karamanlis was able to
take was to link the settlement of the Cyprus issue to other
issues. To attempt to force NATO and the U.S. to put pres-
sure on Turkey to withdraw from Cyprus, Greek reintegration
into NATO and the use of U.S. bases in Greece were made
contingent on a just Cyprus settlement. To further pigue
the conscience of the U.S., Greece linked the perpetuation
of the U.S. military presence in Greece to Cyprus policies,
citing U.S. policies which seem to support the Turks and
accept the fait ac co mpl i. This linkage, however, was not
totally successful in the long run, although it has gener-
ated some support in the U.S. Congress for the Greek side of
the Cyprus question, notably the Turkish arms embargo. When
the embargo was lifted, the U.S. President was required to
certify progress toward a Cyprus solution.
In 1980, pressed with other concerns— European inte-
gration, Aegean issues, and other security concerns—Greece
finally returned to NATO. New Democracy came under heavy
fire for reneging on its 5-year policy of making a return to
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NATO contingent on the settlement of the Cyprus problem. ND
justified this by pointing out that the reintegration made
Greece militarily stronger, which would lend force to its
support ox the Greek-Cypriot cause, and that over the years
the NATO withdrawal had simply achieved all it could or was
even meant to achieve. This brought an uproar of protest
from the Greek opposition and even the Cypriot community saw
it as a tacit capitulation to Turkish power and resignation
to the new status guc in Cyprus.
Despite this. New Democracy has never accepted the
idea of either a partition in a iy form, the establishment of
two essentially autonomous Cyprus communities under an
extremely weak central federation, or the solution of the
problem without the aegis of the U.N. or within the NATO
community on the bi-communal level. These would all be
politically suicidal for the party in Greece, would accom-
plish nothing for the Greek Cypriots, and would tacitly
reward what were perceived as aggressive and expansionist
power tactics by Turkey.
This last point hints at the real significance of
the Cyprus problem. Having renounced formally all desire
for gnosis and exhibiting willingness to accept some equi-
table compromise in the relationship between the two Cyprus
communities, and having even acknowledged the
Turkish-Cypriot needs for a just settlement to protect their
community, one can draw the conclusion that for ND it is not
"Cyprus" which is the central threat. The central meaning
of the Cyprus affair for the New Democracy was its implica-
tions for other security concerns. Cyprus first caused the
Greeks to question the viability of ' the NATO alliance in
protecting Greek security interests. Secondly, it confirmed
Greek fears of Turkish expansionist intent in the region.
These were linked to the more vital Greek security interests
in the Aegean region, which had heated up in 1973 and were
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continuing to play a more central role for Greece. The
Greek view of Turkish militancy and intransigence led tnem
to interpret every move of the Turks in the Aegean as a
threat to their sovereignty and an attempt to eventually
create a Cyprus-style fait accompli and alter the Aegean
status quo. It therefore caused the ND government to main-
tain an absolute hard line on all Aegean issues, no matter
what justification the Turkish government used for its posi-
tions. The Greek government's reasoning went roughly as
follows:
The unyielding Turkish line on Cyprus deepens Greek
suspicions that Turkish claims to be a continental shelf
in the Aegean Sea and an extension of its airspace over
the sea [have to do] with regaining Greek islands lying
off Turkey's Aegean coast. If Greece agreed [to any
concessions in the Aegean] Turkey's next argument would
be that the Greek islands on the Turkish shelf ... should
revert to Turkish control. [ Bef . 29]
Thus the Cyprus events had a precipitati ve effect of
hardening Greek policy toward Turkey. They also led to a
stepped up defense effort, which absorbed about 255o of the
Greek government's budget throughout the period. Ey citing
Turkey's disregard, in the Cyprus situation, for interna-
tional law and Turkey's "illegal and immoral" use of power,
New Democracy dictated the f crtif ication of its eastern
islands and the Thracian border area. Karamanlis intended
to deter the possible further expansion of Turkish claims,
in the Aegean region.
1 • Aegean Issues
Ultimately mere important to the Greeks than the
Cyprus issue are the disputes with Turkey in the Aegean.
Greek islands located off the coast of Turkey were perceived
as threatened by Turkish expansionism. During the period
1974-1981, the Greek government saw what it called a
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persistent pattern of provocation and aggression in the
Aegean region. The effect of the Cyprus invasion on this
perception has already been alluded to. Reinforcing the
fears of the Greeks were the recent predictions of Turkish
population growth. "They fear that Turkey, with a forecast
population of TOO million by 1995 will be expansionist.
Since an eastward expansion is definitely out, Turkey covets
the land to its west, they say" [fief. 30]. In addition,
statements by Turkish politicians on the theme "struck by
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in an interview in July
[1975]--that the islands of the Aegean always belonged to
whoever possessed Anatolia" [Ref. 29] reinforce Greek appre-
hensions. Referring to the Turkish oil exploration ship
provocations of 1976, a Turkish minister flatly stated that
"the first thing is to establish our sovereignty rights in
the Aegean in a way to leave no room for doubt. . .sovereignty
rights are safeguarded by carrying out seismic surveys"[Ref
.
31]. In the face of this, what Greece saw as the continual
provocation and insincerity of Turkey, Karamanlis had found
it necessary to take a hard line. The issue here was not a
matter of a Greek ethnic majority within an independent
state but a matter of Greek sovereign territory.
The general position of the New Democracy government
therefore was clear:
[it is to] seek earnestly a peaceful settlement. The
recommended sequence was as follows: (1) negotiate
bilaterally with Turkey on the various Aegean questions,
(2). avoid situations that might give rise to aggressive
unilateral acts in the interim period< and (3) submit
points that cannot be agreed upon bilaterally to the
adjudication of the International Court of Justice.
[Ref. 28: p. 177]
Karamanlis had always stated a willingness to negotiate the
issues, but only on certain pre-agreed and legal bases.
However, his Defense Minister, Averoff, stated, "In our own
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sea, the Aegean, our attitude will be aggressive, if neces-
sary, and victory will be certain" [Rex. 32]. The ND
government rejected suggestions tnat the Aegean issues be
settled at the ministerial level (as Turkey proposed) , since
any agreement might lead to de facto change in the status
quo which would then be viewed in Greece as a territorial
concession. Therefore, elevation of the issues was impor-
tant to gain acceptance and reduce risk within the Greek
political realm. While reiterating his desire to negotiate
(from a position of strength), Karamanlis asserted:
I can assure you that when the critical hour does
come... both our vital interests and the honor of the
nation will be protected... while we negotiate with
Turkey we must reinforce our defense to the utmost so
that it can act as a deterrent to certain circles in
Ankara who want to mislead the Turkish people toward a
dangerous adventure. [Eef. 33"
It will be most effective here to simply state the
New Democracy policy on the important Aegean issues. The
reader must keep in mind, however, that the issues are much
more complicated than as presented here. (See Ref. 34 for a
more complete treatment of the issues.)
a. The Continental Shelf
ND based Greek rights on the provisions of the
Geneva Convention of 1958, which gives islands their own
continental shelf. This gives Greece effective control of
the seabed surrounding most of the Anatolian coast. The
Turkish desire for an Aegean Sea median line solution is not
acceptable to Greece. Any arrangement which would result in
enclavement "of Greek islands within a zone of Turkish
economic interest would be seen as a threat to the islands'
future security. ND was not opposed to negotiating an
arrangement whereby the wealth of the Aegean might be shared
in some equitable manner, but it rejected as absurd Turkish
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claims tc settlement by virtue of population proportions in
the area. Karamanlis attempted to get arbitration on the
issue by the International Court of Justice, but these
efforts were relatively unsuccessful. He also signed
various documents with the Turkish government to establish
peaceful bases for negotiations, most notably the Perne
protocol of November 11, 1976. Ke also simultaneously took
the issue to the U.N. Security Council to restrain Turkey
from provocative acts in the region, which the Security
Council supported (U.N. Security Council resolution, August
25, 1S76). Politically having the status quo and the weight
of legal argument in her favcr, Greece would not have
accepted any agreement other than that handed down by an
internationally respected body (ICJ) . Athens sought diplo-
matic level contacts with Ankara to define the situation and
find some common ground for agreement. However, Karamanlis
insisted that the legal documents from the Geneva convention
of 1958 and successive U.N. law of the Sea conventions be
the basis. This has been supported by U.N. Resolution 395
which calls on the parties to settle their differences
within the framework of international law. ND was and
remains opposed to any bilateral or ministerial agreements
or formulae.
b. Territorial Waters
Quite simply, New Democracy did not choose to
extend its island territorial waters to the internationally
acceptable 12 mile limit. However, it consistently empha-
sized that it would not relinquish the right to do sc should
Greek" interests dictate the move. Occasionally, the Greek




In the wake of the Cyprus crisis, turkey, osten-
sibly for security reasons, issued NOTAM (Notice to Airmen)
714 which required aircraft travelling east to report to
Turkey over mid-Aegean. This was contrary to ICAO proce-
dures of 1952 which established the boundary of the
Greek-controlled Flight Information Region (FIR) , for tech-
nical purposes, at a median line between the eastern Greek
islands and the Anatolian coast. This arrangement, origi-
nally intended as a convenience for the facilitation of
international air traffic, has been subject to various
interpretation by Greece. ND came to view the FIR as essen-
tially defining Greek sovereign airspace. They cited
several reasons for not conceding on this point. First,
they saw the attempt by Turkey to control the eastern half
of the airspace as a further effort to isolate the Greek
islands. Greek flights originating from the mainland would
have to "receive permission" from the Turks to commute to
their sovereign territories- Second, such an arrangement,
according to the Greek positions, would enclose the airspace
of the islands and threaten their sovereignty. Thirdly,
such arrangements would make it difficult for Greece to
insure the security of their islands from the air.
Consequently, the ND government took several actions:
1. It issued opposing NOTAM 1157 which declared Aegean
airspace unsafe and suspended air services in the
region, blocking it to international traffic.
2. It extended the airspace limit of the Greek islands
from 6 to 10 miles.
3. It expanded the Limnos Island airspace to include
3000 square miles for military and civilian traffic.
4. It stated that any final agreement must be taken
within the ICAO aegis at the international confer-
ence level.
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5. It has demanded prior Turkish notification of
military/NATO exercises reserving the right to limit
operations in the area for "air safety" purposes,
and played down Turkish complaints of harassment.
With advancement of radar coverage in the area, the median
line requirement became less necessary and progress was
made. However, the government continually cited violations
by Turkish and U.S. planes over what Greece considered her
sovereign airspace.
d. Militarization of the Greek Islands
Efforts in this respect were psychological as
well as military:
There are reports that many Greeks have fled from the
Eastern Islands. The Athens government believes that
unless it takes an unflinching stand against Turkey,
depopulation may continue, making it easier for the
Turks to move in. [fief- 30]
In order to protect the security of the Greek inhabitants,
Greece undertook to reinforce the islands militarily. The
government cited several reasons:
1. In the area of Limnos and Samothrace, the islands
are critical to Greek defense arrangements and were
considered militarized by the Montreux Treaty of
1936.
2. The rest of the Greek islands along the coast have
the right to self defense which supercedes the
Treaty of lausanne, which supposedly demilitarized
some of them, and the Treaty of Paris, which applies
to the Dodecanese.
3. The formation of the Turkish Fourth Army, located on
the coast opposite the Greek islands, is suffi-
ciently provocative to warrant Greek defensive £rep-
arations. Its commander stated, "The army of the
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Aegean has a striking capability. Its deterrent
potential is very important to us. It now [19
August, 1976] disposes a force of 123,000 men" [Eef.
34: p. 40]. New Democracy stated that because Turkey
continues to act in contravention of international
law, treaties and resolutions, the Greek government
was relieved of any qualms about militarizing the
islands.
e. Aegean "Balance of lower"
The Nev* Democracy government continuously under-
took to improve its military position vis a vis Turkey. The
withdrawal from NATO was couched in these terms--to gain the
military flexibility to meet the Turkish military threat.
Later, the maintenance of this lalance turned into an Aegean
arms race— or rather an "aid race." The government was
extremely sensitive about the amount of military aid it
receives from the U.S. relative to that received by Turkey.
New Democracy continually linked this ratio to Greek- rJ.3.
negotiations on U.S. military facilities in Greece.
Notably, the 1976 Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA
framework) was negotiated in light of the. Turkish DCA of the
same year. As part of the price of operating its bases, the
U.S. agreed to grant Turkey $1 billion in aid over four
years and Greece was to receive $700 million. Although
these agreements never went into effect, this 7:10 ratio
became a standard reference pcint in the New Democracy's
balancing program. In 1980, Foreign Minister Mitsotakis of
the Rallis government stated that "Greece is absolutely
opposed to any grant that might upset this delicate equilib-
rium... the balance providing military assistance to Greece
and Turkey at a seven to ten ratio--we insist on that" [Ref.
35]. Karamanlis has regretted this expensive balancing
process, however. In the context of a 1976 non-aggression
pact effort with Turkey, he said:
91
I would make two proposals to Turkey—that the two coun-
tries put an end to the arms race which is detrimental
to the welfare of its people and to conclude a non-
aggression pact and seex. a peaceful solution to their
disputes- [Ref. 36]
Of the external threats to the security of Greece, New
Democracy definitely gave priority to issues on the Aegean.
These issues bear directly on Greece's NATO relationship for
not only have they contributed to continued frustration
among NATO allies, but they have confounded attempts to
reintegrate Greece into the NATO military structure. This
will be the topic of the next section.
5- New Democracy and NATO "Ins and "Outs"
a. The NATO Exit
That NATO interests in the "Southern Flank" have
been affected by the events of 1974 is obvious. Quarrels
between two NATO members, by definition, reduce the capabil-
ities of the military alliance in that area. From the Greek
point of view, the events of 1974 crowned a seven-year
buildup of anti-NATO feelings. The Turkish invasion of
Cyprus was a crowning blow. Faced with the infeasibility of
pressing a military solution and their political inability
to make concessions in Cyprus, the only option was to
attempt to placate public opinion and relieve public humili-
ation by a bold and assertive move. When Turkey, in
apparent disregard for U.N. ceasefire orders, pressed the
second invasion of Cyprus on August 14, 1974, Karamanlis
went to the public and announced that Greece was removing
itself from the integrated structure of NATO.
At the time, the government tried to emphasize
that it was not a political or diplomatic maneuver. They
justified their actions on two grounds, principles and mili-
tary necessity. George Mavros, the Foreign Minister at the
time, explained:
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An alliance which is in no position to impose on its
members respect for those principles for which the alli-
ance itself was founded in the first Dlace, and remains
unmoved when one member attacks another, has lost both
its credibility and its usefulness. [Ref. 37]
A Karamanlis radio address referred to the scandalous act of
the Turks as being perpetrated with the tolerance of those
who could have prevented it [Ref. 38: p. 106]. He also indi-
cated that, because of the compilation of Turkish aggressive
moves, it was necessary to assume complete control of the
military so as to meet the Turkish threat. Recalling the
situation in 1974, Rallis remembered in 1930 that Greece at
the time was faced with 3 options with respect to the the
Cyprus situation; (1} to Unit itself to simple verbal
protest, (2) to declare war, or (3) to effect "withdrawal of
our military forces from the alliance and their placement
under Greek control, under Greek command, and. ..[to make a]
statement that this was a move of severe protest for what
was happening..." [Ref- 39]. Since that time various
analysts have pointed out that aside from the public protest
and military reasoning, the intent was two-fold: (1) to
place pressure on the U.S. particularly (through the
connected issue of U.S. bases and as leader of NATO) and to
bring the issue before the NATO community in a dramatic way
to gain support for the Greek side of the Cyprus problem,
and (2) to allay leftist and centrist public opinion by
capitalizing on the anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism,
which had built up over the junta years to broad propor-
tions, and thereby strengthen troad-based political support
for the Karamanlis program. An indication of the effect
that the" first had, was mentioned by Rallis in his justifi-
cation of the 1980 integration move. He pointed to the
United States' Turkish arms embargo of 1975 (U.S.
Congressional arguments for which were similar to Greek
arguments). [Ref. 39 1
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The second intent was almost predetermined for
Karamanlis if he was to survive politically. The genesis of
the anti-American and anti-Atlanticist mythology in Greece
is not to be analyzed here. Suffice to say tnat the legends
of the "power that wasn't used" and the Kissinger "Mid-East
miracle worker" made the failure in restraining the Turks
look, to some, like conscious U.S. policy in Greece. Thus,
when Karamanlis said he was withdrawing from NATO and
rejected a meeting with U.S. President Ford, he was met
with accolades of approbation from all sides--from the
monarchists to the communists. The wide-spread feeling was
that Greece would now no longer be "sacrificed" to
Washington and Atlantic interests. "Most Greeks seemed to
welcome the decision to withdraw armed forces from the
Atlantic Alliance as an assertion of Greek pride following
weeks of humiliation" [fief 40]. But even though the NATO
move seemed to be a tactical political masterstroke, the
longer-range risks were also evident:
....the most serious damage done to NATO may be neither
the tension between two of its members. nor yet the
decision of the Greek government..., but the hostility
aroused in the Greek public. All reports from Athens
agree that Mr. Karamanlis' action was the minimum he
could get away with politically in the circumstances,
and that resentment against NATO and the United States
runs very deep in Greece at present. Most observers are
very doubtful whether any future government will find it
politically possible to reverse the direction. [Ref.
1]
But Karamanlis calculated that the risk was acceptable in
view of his political priorities. Faced with a choice
"between a disastrous war or open capitulation, or to follow
"the lead of popular reaction" [P.ef. 42], Karamanlis was
bound to choose the latter. Foreign Secretary Mavros
pointed out that "The Cyprus problem is a delaying factor to
the process of restoring democracy. .. we have to give
priority to solving that problem." [Ref. 43] With the swell
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of multi-partisan public support created by the NATO with-
drawal, Karamanlis could reinstate democracy with less
trouble than would normally have been thought possible in
the centrifugal Greek political culture. Given the
inability of Greece to effect a solution in Cyprus, the NATO
withdrawal could have been a tactical political coup.
However, the persistence of the feelings created were to
eventually cause difficulties for New Democracy in subseq-
uent years. The emotionally created juncture was to eventu-
ally be turned by the opposition against Karamanlis himself
and was to contribute partially to his party's loss in 1981.
b. The Effects of the NATO Move
Although the cliche of a "crumbling southern
flank" of NATO became a perennial concern for some analysts,
the effect of Greece's limited exit was probably to be felt
more severely within Greece than within the Atlantic
Alliance. Most NATO observers saw it for. what it was—
a
political maneuver. And since Greece never completely
severed ties, but remained fully within the political NATO
structure, few actually believed that in the context of an
East-West crisis, Greece would wish to remain "independent,"
especially militarily. Additionally, it was pointed out
that the mission of the Greek NATO forces had been to defend
Greece anyway. Some effects did exist, however, such as the
reassignment of Greek forces toward the East, especially
those in Thrace, the halt to Greek, military force reporting
to NATO, the potential restriction of information to NATO
from the Greek NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Envronment)
sensors, restriction in exercises in the area, restricted
use of the NATO Missile Firing Eange (NAMFI) on Crete, and
the possible effects of the loss of U.S. military bases and
intelligence sites, the status of which was linked to the
whole NATO/Cyprus question.
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The adverse effects were to be more serious to
the Greeks, as it would later appear. First, for Greece to
maintain and modernize its defenses to meet their perceived
Eastern threat, New Democracy had to commit itself to an
expensive program. Defense expenditures rose 43.2'/) from
1974 to 1975, another 23.6% in 1976, remained the same in
1977, and in 1978 were up again ty 26%. This coupled with
an upward creeping inflation rate made it clear that in the
long run Greece's defense effort could not adequately
support its needs. [Eef. 44: p. 26] It also eventually became
apparent that the Turks could use Greece's withdrawal to
veto Greece's reentry (using as bargaining power their
support of later Greek reentry bids) and to possibly further
their interests in the Aegean.
Karamanlis' 1974 interim government, while
taking a hard line in public, showed flexibility almost
immediately. Shortly after the withdrawal announcement,
Greece's NATG connections were shown, as open for discussion
pending a resolution of the Cyprus crisis. As a government
source at the time stated:
The decision to withdraw from the military side of the
North Atlantic Alliance is definite..., but if our
allies contribute to a just solution of the Cyprus
:lude the re-examination by Greece
of her position vis-a-vis the alliance. [Ref. 45 j
problem, we, do not exci
Thus the position was that Greece's association
with the U.S. and NATO was linked to progress toward solu-
tion of the Cyprus problem, a position which became a plank
of New Democracy's security program. But this too was to
have an increasingly adverse political effect on ND. It
deterred the party in its later efforts to reintegrate with
NATO and to effect a Cyprus solution. Any reintegration
efforts without a settlement would be seen, by a number of
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Greek voters, as a capitulation and acceptance of the
Turkish fait accompli in Cyprus. An even more serious
foreign policy complication appeared in reference to the
strong, almost obsessive, desire of ND to achieve full
membership in the ZC. Other NATO/EC members could use
Greece's desires for the EC accession to pressure Greece to
return to NATO as an indication of good faith. The party
was therefore sandwiched between two very public policies,
ZC entry and NATO withdrawal over Cyprus. This was to
become a tremendous political liability, for, in the hands
of the opposition, EC accession could be linked with NATO
reintegration efforts, and the two could then be criticized
as ND's acquiescence to U.S. and central European pressure.
This argument, that ND had once again sold out Greek inter-
ests to the D. S. -Northern European "imperialists," would
surface with a vengence in 1980-31.
c. 1975-1981— Attempts at Reintegration
The foreign policy credo adopted by ND- and
Karamanlis (that "we belong to the West" and that Greece is
by virtue of history and culture a "Western European"
country) confirmed Western beliefs that the Greek break with
NATO was never meant to be complete and permanent. ND's
efforts toward EC entry supported this. In fact, in the
same interview where Foreign Minister Mavros laid out the
official reason for the Greek withdrawal in September 1974,
he went further to say that "the Greek boundaries are the
boundaries of the Western World," [Ref. 37] meaning of
course, the eastern Greek boundaries. This could be inter-
preted that there was never any intention to pursue a
complete break with the West. In concert with these views
of Karamanlis' govemnent:
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Athens announced as early as August. 1975 its interests
in a normalization of military relations to the alli-
ance. Karamanlis justified this change of mind in that
a formalization of the Greek association with NATO would
serve the Greek National interest as well as strengthen
the Athens position in the Cyprus question. The recom-
mendations presented by the Athens government in
September/October, 1975 in Brussels contained the
proposal of a Greek special relationship to NATO. [Eef.
38: p. 106]
The Greek proposals of 1975 contained the
following points:
1. Greek forces would remain under national command
during peacetime.
2. After prior approval, NATO could use Greek territory
for its purposes.
3. Also with prior permission, NATO forces could use
the upper Greek regions for exercises.
4. NATO would be able, as before, to use depots already
in Greece and the early warning (NADGE) equipment.
5. NATO was to establish a 7th ATAF (Allied Tactical
Air Force) in Thessaloniki or Larisa for the Greek
air forces parallel to the 6th ATAF in Izmir manned
by Turkish air forces. [Eef. 44: p. 26]
Immediate opposition arose in Turkey, the U.S.
and amcng other NATO allies against this plan. The argument
was that such special relationships could lead eventually to
the dissolution of the alliance. This initial opposition
soon became a main instrument of Turkish foreign policy
toward Athens and initiated a long struggle against a
Turkish veto of the ND reintegration efforts.
However, the real difficulties for New Democracy
arising out of the NATO question were characterized by two
major opposing forces. First,, political complications arose
from three sources:
• The political center, to which the ND program belonged,
saw the necessity of NATO reintegration arising out of
Greece's organic relationship to Western Europe.
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• The far right perceived a threat from the move and was
more radicalized (polarized), achieved increasingly more
support and eventually turned away from ND to follow its
own course just as before the 1977 elections.
• The left of center forces were gaining strength, to a
great degree, through this open anti-Western rhetoric
{also evident in the dramatic PASOK gains in 1977).
It appeared that the ND dilemma of a split policy toward
NATO was to help in a gradual erosion of support from both
sides, apparently irreversible. [Ref. 44: pp. 25-26]
Second, while the political situation recom-
mended that ND proceed with the permanent severence of NATO
ties, the increasingly serious security situation seemed to
demand a reconciliation even more strongly. This latter
"demand" came primarily from twc sources:
1. the increasing and apparently destructive burden of
defense costs (which, however, achieved relatively
unanimous political support) to the detriment of
domestic programs,
2. the growing seriousness of the Turkish threat into
Aegean security and territorial interests which
culminated in a near-war situation in 1976.
Adding to the seriousness of the latter was the fear that
NATO would give allied control cf the Aegean airspace to the
Turks.
It was eventually the Aegean security concerns
which became the controlling factors in the ND Greek-NATO
reintegration issue. However, the domestic political side
of the guestion became an increasing liability to the
survival of the ND party itself. Under continuous pressure
of PASOK and leftist hyperbole, the public opinion could not
be turned from the anti-NATO/U .S. feelings created by the
events of 1974 and prior. It was finally in 1980 and 193 1
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that both sides realized their desires and were
reconciled— ND got NATO reintegration in October 1980 and
PASOK got the govern nent in 198 1.
The efforts of ND and NATO to settle the NATO
Aegean Forces command and control problem was central to
Greek integration and became increasingly representative of
the numerous outstanding Greek-Turkish conflict issues in
the Aegean, mainly turning on the question of Greek territo-
rial and airspace security.
From' the 1975 Greek reintegration proposals,
negotiations proceeded hesitatingly under continual Turkish
veto, through a special NATO working group (created in
1975)- The work came to a head in 1978-79 with three
specific proposals detailed by then SACEUR Gen. Haig.
C) First Haig. Plan (Haiq-Davos Plan)
.
It envisioned a general return to the
status quo ante 1974. Military control of the Aegean
airspace was to be with Greece, under a new NATO command at
larisa. (Vetoed by Ankara) .
(2) Second Haig_ Plan.
Third party NATO commanders (neither Greek
nor Turkish) would coordinate control of the Aegean
airspace. Control was to be apportioned equally between the
larisa and Izmir commands. (Greeks objected that the plan
would bring defense of Greek islands under Turkish control.)
(3) Third Haig Plan.
This plan attempted to divide equitably
the Aegean airspace between international airspace and Greek
territorial airspace over Greek Aegean islands. This could
have been an effective compromise, but had enormous prac-
tical complications. Greek officers in Larisa were to
oversee defense over the islands, and third party officers,
the defense of international airspace. Greeks protested
this plan also by pointing out that "under this formula, a
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Warsaw Pact bomber on its way from Bulgaria to Crete wouli
fly in and out of Greek. airspace eleven times, which
presented an unacceptable coordination problem." [Ref. 38:
p. 109] The failure of the Greeks and the Turks to establish
a modus yiyendi in the Aegean ever the multitude of conten-
tious issues frustrated any attempts at solution of the NATO
Aegean command and control issue.
The Haig plans had been formulated in the
atmosphere of perceived confidence in A then' s bargaining
post ure
:
Emphasizing that there is growing exasperation over the
protracted deliberations in NATO about the special
status reguested by Greece.
.. [Sreek ministers ninted
that] Greece may withdraw from NATO's military structure
altogether if Turkey continues to block negotia-
tions.. .Mr. George Eallis, the Greek Foreign Minister,
told Mr. Cyrus Vance... that the delay was making Greeks
wonder whether the West wanted Greece to stay in the
alliance. [Ref. 46]
This attitude was also a response to the assignment of
Turkish command at 6th ATAF in Izmir.
However, the situation in 1980 was drasti-
cally altered when Gen. Bernard Rogers replaced Gen. Haig as
SACEDR. New developments on the regional and international
scene, as well as growing impatience to complete slated
programs before the next elections were due, caused ND to
press harder for reintegration. Consultations between high
level Greek, defense officials and Karamaniis took place.
One observer noted:
It is evident that the world crisis emanating from the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and President Tito's
sudden illness have been posing problems for the Greek
defense, adding urgency to the need for an end to the
S
resent ambiguity in the country's military links with
ATO. . .President Tito too is known to be eager to see
Greece once again firmly anchored in NATO both as a
deterrent to a Soviet adventure in the 3alkans, . . . and a
Western lifeline for Yugoslavia ... Another concern for
the Greek government. .. is the American Turkish Defense
Cooperation Agreement signed earlier this month [ January
1980]. [Ref. 46]
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And in May, the new ND Prime Minister (Karamanlis had
stepped down to become President), George Raliis, the sam-2
one who threatened to withdraw Greece from NATO completely,
was saying that "the military reintegration of Greece in the
Atlantic Alliance would best safeguard the interests of the
country, and also the alliance in the Eastern
Mediterranean. " [Ref. 48 ] It was in this context that the
new set of Rogers proposals were formed. The "First Rogers
Plan" was essentially a repeat of the last Haig plan. This
proposal would have set up an air defense buffer zone over
the Greek islands and Turkish territory in which a "cross-
tell" military flight information exchange system would
effect defense coordination. Also the naval forces in the
Aegean were to be organized under a "task force concept"
assigned to the commander with the largest force in the area
at the time. This proposal was unacceptable to the Greeks
because it would change the pre-1974 arrangement whereby the
Greek Admiral had control of naval forces in the Aegean.
The ND government could not accept this apparent capitula-
tion and insisted that Aegean command and control be settled
after integration. (The Turks had always maintained that a
settlement must be reached before Greece was allowed in.
This, of course, was seen by the Greeks as a Turkish plot to
"divide up" the Aegean.) [Ref. 49]
Realizing that there was apparently little
hope in settling the airspace control problem. Rogers
changed his tactics— he would press for Greek reintegration
first and settlement of the airspace question by
Greek-Turkish-AFSOUTH negotiation. What prompted the
Turkish government to become more conciliatory was a matter
of speculation and political controversy in Greece. The
retraction of Turkey's NOTAM 714 and the resumption of
normal air traffic on the basis of the pre-1974 FIR arrange-
ments definitely made the agreement more palatable to the
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Greek public. Dnder the final Rogers plan the NATO airspace
control question was to be left to future discussion ana
arrangements between the larisa and Izmir commanders in
coordination with NATO's Air Force Commander, South Europe.
This insured that Greek Aegean interests could not be
compromised by some future permanent agreement. The previ-
ously mentioned "cross-tell" arrangement was implemented.
To resolve the naval command problem, interim arrangements
were made pending final decision on the "task force" concept
(see above). The interim arangement provided that:
The commander-in-chief and the naval commander. South
Europe, will decide in consultation with the area
commanders the delegation of the operational command of
available naval forces. The meaning of this. .. is that
the NATO naval commander in the Aegean, who is a Greek
admiral, stays on but he will no longer have exclusivejurisdiction in the area. The headquarters. .. will
simply consult with him when assigning an operation to a
subordinate commander. . ..[ Ref .50
]
The nebulousness of these airspace and naval command
arrangements was meant to make it easier to advance Greek
integration. Greece was not being tied to any formal agree-
ments, • and both countries were without any stigma of
possible "sell-out. " The Greek Prime Minister was also
quick to point out that the introduction of the agreement
specifically stated that it was to be without prejudice to
the bilateral issues between Greece and Turkey and that it
constituted no precedent for eventual solutions to these
problems. Rallis could therefore argue that there was no
basis for a feared Turkish "next-step," and no control was
formally given to Turkey over any territory or airspace
Greece considered sovereign.
New Democracy therefore met with final
success in its integration efforts. The plan was approved
by NATO on October 20, 1980- However, due to a fairly large
public reaction against the plan, Prime Minister Rallis
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called for a vote of confidence in Parliament. His govern-
ment was retained on October 24, by a vote of 183 to 20.
(94 PASOK and communist deputies walked out before the vote)
[Eef. 51]. As mentioned before, the worsening international
situation could have been instrumental in propelling the ND
government rapidly toward reintegration. However, it
appears that the New Democracy party had consistently
desired and probably expected reintegration from the very
start of the episode. Noteworthy is the fact that espe-
cially after 1978, Greece was relatively active in support
of and participation in Eastern Mediterrean NATO exercises,
notably the annual "Dawn Patrol" and "Display Determination"
scenarios [Eef. 52]. (Greece participated in its first
post- 1974 exercises in 1977.) Also, the HAMFI training
facility had remained active during the period, operated and
upgraded by the Hellenic Army and used by forces of the
U.S.,FEG, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece for ail sorts
of missile training and tests [Eef. 53]
It could be assumed, then, that the delay
in making de lure what was already almost de facto integra-
tion might have been the persistence of adverse public
opinion. ND may have thought at the outset (1974) that
Greek public opinion would eventually forgive and forget-
It appears, however, that the opposite was true. A poll
released in 1980 surveying Greek opinion about NATO,
conducted in November by the Greek magazine Tachydromos,
sampled 600 Athenians. 51% of those polled said that
Greece 1 s return to NATO was bad, 43% were more impressed by
the opposition over the NATO debate in the Greek parliament,
and 51% preferred nonalignment and indigenous defense
efforts for Greece as a NATO alternative [Eef. 54]. While
this may show that the Greeks had a distorted view of their
defense capabilities, it also shows that they were not
convinced of a credible threat requiring NATO protection and
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had not bought into the ND pro-West line. A study reported
in the fall of 1981 presented similar conclusions and showed
a persistent anti-U- S./anti-NATC trend since the days of the
1967-74 junta [Ref. 55]. It could be said, then, that New
Democracy, aware of the trends in public opinion and the
gaining strength of PASOX, locked desperately to conclude
its reintegration into NATO before a possible PASOK victory
in 1981 could reverse this and lead Greece to a "dangerous
course" of non-alignment [Ref. 55].
d. The Great Debate
Confronted with a considerable ammount of
hostility at home over the announcement of the agreement
which brought Greece back into full NATO participation (the
now infamous "Rogers agreement") , Prime Minister George
Rallis called for a vote of confidence for his government in
the parliament. He also agreed to 3 days of parliamentary
debate in which he could present and defend the government's
NATO policy. Assured of a ND majority, he hoped to allay
some of the criticism by formally answering the opposi-
tions's objections. Rallis 1 arguments and the ND NATO
policy as presented before Parliament en October 22, 198 1
can be summarized as follows:
1. The original 1974 NATO withdrawal was based on the
realities of the time, when there was no other
option. It was done for the defense purposes against
Turkey and as a symbolic protest over the invasion of
Cyprus.
2. It had had important beneficial international
effects, stimulating the Turkish arms embargo and
[J.N. anti-Turkish resolutions.
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3. It had important psychological effects for the morale
of the Greek and Cypriot people.
4. Return to NATO had been desired in 1977, since
prolonging the rift would be "dangerous" to Greek
security.
5. Turkish veto pcwer and Greek steadfast resolve net to
compromise sovereignty had prolonged the process.
6. The accepted plan did not in the least infringe upon
any Greek sovereignty. It represented no concessions
or bargains.
7. All pending issues of Greek interests which existed
prior to 1974 and were created thereafter were left
open. Only temporary solutions were reached, over
which Greece had complete control.
8. Turkey lifted its veto because of the "extremely dark
international horizon."
9. It reduced Greek island airspace to 6 miles from the
10 mile limit for NATO military purposes only, in
accordance with NATO procedures established in 196G-
10. It strengthened Greece militarily, and a strong
Greece would be better able to press a solution to
the Cyprus problem and protect the Greek-Cypriot
majority interests.
11. Greece's total withdrawal from the alliance would
weaken her security and channel increased NATO mili-
tary aid to Turkey, thus tipping the Aegean balance
of power against Greece. Additionally, Turkish
aircraft and ships would take over control of the
Aegean.
106
12. Greece has to remain in NATO to protect its national
interests. This was the only arrangement that could
provide full security to the Greek people, given the
prevailing circumstances. However, the option of
change was left open should conditions warrant a
reevaiuation. [fief. 56]
The Pasok NATO positions will he covered in the succeeding
chapter. However, while New Democracy had apparently
achieved a major security goal in the 1930 NATO reintegra-
tion and a foreign policy goal in tying Greece to the West
(Greece also became a full member in the EC on January 1,
1981), the goal of consolidating political support for the
party seemed to be slipping through its fingers. Ealiis
stated that the final decision on the NATO issue would be
made at the polls in 1981. The exact extent to which the
NATO issue affected the outcome can never be certain.
Indeed, the decision was made--to the delight of PASOK and
to the disappointment of New Democracy.
6. New Dem ocrac y and the U.S. Military Install ati ons in
Greece
The future of American military bases in Greece
(which were provided for initially under the 1953 Military
Facilities Agreement which has teen supplemented by numerous
"technical agreements") underwent reconsideration after the
events of 1974. The September withdrawal of Greece from
military integration with NATO naturally brought the bases
in question, since, although the actual operation of the
bases had been codified by bilateral agreements, the exis-
tence of the bases under bilateral arrangements was based on
the broader authority of Article 3 of the basic North
Atlantic Treaty. Under existing agreements, certain U.S.
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operations were authorized in peacetime, but the bases were
to revert to NATO control during NATO-related contingencies.
Thus, the status of the bases became involved within the
whole Greek-Turkish- NATO-U. S. nexus of issues and disputes.
In line with the "independence" plank of Karamanlis 1
foreign policy, a thorough review of the U.S. military
installations was to be undertaken. The reasons behind this
are quite clear. First, Karamanlis was well aware of the
general anti-Americanism which had been growing in Greece.
The presence of the bases in Greece was to some visible
representation of dependence on and domination by foreign
powers. Since they came under almost total control of the
D-S. commanders and the personnel were protected extensively
by extra-territoria lity agreements, they were seen as
"greatpower" enclaves on Greek soil. Even the former
Papadopolos dictatorship had tc succumb to public pressure
in 1973 by severely limiting U.S. use of the bases for
support in the Arab-Israeli War.
With common perception of U.S. acquiescence to the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the belief that the U.S.
could have prevented it if it had wanted to (as it did in
the 1960's), the bases had important implications and
liabilities. Second, their value in enhancing the security
of Greece was questioned. With Greece severing military
ties with NATO, and the U.S. not performing up to Greek
expectations in the Cyprus affair, their value in Greek
security needed to be redefined.
That this redefinition included bargaining power
with the U.S., is clear. If Athens could put pressure on
the U.S. to alter Turkish policy by bargaining over the
bases, they would definitely serve a security interest.
Thus, despite the calls from the more vocal opposition to
immediately close down the bases, Karamanlis decided to take
a more measured approach. The official ND party policy
(1975) was formulated as follows:
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The future of the American military installations in
Greece will depend on the outcome of the 'technical
negotiations ' which opened in force in \thens MO
February 1 975 ]. . . Xaramanlis told Parliament in December
that all foreign military installations 'not relevent to
Greek interests would go.' He promised a full revision
of agreements on American bases in Greece. The Greek
Defense Ministry has been giving priority gradings to
the bases for their relevence to Greek, NATO, and U.S.
interests. Those having the highest ratings in the
first two catagories will be maintained, altnough they
will be stripped of the many privileges and exemptions
they enjoy at present. [Ref. 57]
It was also pointed out that the legacy of the hases
was that Greek interests, indeed its democracy and freedom,
had been sacrificed to the interests of the U.S. to support
Israel during the junta period. On this basis, along with
the adverse public opinion created, the status of the bases
warranted review. According tc U.S. administration offi-
cials, a note from the Athens government at the time
asserted that "all foreign installations in Greece were
there as part of NATO and that therefore their future had to
be discussed, now that Greece was reaffirming her sover-
eignty" [Ref. 58], i.e. her independence from previous
patterns of foreign involvement.
The first action taken by ND concerned the U.S.
homeport of 6 destroyers at Eiefsis. This arrangement had
been completed not long before by the former junta govern-
ment and was particularily visible and sensitive. In April
1975 it was announced that other installations would be
closed, including the U.S. Air Base at Hellenikon. The
second plank in the ND bases policy was made clear in
conjunction with this action. In the April 29 joint
U.S. -Greek statement, it was agreed that in addition to "the
elimination, reduction, and consolidation of other U.S.
facilities, ... the installations where United States facili-
ties remain will be placed under Greek commanders." [Ref.
59] Those facilities remaining were to respect full Greek
territorial sovereignty and Greek laws.
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Another plank in the ND bases policy was made clear
in early 1975 also. It was reported that:
Greek officials indicate that they are using the current
talks to put pressure on Washington to aid the Greek
cause in Cyprus. In addition, Athens is seeking foreign
aid to ease its balance of payments deficits and refur-
bish its armed forces. In public. Greek Officials deny
that American aid would influence the fbrases] talks. In
inked.' [Reft 60]'
private, _they ,say that the two issues are definitely
Thus the principle of linking the bases to a general
Greek-Turkish balance of power was established from the
beginning. Indeed, the fact that no new bases agreement was
ever put into effect under the ND government, could have
indicated their status as a permanent Greek bargaining chip
with the U.S. The 1975 ND actions dictated that the home-
porting agreement would become the sacrifice to public
opinion and the legacy of the junta. The other bases were
to be held hostage to the Greek-Turkish Aegean "balance of
power.
"
The culmination of this approach came in the Spring
of 1976. On March 26, the United States and Turkey signed a
comprehensive Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) . Article
XIX of that agreement committed the United States to
"furnish defense support consisting of grants, credits and
loan guarantees of $1,000,000,000 during the first four
years." [Eef. 61: p. 92] (Grants were to amount to
$200,000,000.) In reaction tc this the Greek government
broke off negotiations on the status of U.S. bases and
indicated that it would make a major policy review. The
general concern was voiced that "this large-scale military
support for Turkey may upset the balance of power in the
Aegean at a particularily delicate phase of Greek-Turkish
antagonism." [Eef. 62] Greek officials also were inter-
ested in establishing a new set of rules governing any
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further negotiation in light of the new bases relationship
agreed to in the U.S. -Turkish DCA. It was also made known
that Greece would be interested in a commitment by the U.S.
(as the major military supplier and foreign military force
in the Aegean) to guarantee the status quo in the region.
On April 12, this proposal was agreed to by the U.S. As a
prelude to resumption of U.S. -Greek facilities talks, the
U.S. said it would give public reassurances that it would be
determined to prevent and, if necessary, oppose aggression
in the Aegean and Cyprus. Having the guarantees it wanted,
New Democracy could now be politically safer in presenting
any sort of U.S. agreement to the public.
The document which was to form the pillar of ND
bases policy was initiated on April 15, 1976. (It was offi-
cially titled the Department of State Press Release on
Principles to Guide Future United States-Greek Defense
Cooperation.) Karamanlis assessed the package deal by
pointing out that "the agreement vindicated Greece because
not only does it avert the dangers, it strengthens the Greek
position [in the Aegean]." [Eef. 63] His Foreign Minister,
Mr. Bitsios, went on to add that "the balance of power in
the Aegean, which we had feared might be upset by the United
States-Turkish agreement, is no longer threatened." [Sef.
64 ] Major points of the agreement are as follows:
(a) Installations:
each one under Greek command.
only activities autorized by Greece are allowed.
up to 50% of the worker personnel on the base
will be Greek and the U.S. will provide for
training.
intelligence information collected by bases will
be shared.
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the agreement will last for four years but may be
terminated earlier and must be renewed.
specific operations at major installations will
be provided for by separate annexes.
(b) Assistance:
four-year military assistance commitment estab-
lished.
amount will total $700 million, a portion of
which will be in grants. [ Ref . 61: p. 37]
Unfortunately for the ND party, the agreement met
with only limited public approval. Although it appeared to
accede to Greek wishes and addressed the issues, the opposi-
tion continued on the anti-West line and criticized the
agreement, saying that it jeopardized the independence of
Greek foreign policy. Conseguently, to placate public
opinion, Karamanlis was forced to make some changes in the
status of the bases.
A decision whether to sign the agreement was put off
for other political reasons. Karamanlis was reluctant to
give the Ford-Kissinger duo ("Kissinger the Killer," on
Athens' demonstrators* placards) a pre-election victory
[Ref. 64]. Actually, the Prime Minister also would not have
been upset if neither the Turkish nor tne Greek agreements
were ever signed, and he stated so openly in connection with
his proposals to end the Aegean arms race and conclude a
Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact. Altough the two agree-
ments (Turkish and Greek) never took effect, their provi-
sions remained guidelines for Greek bases an aid
policy— specifically the linkage of the bases to aid and the
maintenance of the Greek-Turkish 7:10 ratio.
The second success cf the linkage policy of
Karamanlis, although not specifically related to the bases,
was the further codification cf U.S. responsibility in
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maintaining the Aegean military balance. This was in the
form of the 1978 amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961. One of the provisions was that U.S. ail would
be provided for NATO purposes and that "the present (1978)
balance of the military strength among countries of the
region, including between Greece and Turkey, would be
maintained." [Ref. 65]
The new ND government of George Rallis perpetuated
the policy of the former government, insisting on the bases'
linkage to larger issues in which the U.S. was involved.
For example, his government threatened dire consequences and
closure of American bases if the U.S. did not pressure
Turkey to lift its veto of Greek NATO reintegration.
Sensing trouble brewing for the upcoming elections, his
ministers insisted that the NATO issue would be liquidated
one way or another before the 1981 elections. [Ref. 65 S
66] The uproar created also spilled over into the ND party
itself, creating visible tensions between the more politi-
cally centrist Rallis and the respected Defense Minister
Averoff, who leaned further to the right.
Finally, the inability to settle on a completely
acceptable bases package in the face of increasing NATO and
U.S. aid to Turkey and in light of the public uproar of the
left, forced Rallis to conclude that no final agreement
would be politically possible before the 1981 elections. He
foresaw that a concluded agreement with the U.S. could be a
pre-election liability, so he decided to suspend negotia-
tions with the U.S. until after the elections.
C. SUHMARY
This chapter reviews the New Democracy program with
reference to the three major 3reek security concerns;
internal security, security from the Northern threat (Balkan
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Issues) , and security from the Eastern threat (Greek-Turkish
Cyprus and Aegean disputes) . It can be seen that all these
security considerations coalesced to form the background,
indeed, the shaping force, of the Greek-U. S.-NATO relations.
The discussion is deliberately limited to the right-of-
center Karamanlis and Rallis majority governments. It is
important to note that at no time during the 7-year New
Democracy regime was there a need for coalition government.
This brought in a particularly stable political situation
where essentially two major political poles developed--
right-of-center and left-of -center. With the strengthening
of PASOK and the dissolution of EDIK in 1977, both parties
were in contention for the center votes while a small
increase in the radical right and radical left developed.
What is important, though, is that, disregarding the usual
hyperbole (characteristic of parliamentary and opposition
politics and a way of life in Greece), transitions and
internal changes occurred remarkably smoothly.
Unfortunately, the New Democracy party itself was apparently
unable to modernize to fit its new vision of Greece. It
remained under the autocratic control of Konstantinos
Karamanlis, and, because of a fear of losing influence and
the lack of any deep, well-organized party structure, tended
to hold on perhaps too much to the old paternalistic image.
Thus with the tarnish of a seven-year tenure, the Karamanlis
aura began to fade, and with it the fortunes of his party-
On security issues, the party tried to maintain its
attachments to the West, seeking support for its national
interests through a foreign policy aimed mainly at negotia-
tion and diplomatic influence. Karamanlis tried to supplant
some of the historically traditional great-power patronage
with reliance on international regimes such as the UN, ICJ,
EC, and NATO for security. At no time did he ever endorse
the false notion that Greece could realistically pursue its
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security goals with total independence from association with
allies. When the Greek-NATO association prior to reintegra-
tion was compared to France's 11AT0 relation, Rallis, then
Prime Minister, only scoffed that the comparison did not
obtain, since Greece had neither the military capabilities
of France nor the resources. Therefore, w'D gave priority to
the stabilization of the Greek domestic base, for only with
a strong government, society, and economy could Greece
project a credible unified image abroad. Divisiveness and
domestic weakness had caused great-power intervention and
domination in the past, and had led to the abhorred seven-
year junta. Furthermore, Greece's past military adventures
had led to defeat, foreign intervention and domestic strife.
It was therefore in the interest of building up domestic
strength to pursue an aggressive peace policy to settle
differences with neighboring countries. To rid Greece of
the plagues of the past would be to make Greece independent,
secure, and an "equal" actor in European and regional
affairs—to whatever extent possible.
The next chapter offers for comparison and contrast the
developing policies of PASOK and its leader, Andreas
Papandreou, relative to the same set of issues presented
here.
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IV. PASOK OPPOSITION POLITICS AND SECURITY ISSUES, 1974^1981
As we have noted in the previous chapter, the New
Democracy security framework was based on the necessity of
government management. New Democracy did not exist in a
political vacuum, since, as has been discussed, it governed
with a diminishing consensus. The evolution of the polit-
ical opposition to the ND government is examined in this
chapter in order to form a basis for comparison of Greek
security policy under a "divergent" political trend.
The developing PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement)
party is used for this comparison. Like New Democracy, it
was a new actor on the Greek political stage in 1974.
Despite its relatively modest beginnings, most observers
predicted an enduring importance for PASOK in Greek post-
junta politics. These predictions were realized by the
PASOK national election victory in 1981.
This chapter begins with a survey of the rise of PASOK
from 1974 to 198 1, including an overview of the formation of
its general character and policies. The PASOK security
policies will then be discussed as they evolved through this
period. Specifically, the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean and
the U.S. /NATO bases and the Greek-NATO connection will be
detailed from the point of view of the PASOK opposition
party.
A. THE POEHATION AND RISE OF PASOK
1- The Party of September 3, 1974
Andreas Papandreou arrived in Greece in mid-August
1974, after an exile forced by the colonels' regime in 1967.
The enthusiastic crowds that greeted him on his return from
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Canada attested to the fact that he was already an estab-
lished political figure in Greece, and one who, in the Greek
tradition of single personality-based parties, would have
some impact. Andreas was the son of George Papandreou,
pre-junta leader of the Center Union Party. Ihe father's
party governed in the early 1960's and was close to winning
another election in the Spring cf 1967, only to be preempted
by the April 21st coup. Andreas, an American-educated econ-
omist, had taken part in his father's government, forming
somewhat unorthodox economic policies for the Center Union.
He also became known for his leftist tendencies and was
allegedly linked to a small left-wing covert army group,
ASPIDA. His increasing notoriety in Athens politics--he was
perceived by some as a protest leader and a Marxist,
anti-American revolutionary— contributed to the growing
apprehension among the conservative elements of the govern-
ment which ostensibly precipitated the 196 7 coup. (Andreas
Papandreou himself has characterized the coup as being
directed by the U.S. to keep him and his leftist movement
from achieving power.) During the junta period, Papandreou
had organized the Panhelienic Liberation Movement (PAX)
which operated in Greece mainly through contacts within the
student-academic sphere. Within his anti-reactionary rhet-
oric he portrayed the slain students of the "Athens
Polytechnic Massacre" of November 16, 1973, as martyrs for
the "genuinely socialist, anti-imperialist" cause, who were
described as sacrifices on the altar of U.S. imperialism and
domination of Greek politics controlled through the hated
military regime and the CIA, which some alleged was in
control of Greek politics. [ Eef. 1 ] The slogans of the
student movement— "out with the Americans," "democracy now,"
"Greece out of NATO," became slogans of the "movement"
established to contest the elections of 1974 after the fall
of the junta and to carry on Papandreou's vision of the
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socialist transformation of Greek society. Thus Papandreou
brought with him the credentials of a leader; who had been
oppressed by the junta with its allegedly close U.S. and
NATO connections, and who was a fighter for Greek indepen-
dence and nationalism. He apparently possessed the first
prerequisite for the traditional single-personality Greek
political party pattern.
On September 3, 1974, Papandreou announced the
formation of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) . In
the previous month Papandreou had attempted to quiet fears
of new radical political activism and upheaval by saying "We
have seen the cost of a confrontation and we know we have to
be more patient, but not less determined. We have all
matured, not only me, but the Greek people at large." [Ref.
2] This iiore cautious, measured attitude was an important
factor for PASOK, for it allowed the party to gradually gain
strength while maintaining its legitimacy, promoting a
stable atmosphere for change and eventually allowing for
orderly transfer of power— something unique in Greek poli-
tics. In his ideology and policies, however, Papandreou was
to remain assertive. His movement, despite the possibility
of antagonizing the conservatives and risking a return of
the military, was not going tc be politically coerced into
acquiescence. He emphasized, "We [the left] shall not be
overwhelmed by any complex of fear, we shall not suppress
the broad guiding objectives of our political life, which
are national independence, full popular sovereignty, and
social justice." [Ref. 2] PASOK was not to return to the
centrist politics of his father's pre- junta party, but was
to be a continuation of the "national liberation" movement--
anti-royalist, anti-U.S. /imperialist and anti-rightist
—
begun in the 1960's and hardened through the junta
resistance and the "blood of November." As such it was to
be a truly unique appearance on the Greek political scene—
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the first non-communist leftist party formed in -Greece since
it achieved independence. 16
The so-called "principles of 3 September" have
become the persistent leitmotif of the PASOK political
program. They are based on a set of three sequentially
organized goals: "national independence, peoples' sover-
eignty and democracy, and social liberation." Papandreou
based the future survival of a true Greek state on the ulti-
mate strategic goal of socialist transformation. To create
the atmosphere for this proposed transformation to occur,
the state would first have to be purged of all non-
democratic, oppressive elements (i.e. the Monarchy), all
foreign (i.e. the Q.S.) political penetration and domestic
patronage, and all intervention of foreign-controlled,
exploitative, multi-national capital. Of crucial interest y
for this survey, however, is the issue of "national indepen-
dence," for in it lay the basis for the development of PASOK
internal and external security policies and general foreign
policy views. The idea of "popular sovereignty , "formed
basis for the PASOK political policies which would establish
a Greek state capable of safeguarding the Greek national
interest and the interests of its populace.
2 • The Pr ogra m for National I nd epende nee
To understand the post-civil War [1944-1949] history of
Greece, one must bear in mind that the political life of
the country was closely supervised. wnen not directed,
by the United States. The Washington formula for
Greece- .. included the direct penetration of the Greek
state machinery, ...unconditional support for an affili-
ated dependent political party, the party of the Sight,
...the development of a bourgeois opposition party to
16This, in itself, is perhaps a tribute to the post-1974
Greek "political maturity" which many have noted. The facts
that a leftist party was legitimately taking shape with
apparently little reaction, and that it added a new ideolo-
gical dimension to Greek politics seem to indicate that a
maturation process was indeed underway. The implication is
that a more politically "mature" state tends to tolerate a
greater spectrum of dissent and political activity.
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\engage in creative criticism/ fand] finally, the obli-
teration of any party of the left.
From information that is now [1973] available, it is
clear that the decision for a military coup in Greece
was taken in Washington in mid-196D. Bat the actual
execution was delayed until 1567....
..., United States faces an impasse in Greece. The
anti-American feeling runs so high that bourgeois democ-
racy is not an eligible option for them. The Greeks
have come to identify their bondage, their economic
exploitation, with U.S. policy and, of course, with
NATO. No political party could survive in free
elections that did not commit itself to national inde-
pendence, to a complete rupture with NATO, to ousting
the American military from the shores of Greece.
....It has become clear in Greece by now that democracy
is meaningless in the context of foreign domination, or
covert foreign occupation: that popular sovereignty
cannot be established without national independence.
For this reason the primary objective is national
liberation— the ousting of the United States and NATO
from Greece. [Eef. 1: pp. 16-21]
In these statements, Andreas Papandreou, in 1973,
characterized what he saw as the essentials of his party's
struggle for Greece. The threat of external control of the
internal workings of the Greek state was clearly character-
ized by these statements and their gist was written into the
new PASOK movement' s guiding principles. Parallel to the
demonology created around the U.S. /NATO complex— the
supporter of the Monarchy, perpetrator of the 1967 coup,
supporter of the junta, controllers of the GreeK military,
architects of the 1974 Cyprus coup, and supporters of the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus--Papandreou portrayed himself and
PASOK as the incarnate representative of the myth of the
Greek resistance fighters of the 1940's, the "generation of
the polytechnic," and the aspiration of the people for
freedom and democracy.
The desire to rid Greece of what he saw as the
negative foreign influences was immediately put into
concrete policies in 1974. Within the 12-point declaration
of party principles of September 3rd, PASOK declared that
"All international treaties and agreements which led Greece
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to economic, political and military dependence on the
monopolistic blocks [sic] of the West, and particularly
American imperialism are to be abrogated." [Ref. 3] If
some could see room for interpretation in this statement,
their optimism would have been shattered by further campaign
pronouncements such as those criticizing the only partial
Greek withdrawal from NATO. Papandreou asserted that "links
with the political sides of NATC must be severed and we must
oust all American bases which converted our country into a
nuclear target without affording us any protection." [Ref.
3] This policy was put in even starker terms in November,
when Papandreou indicated that if his party won the upcoming
elections, Greece would walk out of NATO, disband all
American bases and adopt a non-aligned foreign policy. He
went even further in saying that his government would
"incorporate in the constitution the ban on Greek participa-
tion in any economic political or military blocks £ s -i-c ]
which undermine national independence and popular sover-
eignty" [Ref. 4], referring obviously to NATO and the EC.
The primary element of threat, the most basic chal-
lenge to the very integrity of the Greek state, spreading
its influence both internally and externally to subordinate.
Greek interests to those of the capitalist-imperialist-
colonialist West, was defined thusly by PASOK. It was the
elimination of this threat that became the prerequisite for
all other socialist progress and the freedom of the Greek
populace. As a central theme cf PASOK, this anti-American,
anti-Atlanticist and anti-North European theme may serve
several practical pclitical purposes (in addition to the
ideological ones) both for the electorate in general and for
the party:
1. It disassociated Greeks and the left from responsi-
bility for the problems of the past, especially
since World War II. External forces were made the
12 1
perceptual scapegoats for a multitude of Greek prob-
lems including the Cyprus problems, the 19 67 coup,
the regime of the colonels, the economic problems,
the Turkish militancy, political problems of gover-
nance, the oppression of the right, the politiciza-
tion of the army and secret . service, the
paternalistic and clientelist political structure,
and more—ail of which "oppressed and disenfran-
chised" the "well-meaning but powerless Greek" citi-
zens.
2. It provided a facile political argument (lacking the
necessity for proof) that anything suspect or not in
accordance with PASOK pclicies was most likely being
manipulated by the U.S. in its "well-known desire"
to reassert its former controls over the Greek situ-
ation. Those opposing PASOK, even Karamanlis
himself, could be linked with "well-known" U.S.
behind the scenes manipulation. An instant reaction
was sure to follow amcng a large section of the
populace whenever these hackneyed phrases- were
uttered. This was done with increasing frequency by
PASOK and reinforced their supposed believability
.
3. It relieved Papandreou and his leftist activism of
the 1960's fiom responsibility for inciting rightist
reaction. (Some had linked him to outbreak of the
events of 1967.)
4. It provided Papandreou a very visible and (in the
age of detente) fashionable rallying point, suffi-
ciently removed from the Greek "bread-and-butter"
issues but closely tied to vague feelings of Greek
pride and nationalism, so as to be a "safe" issue
for garnering popular support.
The extent to which the last of the above was used
by Papandreou is quite apparent, and an opportunity was
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rarely allowed to pass during the 1974-1981 period where he
did not bring the issue of freedom from foreign intervention
to the fore in some context. Ihrough persistent, pounding
rhetoric PASOK made the United States (as "overlord" of
NATO, multinational capital, and Turkish militarism) a
perceived threat to Greek security. Typical of this line
was his statement at a 1930 New Year's Party celebration
where he described the outlook for the coming year in the
following menacing terms:
We are faced with dangerous developments not only on a
world-wide scale but also in cur own immediate area. 7?e
are particularly faced with the d.S. threat against our
very freedoms, the very democratic institutions and the
very course laid down by the peoples' movement in Greece
which, despite contrary U.S. desires, leads to the
victory of the people and of EASOK. [Ref. 5]
Indeed, as the 1970 's progressed, it became apparent
that the idea of national independence with its corollary of
reaction to perceived American dominance had been installed
as a persistent feature in Greek political life for the
indefinite future, its roots going back not only to the
events of the previous two decades, out reaching far into
the history of the Greek republic. Papandreou established
the U.S. as a symbol of the chronically foreign-penetrated
Greek state. In this light, his statement after returning
to Greece in 1974 seems politically realistic, perhaps even
calculating. Referring to the United States, his analysis
was that "They have lost the Greek people. It will take a
generation to heal those wounds." [Ref. 2 ] It most certainly
will take the duration of the period of Papandreou leader-
ship, if not much longer.
123
3. Political Development of PASOK, 197 4-1 98
1
a. Ideology
To political observers of this period, PASOK was
enigmatic. Lacking precedents in Greece and concrete ideo-
logical links with any of the more common varieties of
socialism, it was, and has been, difficult to make
predictions as to where its politics would lead.
Papandreou initially labeled the party socialist based on
Marxist principles but always pointedly rejected even a
remote connection to Marxism-Leninism. He also rejected the
Eastern European bureaucratic state socialist model.
Opposed to this he asserted a sweeping populist approach to
government and advocated decentralization. Indeed, the
Marxist model does not apply well to the economic and struc-
tural views of Papandreou. [Ref. 6: p . 1 1 1 ] Referring to
various connections Papandreou cultivated, especially among
the Arab socialist states, PASOK was criticized from time to
time for advocating a one-party socialist state. However,
the PASOK leader has always emphasized the strictly demo-
cratic nature of his movement, placing it within the frame-
work of a multi-party system based on the present (1975)
constitution. He has not proposed any sweeping constitu-
tional changes. The most often mentioned structural change
has been a change in the parliamentary elections system— and
that only to a strictly proportional system. Of course,
this change would have resulted in seme restructuring of
alignments, probably giving slightly greater weight to the
combined left representation. Attempts at finding parallels
for PASOK have been undertaken, comparing PASOK to the
Swedish, Austrian, and Yugoslavian systems, to the French
socialist party, and to some of his Arab Mediterranean
counterparts. However, each cf these comparisons is only
successful within very limited contexts. The terms
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populism, extreme nationalism, paternalism, and trade-
unionism in addition to socialism all apply to the PASOK
program; each, however, only to a limited extent.
Aa Featherstone has stated, and this is probably
the best summary, "PASOK' s ideological roots are eclectic
and ambiguous. " [Ref- 7: p. 182] Perhaps this was the essence
of the party, especially if one added the term "flexible" to
the list. For it is this ambiguity and flexibility which
gave the party the capability cf responding to an increas-
ingly broad spectrum of left-of-center public opinion, and
it is the eclecticism which has made it appear as an indige-
nous movement and has given it its populist and nationalist
appeal. 17 The ideolcgical flexibility of the party is
evident in that the term 'Marxist 1 essentially disappeared
from the party rhetoric quite early in its development, and
even the term "socialist" has been used less and less [Ref.
6: p. 116]. The best description available of PASOK
socialism is that it is the triptych of these strategic
political goals: "national independence, popular sovereignty
and social liberation"—in whatever concrete tactical form
they may take and whatever perceptual images they may create
among electoral groups. It. is structurally as well as ideo-
logically significant to say simply that PASOK came to
represent increasingly larger numbers of voters who occupy
positions from the left side of the political center up to
(but not including) the far left, whatever their specific
desires may have been.
It is important, here, to mention what PASOK is
not, politically. First, PASOK is decidedly not a radical-
militant political movement, typical of some far left move-
ments. It showed itself, rather, a more evolutionary (but
1 7Three very good theoretical treatments of the PASOK
political phenomenon in Greece are contained in
Featherstone, pp. 181-185, Elephantis, in Penniman Chapter 5;
and Mouzelis, "On the Greek Election."
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assertive) movement, content to allow its support to build
through the "natural expression" of the wishes of the masses
(those people were seen by some as disenfranchised by the
domination of foreign interests and by the political
patronage system which, Papandreou would say, is the charac-
teristic of the rightist-monarchist-militarist Greek govern-
ments of the past decades) . It appears by giving these
formerly "enclaved" (that is, held in a group outside and
without access to the political process) groups access to
Greek politics through the PASOK party structure, a "change"
would occur which would finally vindicate the PASOK posi-
tion with its democratic support. Papandreou and PASOK:
....never failed to pledge that the road to change would
be peaceful, parliamentary, and democratic, clearly with
the aim of minimizing adverse reaction from the conser-
vative middle strata.... Above all, [PASOK] wanted to be
seen as a party striving for the integrity of the
country.... Papandreou carried this to the point of
undisguised paternalism; always he was anxious to
convince, to reassure- [Ref. 6: p. 116]
This was politically realistic. It was near the center,
where the broad popular electoral base lay. Furthermore,
any return to radicalism could have risked return of mili-
tary rule.
This points toward the second thing that PASOK
was not —a socialist party which cared to embrace the far
left. From the outset, PASOK rejected the idea of forming
any close association with the long-established communist
left in Greece. Although the various communist and far left
parties of Greece continually sought to form a grand leftist
coalition with PASOK, lending support on some occasions to
PASOK candidates, especially in local elections, Papandreou
has continually refused to acknowledge these parties within
the PASOK sphere. While many of the policies of the commu-
nist parties seemed well-matched with those of PASOK, this
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seemed to be viewed by Papandieou as merely coincidental.
This again Lad to do with Greek political realities. Any
gains PASOK may have realized in additional political power
by associating with the left (e.g., in the Parliament) would
most likely have been negated by the loss of center votes to
New Democracy (the center not being a powerful independent
force since 1974 and experiencing its final breakup in 1977)
and increased internal party nanagement problems. PASOK
ideology was already spread thin, from the more radical
Marxist PASOK youth, to the centrist parliamentary group.
The broad base which Papandreou sought lay toward the
center.
Two other considerations are important here.
First, there was the lingering legacy of the Greek communist
civil war which mitigated against support for the communist
left among certain constituencies. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the communist parties represented internationalist
tendencies and associations with "great powers" which
Papandreou and his nationalism could not abide. Papandreou,
during this period, essentially rejected any form of inter-
nationalism for PASOK no matter what its flavor, te it the
Marxist-leninism of the KKE, the Eurocommunism of the KKE-I,
the Socialist International, European Social democracy, or
anything else. In 1980, although Papandreou had started a
dialogue with European Socialists, he asserted that each
party is free to choose its "own road" to socialism. For
PASOK to exercise complete autonomy over its policies for
Greece and not enter into any leftist coalitions was funda-
mental to PASOK ideology.
b. Structural Development
A detailed discussion of the structure of PASOK
is not within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless,
several structural aspects are important in assessing the
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nature and strength of the party--thus its potential for
future power.
First, in addition to its novel leftist ideolo-
gical basis, PASOK was also a unigue structural entity. It
was the first Greek party, aside from the communists, to
organize a thorough vertical structure which reached from
the central committee all the way down to the "grass roots"
level. The party structure is ostensibly set up (on lines
very similar to typical communist organizational structure)
to provide a vehicle for the mass electorate, the so-called
"non- privileged Greeks," to express their political will,
which PASOK would then translate into political action.
Extensive cadres were formed to bring in "farmers, workers,
wage earners, professional people, scientists, intellec-
tuals, artists, as well as the youth and women, all of whom
are exploited by the foreign and domestic economic
oligarchy." [Ref. 7: p. 183 ] Ihese strata were to form the
electoral base of PASOK. As they would break out from their
"oppression" they could form an ever broadening base for the
movement. Indeed, this expansion became one of the main
Papandreou directives to his party cadres--to actively
recruit membership participation among the voters. As he
put it:
PASOK.. -has become the main and decisive representative
of the people's movement in our country. ...it opens up
an avenue which leads toward a new Greece after entire
decades of lost opportunities for our people. It is not
sufficient. .. that we are determined and militant.
...our organization must quickly open its gates and
embrace our people, the farmers, the workers, the
artisan the wage earners and the youth of our country...
The movement has deep roots among the people and it is
we who will be responsible if we are unable to embrace
our people and safely lead them toward. . .victory . " [Ref.
8]
The second purpose of the organization is to
destroy the influence of the "traditional" Greek political
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patronage system, often referred to as "rousfetti." This
system relied on a small cadre of regional party bosses who
dispensed favors in return for support of the party. The
PASOK organizational scheme theoretically did away with this
and opened up the avenues of cower to the mass electorate
through its participatory structure.
While this populist structural orientation
remained an ultimate goal of the movement, there is no doubt
that during the 1974-1981 period, a major portion of FA SOX
support was actually based on its charismatic leader.
Andreas, during this formative period, left little doubt as
to the centrality of the party and to the primacy of
Fapandreou within that structure. Angelo Elephantis judged
that "Appearances not withstanding..., the party base does
not participate in any direct constitutive way in the forma-
tion of PASOK' s political line, which is determined almost
solely by Papandreou. .. . " [Eef. 6: p. 107] In the initial
phases of the consolidation of party power and the reconcil-
iation cf divergent political "mentalities" within the
party, the "connecting link is the President of the Movement
[Papandreou] and the September 3rd declaration" [Ref.6:
p. 108] And indeed, it has been the imposing figure of
Papandreou which has been able to balance the divergent
trends (one towards Marxism and one toward the center) on
the basis of his party centrality.
Notwithstanding the populist theory behind
PASOK's organization, the fact was that during the formative
period the structure was instrumental in carrying the views
of Papandreou and the central party organs to the voters,
not vice versa. That the central party organization was in
control of policy formation and that at least for an indefi-
nite initial period, the rank and file was expected to
follow, was pointed out in a 1979 editorial discussing
PASOK's alleged internal probless. " the problem PA50X is
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facing. . .could be easily solved if everyone understands that
decisions must be implemented and that the leadership is
determined to supervise this i nplementation at close range.
All those who do not conform tc tae decisions will have to
face the consequences" [Ref. 9] Papandreou himself expressed
this several months later in quite concrete terms: "We must
warn everyone that either they join our ranks with self-
sacrifice and with militant spirit or else they should get
off the bandwagon now so that they may not have problems
later." [Ref .3 ]
That Papandreou intended to retain his position
as the undisputed head of the party and would, at least for
the time being, brook no encroachments on his authority, can
be demonstrated by several examples of internal party issues
from the period.
• In June 1975, 42 PASOK officers published a declaration
which criticized Papandreou for considering himself "the
only source of power within the party." This action was
in response to a dismissal of 11 members of the PASOK
Central Committee. 37 of the 42 critics were dismissed,
15 of whom were members of the Central Committee.
• In the September 1977 report of the PASOK Executive
Secretariat, Papandreou was acknowledged as the "crucial
parameter" of PASOK 1 s existence. [Ref. 6: p. 108]
• The removal or resignation of a high PASOK official, Mr.
Simitis, in 1979 was related to his "ideological prob-
lems," which he developed when he criticized Papandreou.
[Ref .9 ]
• The alleged proposal by the editor of Exo rmisi (a PASOK
oriented newspaper) that a party congress should be
convened "for the purpose of electing new leadership"
was criticized. A party spokesman responded that "the
time was not ripe" for such a move. [Ref. 11 ]
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• A general party congress was never convened; only
central committee meetings and "conferences" took place.
Presumably the congress would have the authority to
change party leadership, including its president, if it
desired. 13
One former associate of Papandreou stated that Athens was
littered with former friends of Andreas who had opposed him.
Papandreou has not denied internal problems, but
he had to neutralize and control them. Especially after the
1977 elections, Papandreou undoubtedly was concerned with
holding the party together while pursuing the drifting
centrist vote. This could best be accomplished by a certain
amount of policy flexibility which only a single-personality
party could offer. Papandreou contented that during this
critical period of PASOK's rise toward power, the party must
unify behind his leadership. This, in his mind, was impor-
tant for the short term but did not in any way affect long
range goals. In an interview with Ixormisi, Papandreou
explained:
At this stage. it is a fact that PASOK is very closely
linked with the name of Andreas Papandreou. Indeed,
this is how it is. However, our entire course is such
that even this will be surpassed at some other stage and
PASOK will become a movement that will be less identi-
fied with a specific personality. This happens in my
case because I am the man who created the movement.
However, if one were to talk about the country's distant
future, our effort and hope is that the movement should
rely on our people's own forces. ..in the country's long
development, which of course cannot be counted in 4-year
terms or even decades. [Ref. 12]
Thus, for the time being and for decades to
come, PASOK was expected to remain a single-personality
party in consonance with Greek political tradition.
Authority was to flow from the top down for an indefinite
1
8
A general party congress was finally held in May 1984
and Papandreou was overwhelmingly reelected as chairman.
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period of time, and the structure was to temporarily
subordinate itself to the support of the leader's policies,
giving him the flexibility needed to take advantage of the
short-range Greek political reality to eventually achieve
PASOK 's goals. At least temporarily, "the organiza-
tion.. .[was] assigned a secordary role, and the whole
mission of its rank-and-file entities [was] to cultivate the
leader's myth and strengthen the members' bonds with him."
[Ref. 6: p. 109]
c. International Political Orientation
The centrality of foreign policy to the PASOK
political line is illustrated in the description of a 1S8 1
campaign poster: a claw hammer (representing PASOK) was
poised over a Greek flag nailed against a wall with three
nails, representing NATO, the EEC and the U.S. respectively.
The caption underneath read, "With PASOK in power Greece
will belong to the Greeks and will have a foreign policy
independent, proud and respected." [Ref. 14] However, Greece
was not totally, self-suf f iciently secure, and therefore
needed some support from outside sources. It is of course
this guestion which may have worried analysts the most about
Greece— would PASOK turn Greece away from the West
completely? And where—and to whom--would Greece turn?
The early views of EASOK indicate that a turn to
either of the two superpower blocs was ideologically out of
the guestion, although the party's views concerning the
Soviet Union were considerably more vague than those
concerning the U.S. Papandreou was quite adamant about the
"anti-imperialist" course for Greece. The Atlantic Alliance
and the Warsaw Pact were seen as extensions and mechanisms
of this super-power imperialism. He therefore took a more
"thir d-worldist" point of view, advocating an independent,
non-aligned course for Greece. Through the 1970 's, in
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addition to regular contacts with Eastern European govern-
ments and Greece's Balkan neighbors, especially Yugoslavia,
he sought support from two important directions. First he
maintained liaison with a selected group of the European
socialist parties (especially those of the Southern European
and Mediterranean area), such as the French and Belgian
Socialist Parties, the People's Socialist Party of Spain,
the Italian Socialist Party and the Labor Party of Malta.
[Eef. 6: p. 113] Papandreou specifically excluded the possi-
bility of PASOK association with European Social Democracy
and the Western European Eurocommunist movements as bein
j
collaborationists to the super-power capitalist-imperialist
nexus, which was bent on exploiting "peripheral" states such
as Greece [Eef- 6: pp. 112-113 \ For Europe, he saw the
grand goal as being the eventual elimination of the two
opposing blocs and a unification, not solely under Western
European auspices, of all European states (Eastern and
Western). This would eventually allow Europeans to pursue a
course free from the diverse influences of super-power spon-
sored East-West confrontation.
A ' second important direction in Papandreou'
s
international politics was toward an establishment of a new
Mediterranean axis of cooperation. To this end, he sought
close relations not only with the Socialist parties of the
Mediterranean littoral, but with all regional "progressive"
forces. He actively supported and participated (even organ-
ized) conferences of the "Socialist Progressive" parties of
the Mediterranean, examples of which took place on Malta, in
July 1977, and Athens in 1979. In his speech at the former
conference, he:
.
... stressed that these parties [Mediterranean Socialist
and Progressive] must struggle for the overthrow of
imperialist dependency, for a radical change in the
international economic order, and for the formation of a
Mediterranean communitv whicn ought to play an important
part in the development of the North-South
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contradiction. For this reason, these oarties must
coordinate their activities and promote Mediterranean
cooperation.
As he put it:
In North Africa and the Middle East, Algeria. Libya,
Iraq and, of course. the Palestinian movement make up
the progressive anti-imperialist front. For in our
era— the dominant fcrm of class struggle is the struggle
between the capitalist metropolis and the periphery,
i.e. the struggle for national liberation. [Sei. 6:
pp. 113-114]
This concept naturally excluded such countries
as Israel and especially Turkey. They were seen as instru-
ments of the extension of super-power influence which
trameled the national interests of developing countries. A
concept, which became common in Papandreou's rhetoric from
the late 1970 's on was that Greece was simultaneously
European, Mediterranean and Ealkan. PASOK intended to
diversify its international guest for political support
toward all four cardinal compass directions.
The guestion remains as to the PASOK view of
existing European cooperation efforts, especially in light
of the ND-led Greek government's decisive EC-integration
policy. In the initial stages, Papandreou was vehemently
opposed to Greece's integration within the EC. In 1974, the
general idea was that if PASOK were to come to power, ties
with EC would be severed immediately and applications with-
drawn. As this issue evolved, the party line began to
include a referendum on the issue. PASOK reasoned that
broad anti-Western Greek sentiment would demand severance of
Greece-EC ties, which were instruments of external control
of Greek national interests.
As the decade progressed, however, Papandreou
was to begin softening on this issue. "By 1977, PASOK'
s
policy had developed to one of putting Greek membership to a
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referendum and of forming a special relationship with the
community." [Ref. 7: p. 183] There was, at that time,
perhaps a touch of reality creeping into the PASOK program,
for it was pointed out that the Greek: farmers (an important
source of PASOK support) saw the Community as a panacea for
their economic problems and would look. forward to the
massive influx of development funds, were Greece to become a
full member [Ref. 15].
By 1980, when the efforts of the Karamanlis
government for Greece-EC integration had succeeded, a
decided change in PASOK' s European relations position was
increasingly evident. In February, in an address to foreign
journalists, Papandreou appeared to be realigning his
European policy. During this speech, it was reported:
He underlined a divergence of positions between Europe,
particularly France, and the United States... He
appeared closer to the positions of the Socialist
International [which he had formerly rejected] as
adopted in Vienna, [and] he admitted his party does not
want to break off relations with the EEC but that it
intends to propose an agreement on special relations...
He accused the United States of wanting cold war and,...
he stressed it is fortunate that the Europeans, and
particularly France, are separating their positions from
those of the United States.-.." [Ref. 16]
The decisive move came in August when PASOK arranged a
meeting (August 20-2 1) of European socialist leaders. 19 The
meeting was to have an open agenda, although (according to
PASOK) it was convened to "coordinate action on peace,
detente, and, disarmament." [Ref. 17] In viewing the
meeting, Papandreou in a September speech before the party
youth conference attempted to put the meeting into perspec-
tive with PASOK policy:
1 attending were Benito Craxi of Italv, Felippe Gonzales
of Spain. Mario Soares of Portugal. and Charles Hernu,
representing the French Socialist Party.
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For PASOK, the Kekira meeting [with Surosocialist
leaders] was one of the most important milestones in its
6-year history. This is because the five socialist
parties of Southern Europe laid the foundations for
long-term cooperation and coordination of their activi-
ties in the struggle against the right, [and] in the
promotion of the interests of the people of Southern
Europe... at the same time despite its youth, PASOK has
established itself in the European area as a dynamic
people's partv which is at the threshold of authority.
It appears that... the great change in Europe will come
from the South, that the great change will begin in
Greece. ...
PASOK, which has already conducted important activities
in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area, is today a
bridge between the progressive national liberation move-
ments of the Mediterranean and para-Mediterranean areas
and progressive socialist forces of Southern Europe. In
this way it is decisively contributing to the strength-
ening or the south in the North-South dialogue both in
Europe and, more generally, in the Mediterranean area.
[Ref. 18: p.S9
]
PASOK, then, in these expansile terms, was looking for a
more amiable relationship with Europe and Surosocialisiu.
This was perhaps because Greece inevitably would have full
accession to the EC on January 1, 1981, and PASOK support
was growing, leading it closer to attaining power. To
portray PASOK as a leading force in the mainstream of the
Southern European socialists movement would give the party
(previously associated with the more peripheral
Mediterranean movements) a new image of international legit-
imacy. One would probably not doubt that this political
move was in part aimed at balancing the desires of the more
centrist PASOK elements for a less radical foreign policy
with more leftist elements of the party. The latter could
be appeased in that PASOK was at the vanguard of an "inde-
pendent" Southern European movement aimed at confrontation
with the rightist Northern E uropean-U. S. bloc.
This evolution toward Europe spilled over into
the PASOK policy on the EC. Fapandreou sought to undercut
criticism of his apparent turn-around on the Europe-EC issue
later in the September 8 speech cited above:
136
Rapprochement with the Socialist, parties of Southern
agent ly
areas and it has played a decisive role in establishing
permanent cooperation both among progressive movements
of the Mediterranean and amcng socialist parties of
Southern Europe. As of 1 January 1981 it will play an
active role in the socialist group of the
Europarliament.
It has always been PASOK's pcsition that the accession
of our country to the EEC is a mistake [economically]...
In place of accession we have proposed a special agree-
ment of the type recently granted to- .. Yugoslavia. It
has always been PASCK's position that the people must be
called upon to judge— within the framework of a genuine
plebiscite— between accession and a special agree-
ment. .
.
It has always been PASOK's pcsition that—once ve have
acceded to the EEC—we must participate in all organiza-
tions of the community; that we should wage a battle to
protect Greek interests. ...[ Ref. 13: pp.S9-10]
This was to become the basis for the PASOK's EC policy.
However, Papandreou in 1981 emphasized that PASOK did not
intend to join the Socialist International despite
increasing contacts with the Eurosocialists. He character-
ized his position as an act of solidarity which conveyed the
message that "PASOK is not alone in the European area," but
rather an integral part of a legitimate European
movement— "France is first, Greece second and Spain third"
in the socialist transformation of Europe. He also further
gualified his stance en the EC referendum, pointing out that
"We [PASOK] believe that. .. Greece and the Greek people have
the right to judge through a plebiscite. Whether this will
take place or not and whether it will be soon or late I
cannot say at this moment. .-."[ Ref . 19]
Thus, within the context of Greece's assured
admission to the EC, the obvious short-term lack of any
meaningful Mediterranean cooperation, the continued divisive
Middle-East situation, and the active detente policy of the
Karamanlis government, realistic political considerations
dictated that the PASOK policy evolve (from a rejection of
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Eurosocialism in any form and the immediate pull cut from
the EC) toward a policy of qualified conciliation and coop-
eration with European forces. It is noteworthy that this
evolution was highly correlated to the growth in PASOK elec-
toral support— increasing voter support at the ballot box
was matched by increasing PASOK flexibility on European
relations. Some important reasons for this could have been:
1. A quest for greater respectability as the PASOK's
chances at victory increased.
2. A desire to retain contacts with the West, from
where most of Greece's (economic and military)
support came, in the light of limited tactical
alternatives.
3. A desire for more statesmanlike and centrist image
to lure more of the political center votes away from
New Democracy.
4. The ability for PASOK to couch its policy in the
framework of the independent approach to socialism
and the Southern European commonality of interests--
separate from the Atlanticist-U. S. connection of the
Central European bloc. This could appease the more
leftist voters.
While PASOK, by 1981, was advocating a foreign policy
program which it characterized as truly "multi-dimensional;
and which placed an "independent" Greece at the center of a
nascent Euro-Mediterranean anti-imperialism coalition move-
ment, it was obvious that the traditional European ties
would not be severed as early PASOK policies had led some to
fear. Greece's position and security, according to
Papandreou, was to be based on "multiple external props,"
each designed to support Greek interests.
Shortly before the 198 1 elections, Papandreou
put his external politics in perspective:
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Concerning the story that PASOK will turn Greece away
from the West, I Relieve that the matter is placed
wrongly. We want to have excellent relations with the
Rest. However, we do not consider that the West is the
entire world. ...one target is to turn toward all
cardinal points: East, West, North, and South. [Ref. 20]
It is this flexibility that had become important in Greek
politics, for both government and opposition. The
Karamanlis-Brezhnev 1979 summit resulting in Greek-Soviet
agreements and the Papandreou turn to Europe might be seen
as two expressions of a single Greek political trend away
from the single great-power patronage arrangements of the
past to a new political realism and diversification. In
foreign policy, this could form the basis of the "indepen-
dence" (limited as it may be by international reality) which
both parties were seeking for Greece. It also may have been
the expression of a new centrist trend in Greek politics
which could form a more stable political basis for internal
Greek security.
B. PASOK AND SECURITY ISSOES (1974-1981)
PASOK policies relative tc Greek security issues can
also be seen as evolutionary. As PASOK policy moved from
the declaration of September 3, 1974 to the comprehensive
government program declaration cf July 19 81, the realities
of becoming the growing voice of the opposition under the
New Democracy regime influenced PASOK policy. This policy,
until the 1981 program was published, was basically a compi-
lation of the various pronouncements of Andreas Papandreou.
In addition the policies were typical of parliamentary oppo-
sition politics— they were, often reactive to government
actions, often hypercritical, ani lacked the concreteness
and specificity as to policies to be implemented within
existing realities.
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It is therefore most valuable simply to survey PASOK
policies on the issues of defense, the northern threat, the
series of Greek-Turkish issues (Cyprus and Aegean) and the
issue of United States military bases. These will then be
related to one of the central issues which developed during
1974-1981, the question of Greek relations with the Atlantic
Alliance and, specifically, NATC.
1 . Greek Defense and the Military,
PASOK, despite its many calls for disarmament, denu-
clearization and "zones of peace," continually supported an
aggressive defense effort to build up the country's armed
forces. The party never contested a ND defense budget.
This occurred even though defense, in real terms, repre-
sented an increasingly larger financial strain given a
declining Greek economy and rising inflation. Papandreou
continually maintained that a strong Greek military defense
was necessary to deter the Turkish military threat. To this
end, he also saw the maintenance of the Aegean military
balance as critical. In a 1980 parliamentary foreign policy
debate, Papandreou recalled PASCK's support of the 1974 NATO
withdrawal for purposes of bringing the nation's defense
forces under Greek control. He added that:
It is a fact that it must be admitted. .. that during the
past 6 years [1974-1980] the armed forces were truly
armed in such a way that they are in a position to deal
with any imposition against the nation. This was done
with the concurrent opinion of the Panhellenic Socialist
Movement, [fief. 21]
Indeed, Papandreou usually did not criticize the "Aegean
Arms Race" as the government had, and, instead, in line with
his other somewhat militant views vis-a-vis Turkey, he crit-
icized any sort of negotiations (e.g. NATO reintegration or
Aegean disputes) which might weaken the Greek military
position.
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Criticizing the NATO reintegration efforts of 1980
as detrimental to Greek defense development and deployment,
Papandreou again reiterated the need for a specifically
Greek-controlled defense program. Seeing procurement of
NATO military equipment as ineffective against the "real"
Turkish threat, Papandreou asserted, "We must state it
clearly, aircraft, missile boats, helicopters--this is the
type of equipment we will require to defend the land of our
fathers.... We must be in the position to mount an effec-
tive defense because it is the cnly way that the danger of a
Turkish invasion can be averted." [Rex. 22] In short, in
order to meet what was portrayed as an imminent Turkish
threat, PASOK program for defense was:
to arm the people comprehensively, build an arsenal that
is diversified in source and in scope, develop a sizable
defense industry and secure nuclear weapons ror use as
the ultimate deterrent of external aggressive behavior20
[Ref. 23: p. 37 ]
To this end, priorities were given in the PASOK economic
proposals for the development of strategic industries,
including defense (armaments) , energy and mining.
On the subject of the military forces themselves,
Papandreou and PASOK, evolving from their 1974 calls for
drastic action against the junta elements of the military,
have taken a supportive line. Papandreou's caution net to
attack the military may be at least partially linked to the
desire to avoid a return of the events of 1967.
Consequently, he developed a line which usually linked the
military with the preservation cf the Greek democratic state
from Turkish aggressors--at tempting to continue to capi-
talize on the 1974 Cyprus invasion. The call for purging
20The last policy was maintained early in PASOK 's career
and has been modified with the development of Papandreou^
later peace and nuclear disarmament policies.
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the army rightist junta elements was dropped from the
rhetoric soon after the elections of 1974 and the 1975
trials of junta leaders.
One departure from PASOK's laissez-faire attitude
toward military reorganization or similar measures came in
1979, when in a United States interview he proposed what he
called a "people's militia"— keeping all eligible men in the
reserve security forces from age 20 to 50. This policy was
attacked from several sides as aimed at creating a private
PASOK party militia for enforcement of some future one-party
PASOK Greek state. PASOK said cf the criticism that "nobody
guestions that the rcle of the armed forces is useful in the
defense of our country, but it is truly difficult for us to
understand why the Minister of Defense opposes universal
popular participation in this defense when our country's
integrity is being threatened." [Eef. 24] Nevertheless,
this line was also eventually dropped from the party
rhetoric.
PASOK military policy became even more conciliatory
in the early 1980's, especially within the context of
Papandreou's hyperbole against NATO reintegration,
deferring to the armed forces in a Rhodes Campaign speech,
(Aug. 1981) Papandreou emphasized what had become the
"proper" posture of the military. "Democracy in Greece is
indestructible," he said, "It is guarded by the people and
country's armed forces, which are dedicated to their supreme
duty—the protection cf our national independence and of our
fatherland's territorial integrity." [ Ref . 25: pp.S5-6] In
this same speech he accused the government of fueling righ-
tist alarmism over PASOK policies, serving the "circles of
anomaly" (a codeword used by Papandreou for the 7-year junta
government) . Further, to reassure the military and more
conservative elements within the party, he stressed that:
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With regard to the measures P.ASOK will take to implement
its national defense and foreign policy, repercussions
on the nation's armed forces' righting" ability will be
taken into consideration. In no case and with no step
will PASOK allow the downgrading of the readiness of the
country's armed forces to defeni us from foreign
designs." [Eef. 25: p.S5]
These conciliatory statements were apparently impor-
tant. Papandreou continually tied the PASOK program to the
support of a strong army standing for the same policies as
PASOK. If the predicted 1981 passage of government to the
socialists did occur, it would probably be the most critical
change in Greek history/ resulting in the first non-rightist
government of Greece. Papandreou knew that if ever there
was the possibility of a reassertion of a military rightist
reaction, it would be in the context of an impending PASOK
victory.
2. PASOK and the Northern Threat
In light of PASOK' s muti-dimensional program for
foreign policy, Papandreou could hardly criticize the
Karamanlis government's efforts to improve ties with the
Balkan states. Papandreou himself undertook to improve ties
with various Balkan and Eastern European states, especially
with Yugoslavia. He viewed these countries as being in a
position similar to that of Greece (victims of the super-
power polarization of Europe), and therefore saw the Balkan
community in particular as moving toward a more independent
and mutually supportive regime, free of superpower influ-
ence. Concerning possible threats from the area, Papandreou
iterated a common southern European theme: "My view is that
no dangerous development should be expected in the Balkans
in the immediate future." [Ref. 26] Instead, he foresaw an
attempt to move the Balkans toward more internal coopera-
tion, taking them out of the ccld war blocs and interacting
with other similar regional groups (e.g. in the
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Mediterranean, and the Middle East) for mutual support and
cooperation in order to secure independence and freedom from
superpower hegemony.
For Tito and Yugoslavia, Papandreou held a special
regard. The particular brand of Yugoslav non-alignment was
inspirational to Papandreou and was exemplary of the sort of
position toward Europe and its international environment he
would envision for Greece. "Tito's presence in Yugoslavia,
and in the Balkans," he said, "...as within the non-aligned
movement, is, without a doubt, a stability factor. The
foundations for the unity of the people have been firmly set
in Yugoslavia. Its national defense, based on the mobiliza-
tion of all its citizens, has effectively armed the country
against intervention from the outside." [Ref. 26]
The supposed Turkish military threat was, to
Papandreou, the major threat to Balkan security. He
predicted that should Turkey implement this threat, the
Balkan balance of forces would be overthrown and a serious
regional crisis would develop.
Papandreou therefore sought much the same strategic
goals for the Balkans as he did for the Mediterranean
region— the elimination of foreign bases and forces and the
establishment of a regional regime. He foresaw Greece as
being a central force in the liaison between these periph-
eral regions. The ultimate goal would be the dissolution of
East-West bloc influence within the region— the eventual
expulsion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact— and the independence
of the Balkan countries.
This, of course, would be the most desirable
security position for Greece. With a firm and growing
political and economic linkage between the countries based
on similar national and regional interests, the "Northern"
threat would further diminish and regional disputes could be
solved on a bilateral basis. He foresaw no serious clash or
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outside intervention in the region, even in the increased
"cold war atmosphere" of 1980-- unless the coid war became a
"hot one."
Toward the U.S.S.R., Papandreou was not as enthusi-
astic. Although he did not preclude relations with almost
any country, his attitude toward the Soviets was a little
more reserved. The fact that the Soviets had not intervened
in the 1974 Cyprus situation (as they had to so*ne extent in
the 1960's) and coerced Turkey to withdraw must have been
noted. That the U.S.S.R. and Turkey had ongoing economic
and political relations, quite extensive compared to the
nascent Greek efforts, could alco not be overlooked. As a
result Papandreou viewed the Soviet Union, being -he second
half of the cold war European arrangement, with reserve. An
example of this is seen when he was asked to comment on the
possibility of Soviet "bases" being established in Greece
following the Greek- Soviet ship repair agreements concluded
in the late 1970 's. He stated he was against foreign bases
of any type in Greece and the Mediterranean. He apparently
did not appreciate the growing presence of the 5th Soviet
Eskadera in the Eastern Mediterranean any mors than he did
the U.S. 6th Fleet--both seen as instruments of superpower
infringement on the sovereignty of the regional states'.
3 - EJkSQK and th e Cyprus Issue
The 1974 invasion of Cyprus and its subsequent
partition provided a consistent and constant point zf. depar-
ture for PASOK policy. Papandreou' s initial vievs were lass
directed toward some concrete solution of ta-i problem and
more toward expanding upon the implications of the affair
for internal and domestic policy.
Papandreou was probably the figure most vocal in
keeping the "meaning" of the Cyprus invasion alive before a
large segment of sympathetic Greek opinion. The PASOK
interpretation was that:
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The U.S. had a role in the 1974 anti-Makarios coup
1.
and was therefore largely responsible for the
disaster.
2. NATO and the U.S. could have prevented the Turkish
invasion, but instead, by not preventing it, tacitly
condoned Turkish actions and did not pursue a fair
settlement.
3. The affair made the whole nexus of U. S. /NATO-Greek
relations null, since it was through U.S. and NATO
arms and support that Turkey was able to desecrate
an independent state and oppress Hellenism.
4. The Turkish actions were concrete proof of Turkish
belligerent and aggressive intentions against
Greece.
5. The whole fiasco was a direct contradiction of Greek
interests by NATO and the U.S. superpower in order
to secure a military base and exercise control over
the island for NATO purposes.
PASOK Cyprus policy, then, was fairly consistent over the
period. PASOK first demanded that the U.N. assembly resolu-
tion No. 3312 (November 1, 1974) be implemented immediately
and all foreign troops be withdrawn from the island.
Second, independence and unity of the island must be
restored on a basis equitable to the Greek majority.
Papandreou has stated emphatically that Greece, as guarantor
of Cyprus security, must take a strong stand to achieve the
reunification and independence cf the country.
As to the framework for working out a solution,
Papandreou consistently called for the "internationaliza-
tion" of the problem—i.e. the convening of an international
conference including "third" (ncn-NATO) parties to arbitrate
the problem. The intercommunal talks under U.N. guidance
were criticized as being efforts by the U.S. and NATO coun-
tries to effect a solution to the problem which would
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ultimately end up in de facto division of the island.
Papandreou, in a 1979 parliamentary debate, stated "The
tug-of-war between Cyprus' internationalization and nation-
alization continues." (Papandrecu prefered the former, the
latter being the NATO and U.S. sponsored line.) He
proceeded in typical form; "Immediately after the U.N. reso-
lution of November 9, 1978 21 that was so favorable to
Cyprus, the Americans publicized a new plan.... Its
goal... was to derail' once again the Cyprus issue from its
international framework, to decrease the significance of the
D.N. resolution and create a framework of international
talks which would satisfy Atlantic interests." [Eef. 27: p.
515]
Papandreou has adamantly rejected, therefore, the
intercommunal approach to solution which was supported by
the Karamanlis government. He has seen it as an attempt at
"NATCizati on" of the problem, leading to eventual partition
of the island, the legitimization of Turkish aggression, an!
the thwarting of Greek national interests. Under the pres-
sure of the more than 20,000 Turkish troops on the island,
negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communi-
ties could not possibly lead to a just settlement (according
to Papandreou) . Furthermore, any acceptance of an agreement
made under such conditions by the Greek government would
mean Greek capitulation and defeat. Consequently,
Papandreou and PASOK maintained a hard and vocal line on
Cyprus and its meaning for Greece's relations with NATO and
the U.S. The leader explained the PASOK position as
follows:
21?assed by the general assembly, this called for the
withdrawal of Turkish troops and insisted that the Security
council enforce this.
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The gravest mistake is that \«e, both tne Cypriots and
the Greeks of Greece have allowed the creation of the
impression that the Cyprus issue is a matter between two
communities, the Greek and the Turkish communities.
...when I said that I do not believe in the intercom-
munal talks, I meant exactly that. This is an interna-
tional issue, it is an issue for the United Nations,
apart from the fact that it is an issue for the
guarantor power, it is also an issue for Greece. fRef.
28; p.SIOl
Implied here is that in addition to the plight of the
Cypriot people, there is a basic Greek interest which must
be protected in Cyprus.
Papandreou, contended that the real issue is that of
the "British-American bases" and the Turkish-NATO troops on
the island. At the core is the liberation of the Cypriot
people from the "yoke" of external intervention. There are
no real problems between the two communities on the island,
only problems of attempted external manipulation which had
divided and destroyed the island.
Papandreou adamantly warned both the leaders in
Athens and in Nicosia that:
.... neither the Cypriot government nor the Greek
government has the right to legalize faits accomplis in
order to end the Cyprus problem in accordance with NATO
interests.
we are ready to support the Cypriot people's struggle,
we are ready to support the work of tne Cypriot govern-
ment... However m no way will the Greek people recog-
nize the faits accomplis of Attila I and Attila II
[_Turkish 1974 Cyprus operation code names]. We must not
rorget that our own territorial integrity and national
independence are solidly linked with the fate and course
of tne Cyprus problem. [Ref. 29]
Referring to the ongoing negotiations and proposals of
various types of federations for Cyprus, Papandreou said
that concessions which would even hint that there was a
legitimate separate Turkish community on Cyprus, if accepted
by the Greek government, "would constitute treason."
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It is open to question what PASOK actually had in
mind for the concrete implementation of its vocal Cyprus
position. One weapon it continually advocated was the
complete severance of ties with NATO and the removal of U.S.
bases from Greece. It is therefore understandable that the
1980 reintegration into NATO has condemned by PASOK as a
complete sell-out of the Greek Cypriots and the future of
Cypriot independence under pressure from NATO-member Turkey.
However, one must also speculate that Papandreou's
plan of internationalization was an attempt to place
Greece—essentially excluded frcm the discussions, while the
Turks spoke through their tightly controlled Cypriot
government— in a position of influence in the situation. Be
that as it may, it was clear that Papandreou felt some sort
of close Greek attachment to Cyprus affairs and felt that
the situation demanded more ass-ertive action from the Greeks
to protect not only Gree^-Cyprict interests but Greek inter-
ests as well.
**•
^SIS^lHl !§§li®s and PASOK Policy,
It is in the Aegean Sea region that PASOK sees the
gravest danger to Greece from the Turkish threat. It appears
that Papandreou and his follcwers are convinced of the
reality of their perception that Turkey has militant and
aggressive intentions, supported by the NATO/US military aid
program, to expand its influence around, above and eventu-
ally on Greek sovereign territory. Toward this eastern
"threat" PASOK has taken a particularly militant and intran-
sigent attitude. In a parliamentary debate which mainly
turned on the Aegean issues, Papandreou characterized these
perceptions as follows:
....the nation confronts a mortal threat. Cyprus for
years now has been under the bestial Attila occupation.
In the Aegean since 1973. Turkey has questioned the
entire regime which has been established by
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international treaties and agreements. With numerous
official statements Turkey demands the disarming of tae
Eastern Aegean islands; the partition of airspace: the
partition of the undersea area; the non-implementation
by us of the right to extend our territorial waters to
12 miles.... With numerous high-handed and illegal acts
it has violated Greek airspace, the Aegean continental
shelf and our territorial waters. [Ref. 30: p.S14]
FASOK continually criticized the efforts of the Karamanlis
government at negotiation and arbitration. As Papandreou
saw it, negotiation with Ankara over Aegean issues and even
appeals to bodies such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) for an arbitration constituted a tacit admission that
perhaps there was some validity in Turkish claims--an idea
which PASOK totally rejected. Additionally, behind the
scenes Papandreou saw both dir€ct and indirect support of
the Turks by the O.S. and IIATO in their efforts to create a
Turkish "fortress" in the Eastern Mediterranean— especially
in the context of the loss of Iran. PASOK therefore took an
uncompromising line on the various sub-issues involved. An
unfortunate aspect of opposition politics in the Aegean
situation was that not only were the Karamanlis efforts at
peaceful resolution of the situation hampered by the appar-
ently belligerent attitude of PASOK and the public support
it generated, but the same was occurring within Turkey. The
"hard-line" pressure from the opposition within both coun-
tries was almost identical. (Particularly vocal in Turkey
was the Ecevit opposition to the more conciliatory Demirel
government.
)
a. The Continental Shelf
It was this issue which sparked Athens-Ankara
controversy—and on this issue the PASOK policy was quite
confrontational. The party wholly subscribed to the inter-
pretation that according to the 1958 Geneva Conventions, the
Greek islands off the Anatolian coast have their own
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continental shelf, within which the Greeks have broad legal
rights which should net be negotiated. Turkish probes into
these areas were deliberately provocative, according to
PASOK, and should have been met with unflinching strength
—
militarily if necessary.
In the context of the crisis situation created
by the exploration voyage of the Sismik I into Greek-claimed
waters, Papandreou called for its sinking. This famous
"sink the Hora" speech (Hoia being the former name of the
Sismik I) was to return to haunt him in the 1981 election
campaign, where it was used to insinuate the dangerousnes.s
of Papandreou' s positions. Ke attempted to dodge this
charge by saying that the government at the time had agreed
to the speech in order to indirectly put pressure on the
Turks. Be that as it may, this was a good example of
Papandreou's inflexibility on the issue.
Regarding the government's it-emp-c to resolve
the guestion through negotiations and appeals to interna-
tional bodies (U.N. and ICJ) Papandreou was' also outspoken.
In principle he condemned the approach by the government in
its somewhat inconclusive appeal to the Hague (ICJ) \nd its
simultaneous appeal to the U.N. Security Council (197 6).
"We [PASCK] stated, right from the start, that we opposed
the appeal to the Hague. This is because, in this rfay, we
recognized the guestion of the Aegean as a matter for adju-
dication." [Ref. 30: p.S18] Thus the "fiasco of the Hague"
represented admission that there was some guestion about
Greek rights—the resolution of which could only result in a
change of the Aegean states guo and Greek concessions to
Turkey. In this same view, the Aagust 1976 decision of the
U.N. Security Council directing the two parties to negotiate
a settlement bilaterally could also lead to compromise of
the Greek position.
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Finally, Papandreou denounced the November 1976
"Berne Protocol" which the government had nig.ne5 with Turkey
as giving Turkey an unrestricted framework to formulate
demands against Greek interests, without any firm limits
dictated by the Greek interpretation of the Geneva
Covention. "He characterized the Berne Protocol of November
11, 1976, as a legal void.... 'It means that there is no
obligation regarding principles. There is no specific legal
framework; that important rules of international law can be
ignored altogether—including certainly, the Geneva
Convention which has the famous first three clauses which
define the continental shelf of islands.'" [Ref. 30: p. 519]
However, the PASCK position was not totally
confrontational. Papandreou admitted that "no one can deny
that on the technical issue of the delineation of the conti-
nental shelf, there must be a dialogue. This is provided
for under the Geneva convention." [Ref. 30: p.S20] FASOK
believed that these talks should be based on the following
strict preconditions:
1. Advance acceptance by Turkey of the rules of law,
including the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the
Sea resolutions and the 1958 Geneva Convention, as
the only basis for any negotiations.
2. Public renunciation by Turkey in advance of the
"provocative" measures it has taken in the region
specifically those of the 1973 Turkish Aegean map,
1974 ceding of prospecting rights and the 1976
Sis mi k I cruises.
3. Statement of policy by the Greek government that if
Turkey persists in its "unilateral" delineation of
the Aegean, that Greek publish its own scheme and
effectively solve the issue by extending Greek
territorial waters.
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Thus, in general, the PASOK policy has been to oppose any
Turkish claims in the region, by force if necessary, and to
criticize any negotiations which might appear to concede
that Turkey has any rignts within the legal framework of
international law.
b. Aegean Airspace
With regard to the problem of the control of the
Aegean airspace, PASOK has taken an equally uncompromising
attitude. Papandreou clearly stated the party's views on
this subject:
Under a decision of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, the Athens FIR [Flight Information
Region], as it is called, was and has been defined to
cover Aegean airspace up to our Eastern frontiers..-,
with the announcement of NOTAM 714, the Turks attacked
this status and extended boundaries of their own FIR to
approximately the middle of the Aegean. It is clear
that any extension of Turkish airspace west of our fron-
tiers includes Greek national territory. It mutilates
our fatherland's airspace and adds it to Turkey,
[fief. 30: p.S16]
flith this rhetoric, Papandreou has slightly distorted the
actual legal and procedural meaning of the Athens FIR to
make it appear that it is somehow completely Greek territo-
rial airspace. "The Athens FIE coincides with our eastern
frontiers," he asserted in 1S80, "This FIR cannot be
violated. Any violation of the FIR means an act of war in
exactly the same way that NOTAM 714 of 19 74 was." [ Ref . 3 1
p. S 1 3 ] 22 This statement, issued during the NATO reintegra-
tion parliamentary debate, showed Papandreou' s particular
22In reality, the airspace over the Aegean in mainlv
international airspace. It was agreed by ICAO, of which
Greece is a member, that the Athens FIR control the civil
air traffic for pragmatic procedural reasons. Territorial
airspace with defined vertical and horizontal limits
surround the Greek coastline and the Greek islands. This
has been set at a limit of 10NM and constitutes "Greek
Territorial Airspace." All other airspace is supposedly
free tc air navigation subject to ICAO rules and procedures.
(See Chapter 2. )
153
sensitivity about the airspace issue. One of his main bases
for criticism of the NATO move was that by agreeing to
reentry -without the question of the command and control of
the Aegean airspace resolved, the government had essentially
acknowledged that Turkey had equal rights in the area.
Furthermore, the reduction, for NATO purposes, of Greek
island national airspace from ten to six nautical miles was
portrayed as a sellout under NATO pressure and Turkish
demands. He called this arrangement "a form of joint sover-
eignty over the Aegean," and, using Rail^s' own words, he
equated any reduction in, or ceding of airspace to the
control of the Turks as bordering on treason [Ref. 31]-
PASOK, on this basis, opposed any changes or readjustments
in the Aegean airspace from the pre-1974 status quo and
criticized the NATO reintegration arrangements concerning
the airspace as invasions by NATO and Turkey into sovereign
Greek territorial airspace.
c. Territorial Waters
The position of PASOK regarding the limits of
Greek territorial waters was consistent. In 1974, in
response to the Turkish Cyprus invasion and the 1974-1975
"provocative" acts of Turkey regarding the continental
shelf, Papandreou called unequivocably for the immediate
extension of the Greek territorial waters from six miles to
twelve. Papandreou reiterated these demands during the 1976
Aegean crisis. He maintained this line, even though he
could not but be aware that the Turkish government has
continually stated that this move would be viewed as a
declaration of war. (To disregard these consequences by
deliberate provocation is only the prerogative of the oppo-




....The continental shelf issue would have been greatly
simplified if Greece had used its inalienable right to
expand its territorial waters to 12 miles. Eleven or
twelve Mediterranean countries have done so. Turkey has
also done so on the Black Sea and on its south coast.
...-The argument that this would turn the Aegean into a
closed sea can easily be dealt with through a guar-
antee... in regard to free international corridors.
PASOK is irrevocably in favor of extending our territo-
rial waters to 12 males. [Ref. 30: p.S21]
d. Militarization of the Islands
PASOK supported the fortification of the Greek
islands on much the same basis as the government, and in
this respect there was little divergence between government
and PASOK policy. PASOK reserves for Greece the ultimate
right of self-defense regardless of international treaties
which ostensibly called for the demilitarization of the
eastern Greek islands. Strong defense of the islands was
necessary, according to PASOK, to ward off the Turkish
"menace, " represented by the creation of the Turkish Aegean
Army. "It is our duty to warn the government," Papandreou
stated, "that demilitarization of the islands, which are
under the immediate threat of Turkish armed forces, would be
a nationally unacceptable act." [Ref. 32]
e. Aegean Balance of Pcwer
In response to aid efforts by the U.S. and NATO
to help Turkey modernize its military, PASOK continually
called for "equality of treatment" for Greece. Papandreou
characterized any U.S. -Turkish agreements as further
evidence of the U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey, U.S. and
Atlantic designs in the area, and support of Turkish aggres-
sive tendencies against Greek interests. He described
Turkish policy as "the spearhead of the United States and
NATO, which plays a role of the subimperialist power in the
area. ...[therefore] economic aid being granted to Turkey is
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of no interest to us but... we are particularly interested in
military aid because it threatens the balance of power in
the Aegean." [Ref. 33 ] Consequently, he viewed aid to
Turkey not in NATO defense terns, but in terms of possible
Turkish use of this military equipment against Greek
interests.
With respect to using the military bases in
Greece as a vehicle for securing aid from the U.S., and in
light of the signing of the Turkish- U.S. A. defense agreement
in 1930, Papandreou clearly stated his position:
The new U.S. -Turkish 'defense 1 agreement converts Turkey
into a permanent U.S. strongnold for the purpose 01
policing the Eastern Mediterranean. .. with the additional
military aid furnished by West Germany, ... the balance of
power in the Aegean is completely destroyed. ...the
danger to our country is fatal. ...It is consequently
imperative that we cevelop our own war indusfry--in
cooperation with countries with advanced technology. . .in
two, three or even more directions— and it must not be-
in exchange for providing military 'facilities' in our
country. L Sef. 34
j
5 . PASOK and U.S. Military Bases in Greece
The PASOK call for the elimination of U.S. bases in
Greece is almost legendary. From 1974 on, PASOK has fairly
consistently responded to any developments in Greek-Turkish
issues with a call for the inmediate elimination of the
bases from Greek soil. (This points out the apparent, but
publicly denied acceptance by PASOK of the bases' value as
leverage with the United States.) PASOK has used the
following reasoning to justify its policy:
• The bases did not serve any Greek interest, as evidenced
by their inef fectivness in supporting any Greek response
against what he portrayed as Turkish "aggression."
• They were only important for NATO and U.S. interests,
particularly for interventions in Middle Eastern and
other non-NATO countries friendly to Greece.
156
• Considering the apparent NATO non-support of Greek
security interests, the rases invited attack Ly the
Soviet "Jnion in the event of an East-West conflict while
they were ineffective in guaranteeing Greek security
against the supposed Turkish threat in times of
East-West peace and Turkish "aggressiveness."
• They were residual enclaves of U.S. interference in
sovereign Greek affairs and could re used in U.S.
attempts to reassert its former control in Greece.
• Since they were established on the basis of the NATO
treaty, and since NATO had tecome , in PASOK eyes, inef-
fectual for Greece, the bases automatically became
superfluous.
Consequently, Papandreou during the later 1970' s called for
removal of the bases in numerous specific contexts. On a
more general level, too, elimination of bases was an inte-
gral part of the PASOK philosophy. Papandreou emphasized
this fact in a 1979 statement: "PasoK is in favor of a non-
aligned independent policy. This means refusal of foreign
bases no matter to which country they belong. If we were
the government we could have imnedia tely abrogated and ended
the status of foreign bases." [ Kef . 35] In 1930, he put it
even more emphatically (as a reaction to the Turkish-u.S.
DCA) , by demanding that the government:
....must inform the United States that it does not
intend to sign any agreement on the bases— and it must
set a deadline, after which it will cease providing
'facilities* to the armed forces of the United States
and NATO. At the same time, the government must warn
the United States that it prohibits the use of these
'facilities' for any form of intervention in the Middle
East, the Persian Gulf, or Southeast Asia [sic]. [Ref.
34]
Two additional aspects of the PASOK policy on the
U.S. /NATO bases should be mentioned. The first is the
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tangential issue of the storage sites in Greece for nuclear
weapons. From the beginning/ PASOK claimed that the exis-
tence of the U.S. /NATO nuclear weapons on Greek soil would
be defensively irrelevant in any East-West conflict scen-
ario, but would serve to invite nuclear attack on Greece. 23
In addition, Papandreou^ plans for regional independence in
the Balkans and the Mediterranean, freeing them from foreign
bases and nuclear weapons, were jeopardized by the existence
of these weapons in Greece. The nuclear issue became a
point on which Papandreou could gain political prestige at
the expense of the government which was continually led into
embarrassing situations over the issue. This embarrassment
came to a peak in 1981 with the following incidents:
1. The "Drama incident," in which the inappropriate
actions of a U.S. Army contingent exposed a nuclear
storage site near the tcwn of Drama, the existence
of which the government had tended to play down.
2. The release of the "Mills-Chrisospathis note" of
1977 which seemed to question the honorable inten-
tions of the ND government in negotiating the 1976
Greek-U.S. Defense Cooperation Understanding by
showing that the Greek government had privately
agreed to U.S. control of nuclear storage facilities
despite its nationalistic statements on ties with
NATO and the U.S. 2 * This series of events culminated
in the publishing within Elevther otipia, a
PASOK-oriented newspaper, particulars about four
U.S. nuclear storage sites in Greece, including
230n January 20, 1981, Papandreou pointed out that "The
USSR has warned Greece that for as long as there are nuclear
installations in our country. it would be a nuclear target
in the event of a conflict between the superpowers." (FBIS
VII, 21 January, 1981, p.S1)
2 *Papandreou failed to point out that "the continued
nuclear warhead stockpiling in Greece" was one of the public
points of the 1975 Greek proposals for a NATO-Greek special
relationship. [Ref. 37]
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their location, the nature of weapons stored, and
the nature of the American command. On the latter,
the article pointed out that "the four American
commanders only take orders from the U.S. Pentagon,
and disregard the Greek military authorities, as
happened in Drama recently." [Ref. 38]
Thus, PASOK was ah le to make political mileage out of the
nuclear issue, playing on the fears of the public tc the
discredit of the government.
The second nuance in EASOK bases policy began to
appear as the 1981 national elections drew near. No longer
did the rhetoric include an unconditional removal of the
U.S. bases. Rather, the bases issue was placed in the vague
realm of independence of all regional countries, Balkan and
Mediterranean, from foreign influence and association with
the "superpower politico-military blocs." [Ref. 25: p. 53 J
Couching a shift in policy in the terms of realistic
tactical deviation, Papandreou said, on the issue of the
U.S. bases, "We shall give a time limit for. their removal.
In France's case this took one year, in Malta's three years.
How long this will be here, we shall determine after PASOK
comes to power." [Ref. 40] It was also reported that during
the interim, Papandrecu would also "want guaranteed American
arms sales to Greece while the bases remained. ...'the
decisive issue for us is the full satisfaction of the coun-
try's defensive requirements. ...' " [Ref. 41] This consti-
tuted a considerable shift from the previous rhetoric. This
shift coincided with the shift cf PASOK, as the vocal oppo-
sition, to PASOK, with the real possibility of governing.
6- £ASOK and NATO
PASOK views on the Greece-NATO relationship are well
known and were a source of apprehension among some Western
observers considering the continual gains that PASOK was
159
\
making at the polls during the period 1974-1981. It became
pact of party policy from the beginning that within the
concepts of Greek national independence, of a united Europe
without the "cold- war blocs," and of threats to Greek
security, the Greek-NATO connection was counterproductive.
The Cyprus crisis of 1974 supposedly had made it obvious to
Papandreou that NATC "could or would" not support Greek
interests but rather would support Turkey in the event of a
Greek-Turkish dispute. He therefore called for the total
withdrawal of Greece from NATO. The anti-NATC and anti-U.S.
theme found considerable support among the populace.
Papandreou apparently recognized and reinforced this.
Throughout his political speeches, hardly an opportunity was
missed to link NATO and the U.S. with the Cyprus problem,
the junta government, support cf the Turks and the invasion
of Greek sovereignty. This xenophobic rhetoric touched the
nationalist feelings of a large segment of the voters with
effective political results.
As "evidence" of NATO's undesirability , Papandreou
dwelled on the following themes:
1. NATO support, particularly from the U.S., daring the
Greek junta in deference to Atlantic interests.
2. NATO plans which were at the heart of the 1967 Greek
coup and the 1974 coup against Makarios.
3. NATO desire to partition Cyprus and end its indepen-
dent and, non-aligned status.
4. NATO/U.S. support of Turkey with armaments and aid.
5. NATO arms used in the Turkish Cyprus occupation and
deployed against the Eastern Greek border in the
"Aegean Army."
6. NATO support of Turkish control or partitioning of
Aegean seaspace and airspace for military control.
Papandreou' s anti-NATO rhetoric reached a crescendo
in the months of government reintegration bargaining leading
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up to the reacceptance of Greece into NATO in the Pall of
1980. Ihe intricate, menacing connection between NATO, the
U.S., the EC and Turkey, and its designs on Greek sover-
eignty were laid out clearly by Papandreou in 1979 before
Parliament:
Europe is deeply eroded by the political military appa-
ratus of NATO. In exchange for a protective nuclea;
umbrella, Europe has accepted the overlordship
.
Strategic sectors of the Pest European economy, of the
SEC, are controlled by the U.S. multinational busi-
nesses.
• • •
Western Europe is truly dominated by the United States;
in all critical decisions the views of the United States
must be borne in mind. Our participation in NATO and
the presence of U.S. and NATO bases in our country guar-
antees continuation of our dependence on the United
States.
• • «
EEC is nothing but another aspect of NATO, and the
history of NATO in Greece is well known. NATO is
responsible for the Cyprus tragedy. It is responsible
for the 7-year dictatorship. it is responsible for the
scandalous support of Turkish claims at our country's
expense. [Hef. 30: p.S9]
The most vehement PASCK criticism of the P.allis
government's NATO policy surrounded the Parliamentary debate
on the "Rogers Agreement" (see chapter 3) . In listing the
reasons for criticizing the agreement, Papandreou revealed
the PASOK policies in regard to NATO reintegration:
1. The agreement must be submitted to the Parliament
for ratification as a new treaty (rather than the
vote of confidence proposed by the government)
presumably to both change the" amount of votes
required for passage (from majority to 3/5
majority) and to force the government to make the




2. NATO membership would force the Greek military into
deployments less effective against the Turkish
threat. Defense would be "sacrificed on the altar
of NATO interests."
3. The agreement puts in guestion the control of the
Aegean airspace and leaves it up to trilateral nego-
tiation to set up zones of responsibility for the
6th ATAF (Izmir) and the proposed 7th ATAF (Larisa)
.
This PASOK believed was an acknowledgement of
partial Turkish rights in Greek sovereign Aegean
airspace which PASOK defined partly based on a novel
interpretation of the meaning of the ICAO/Athens FIR
arrangements.
4. In a clash tetween superpowers, NATO membership
would not protect Greece but would instead invite
annihilation by the Soviet Union.
5. NATO offers no automatic defense in case of attack
on Greece. It is conceivable that Turkey might veto
action to aid Greece or Turkey would be the
attacker, in which case NATO would be at best in a
paralyzing dilemma or, at worst (for PASOK) , would
side with the Turks.
6. Membership means "supplying useful information"
(intelligence) to Turkey which could be used in a
Turkish attack on Greece.
7. Cyprus becomes a "victim" of the agreement. By
doing what the Greek government said it would never
do as long as Turkish troops were on the island, it
would be a sell-out and an acknowledgement of the
Cyprus partition.
8. Greek sovereign airspace over the Aegean islands is
violated by reducing airspace from ten to six miles
for NATO purposes, giving Turkish warplanes rights
within the former Greek boundaries.
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9. NATO command of "seaspace" in the Aegean under the
agreement reduced the authority of the Greek admiral
and gave the U.S. adrairal in Naples power to control
forces in the area. [Ref. 31: pp.S11-19]
One could reverse these points in expectation of what PASOK
might request as essential for further continued participa-
tion in NATO. The one concrete proposal PASOK guaranteed
was that once it came to power (presumably in the next
election) PASOK "would be in a position to abrogate the
agreement, but, because we respect the Greek people, we want
to say something else; when we come into government we will
present the Rogers agreement for consideration by the
Chamber of Deputies of that time so that the Chamber can
decide in a sovereign manner." [Ref. 31: p.S18] It is
apparent by this and later statements that PASOK has shifted
away from the former unconditional demands of NATO with-
drawal to a more cautious and conditional attitude toward
any bold unilateral moves once in government.
It is understandable that Papandreou's views on NATO
were distressing to the Alliance. However, one must
remember that as the opposition party, criticism is "cheap"
and politically beneficial. One might take the more opti-
mistic view that there were two political motivations behind
Papandreou's NATO stance.
1. Papandreou actually put pressure on NATO (albeit in
a negative and indirect manner) to force the alli-
ance to consider Greek positions regarding its
security issues, especially Cyprus and the alleged
Turkish threat. At least in keeping the NATO issue
in the forefront of politics and public opinion, he
did not allow the issue to die quietly without
Greece asserting its o«n wishes. His opposition
politics, to some extent, prevented the government
from accepting reintegration too hastily without
pressing Greek interests to the furthest degree.
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Papandreou gained tremendously in political support
because of his ultra-nationalistic views, unafraid
to question the "all-powerful" United States and its
NATO instrument. This not only Drought him, as it
turned out, a continual base of political policy
support, but caused serious complications for the
government. He was able to sustain this issue in
speech after speech, touching the nationalist sympa-
thies of the voters fcr seven years, until his
election in 1980. The longevity and vitality of the
issues were remarkable.
C. CHANGE IN THE PASOK PROGRAM
1 • ZL2® Unknown to Power
It took PASOK barely over seven years to rise from
its very modest beginnings to a position of power. In
November, 1974, running on a platform of radical nationalism
and sweeping reform, it polled only 13.6% of the vote and
received only 13 seats. However, this poor showing could be
accounted for, to a large extent, by the situation of the
time. The Greek people, having the burden of the junta just
recently lifted, exhibited caution and restraint in 1974.
By the 1977 elections, however, running on the same
sort of platform, decidedly on extended issues with less
mention of economic reform, PASOK increased its percentage
to 25.3* and received 93 seats, making it the majority oppo-
sition party. This seemed to vindicate PASOK in its claims
that the real feelings of the electorate were not adequately
expressed in 1974. Had the voters wanted only change, they
had other options in 1977, especially in EDIK, which held
many views similar to PASOK but not to the same extreme.
However, the shift went to Andreas Papandreou, not to the
center, and the center collapsed. Additionally, in the
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municipal elections PASCK continued to gain strength. One
must conclude that at least part of this support was due to
Papandreou's policies.
PASOK' s growing support demonstrated other aspects
of the post-junta political realities in Greece. First, the
power of a single charismatic leader with large crowd appeal
appeared essential, as it had been for generations in
Greece. A new reality, though, was that the people were
responding to a new political organization, one which
reached down from the top and through a well-organized and
pervasive structure, disseminated the party message to the
masses. For the first time, a popular party had attempted
to form an organization based en participation rather than
on patronage. That this participation was severely
restricted and uni-directional did not seem to matter at the
time.
The rise of PASCK in opposition, then, could be
attributed to these general supportive factors; the charisma
of the leader, the party organization, and the perhaps
radical but intriguing change it offered in its ideology.
When observing PA50K policies, one must consider the
realities of the opposition system. (Europeans are usually
better able to do this than U.S. observers.) To be flambo-
yant, assertive, and critical, even a bit radical is fine
for an opposition party. But when it is faced with the
possibility of being the government, other factors must be
considered, not the least of which is gaining a majority
base of support. The 1981 PASOK platform illustrates this
effect.
2 - Ik^ 1981 PASOK Platform and Policy Evolution
It has already been seen that a certain shift in
some of PASOK 1 s policies had begun to take place as the 198 1
election year approached. Pursuing this by analyzing the
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1981 PASCK Policy Declaration released in July, 198 1, as a
statement of the party government projrams, will show some
of the examples of policy evolution as PA50K moved from
opposition toward power. The following points illustrate
some of the consistencies and divergences reflected in the
Policy Statement.
a. General Issues [Ref. 42]
• Of the seven main goals listed, only one, the first,
deals directly with foreign security policy (listed
first in the order) — "national independence and defense
of our territorial integrity." The rest are suitably
general, relating to economic development, cultural and
social matters and the environment.
• The three main "ideological" foundations remain
unchanged from the original September 3, 1974 statement.
• On relations with European socialists, "The movement
[ PASOK ] cooperates closely with socialist and progres-
sive forces of every country," including the socialist
forces of Europe. Previously, the policy was non-
association with Eurosocialism.
• "Peaceful and democratic" processes of cnange are empha-
sized. "We will reach authority through peaceful and
democratic means. ..and we will decisively protect
people 1 s sovereignty and the democratic institutions."
This has been a growing theme to allay suspicions of
radicalism formerly associated with leftist Greek
politics— calming the opposition and expressing modera-
tion.
• Turkey remains as the arch-threat to Greece, "the
concrete, guided Turkish threat against our national
integrity and security." A different, hard-line
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strategy will be used by PASGK to counter this threat.
This "serious external danger ... dictates the orientation
of our foreign and defense policies."
• A secondary threat comes from "foreign and monopolistic
capital" over the affairs of the country. The country's
economic problems are the result of "foreign economic
hegemony which must be broken down."
• What PASOK called "National Issues" (e.g., the supposed
Turkish Aegean threat, Atlantic support of Turkey,
Cyprus occupation, NATO reintegration, foreign bases,
and EC integration) are linked with "strategic goals."
From the previous hard line on these issues, they are
now put in the realm of tactical maneuver toward long-
range greater goals.
• The "Strategic Goals" are three: (1) shaping of a
national defense policy, based on a strong defense
organization and a "firm stand on national sovereign
rights" to deter the threat and secure peace; (2)
shaping an -independent, multi-faceted Greek Foreign
Policy; and (3) active contribution to disarmament and
world peace [a new appearance in this priority slot).
• There is to be an incremental approach to change in the
country. The pace of this change must be keyed to the
balance of power as it is developing at every given
instance, the tolerance of the Greek economy and above
all the consent and participation of the people's
forces. Unilateral and drastic PASOK action, feared
formerly by many, especially " the more conservative
branches of the party, is precluded. The guiding prin-
ciples are pragmatically based on political reality,
economic feasibility and the decision of the electorate.
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• Although goals will be set guickly, their implementation
will be a gradual process so that "insecurity is elimi-
nated." This bone was thrown in the direction of the
existing government structure and bureaucracy.
• "Absolute priority in expenditures" is given for
national defense. For a party which promotes European
disarmament and independence from militant, arms-racing
Atlanticism, PASOK seemed to subscribe to the older
basic tenets of the Atlantic alliance, deterrence and
military strength, to counter its threats within its
Aegean microcosm.
b. Specific "National Issues" [Ref. 43]
(NOTE: The term "national issues" as used by PASOK refers
to those issues which deal with the security and protection
of the Greek national interests, including defense and
foreign policy.)
• The basics are "a defensive arming of the country and a
genuine multi-faceted foreign policy."
• A general caveat is included: "while the strategic goals
are irrevocable, individual steps. .. will always bear in
mind the arms reguirements of the armed forces of our
country as well as the development of the balance of
power in the international area and specifically in our
own area." Essentially, this says that tactical PASOK
policies will be based on international and regional
realities and security policy pragmatism.
• The strategic goal is ".dissolution of both world war
blocs: NATO and the Warsaw Pact." Greek withdrawal from
the Atlantic Alliance is limited to this contingency.
The former call was for immediate exit from the entire
alliance structure, military and political.
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• Formerly PASOK called for total withdrawal from NATO.
This has been changed to: "[PASOK] will bring the Rogers
agreement to the Chamber cf Deputies for its abroga-
tion." This indicates that it is not the NATO involve-
ment per se that is undesirable, but the terms of
involvement. The only decisive move proposed is the
removal of NATO nuclear weapons from Greece.
• The "peculiarity" of the Atlantic Alliance for Greece in
the Turkish threat problem. If this difficulty were
removed by securing Greece's borders against the
supposed Turkish threat and a balancing of Aegean power,
and if Turkey were restrained from its allegedly provoc-
ative acts, it follows that the position of Greece in
the alliance would not be so "peculiar," and would be
normalized.
• "Foreign bases" (not called U.S. bases any more) in
Greece "create a direct interest by this foreign power
in [formerly a threat to] our country's domestic
affairs." They also cause local "social, economic and.
cultural disturbances." Fomerly, they were "enclaves of
imperialism and oppression." The terms used regarding
the bases are considerably more conciliatory.
• Removal of bases will have a transition period. "For as
long as these bases remain ... wit hin a specific timetable
for the withdrawal of these bases [time not specified ]--
there will be guaranteed prerequisites that their opera-
tion will not be against our country's foreign
policy...." The Greek government is to maintain the
right to suspend and control their operation. This is a
far cry from the immediate expulsion called for earlier.
The policy here closely resembles the proposed 1977
bases agreement, negotiated by the Karamanlis
Government.
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• In the Aegean, the policy remains hard-line.
Negotiations with Turkey are seen as non-productive and
leading to Greek concessions. "Dialogue" with Turkey
can only take place to the extent that inviolable, non-
negotiable Greek sovereign rights are acknowledged.
Land, sea and air boundaries and the Greek continental
shelf are not negotiable. There was conspicuously no
mention of extending Greek territorial waters, which had
previously been PASOK's firm policy.
• Cyprus for PASOK is a "priority issue." It is also an
international issue because of foreign (Turkish) occupa-
tion. Greece retains its "legal rights" as "guarantor
power" to support the Cypricts (ethnicity not specified)
in their efforts to remove foreign troops and bases and
return refugees to their hones.
• The Cyprus intercommunal talks are valid only for
producing a political modus vivendi for the island once
its territorial integrity is reinstated. They cannot
lead to agreements which would partition the. island.
These views have remained consistent for PASOK.
• PASOK foreign policy, based on the three identities of
Greece— Balkan, European and Mediterranean— will be a
policy of "realism" not "isolationism." All obligations
will be made with provision for their abrogation if the
national interest so dictates.
• Regarding alliances (presumably including the Atlantic
Alliance) , "there may be historic conditions that will
force our country to ally itself defensively with other
countries." They may be approved if the alliance "truly
contributes toward national independence and defense of
territorial integrity." Since the main Greek alliance
possibility foreseen in the near future is that with the
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West, Greek participation within the Atlantic structure
as well as within a nexus ox bilateral defense alliances
(possibly with the U.S.) is not precluded. This is a
considerable departure from former party rhetoric.
• Policies related to the reform of the military services
were disproportionate to the rest. They were aimed
mainly at personnel program improvements which would
give the military more reason to support the government.
They also led toward a "democratization" of the military
services, breaking up pockets of power, providing more
promotion mobility, and attempting to improve the
general guaiity of the officer corps.
As is evident by these examples, the practical
side of PASOK in power was to be considerably more conserva-
tive (centrist) than some of the early leftist rhetoric
might have predicted. The meaning of this could be seen
from two different angles:
1. That the more militant leftist policies and
"anti"-views were toned down and softened to gain
votes and put the party in power without some
violent conservative reaction. PASOK might then
revert to more extreme policies once its power had
been consolidated.
2. That the reality of Greek politics dictated that to
come to power and remain there certain practicali-
ties had to be considered. Opposition parties could
afford to be critical and at times acrimonious, but
the realities of governient would dictate that poli-
cies be modified to match the particular Greek situ-
ation.
To discover which one of these applies, one must
explore how these policies were implemented by PASOK in
government. This is the purpose of the next chapter.
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V. PAS OK IN POWER, 19 8J-PRESENT
The political developments of 1974-198 1 indicated
certain trends among the two prominent parties, New
Democracy (ND) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) . On this basis , some tentative conclusions might
be drawn. However, one must sea what trends predominated
after the watershed political month of October 1931, when
PASOK became the governing party— the first ieft-of-center
majority ever installed into Greek government during its 30
years of constitutional history.
A. THE ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 1981
Culminating a process which Papandreou said began in
the 1960*3, PASOK brought the left to victory on October 18,
1981. He had come to power on a platform of "allaghi"
(change) based on a party program considerably more
moderate than the Marxist, third-worldist rhetoric of
PASOK's earlier years. (See Chapter 4 for details.) In a
campaign which stressed economic and administrative reform
and social justice at home and Greek national pride abroad,
Papandreou had apparently achieved his goal of isolating the
right, legitimizing the left and avoiding any association
with the communist far left. The election results show the
practical effect of Papandreou' s trend toward moderation.
The right (New Democracy) was the big loser in the
campaign. Even the fact that the far right National Rally
Party decided not to contest the election in order to give
more solidarity to the ant-PASCK vote, could not salvage
much for ND. It is clear then that the losses came from the
center side of ND, and may have been greater than indicated
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by the vote since the far right vote most likely switched to
ND. (The National Rally had received 1% of the vote in
1977.) With its lackluster campaign, lack of identifiable
specific party programs, and lack. of a truly charismatic
candidate for Prime Minister, the ND vote was reduced to 36%
giving it 115 seats in the Parliament. It appears from the
election results that the loss was a result of the center
group party moving left and being picked up by PASOK. Thus
the PASOK campaign for a legitimate, moderate image had paid
off. PASOK received a comfortable H2% giving it a single-
party majority in the Parliament of 172 seats.
Of the other four significant contenders 25 only the
Greek Communist Party (KKE) made any real headway. The KKE
picked up 10.927* of the vote and 13 seats (independently of
the other communist parties), a rise of 2% over its 1977
showing, but these gains were minimal since PASOK did not
need a coalition for support. This shows that while PASOK
picked up considerable support from the. center vote, which
had been set adrift in the 1 S77 elections, the far-left
element of PASOK was probahly not as inspired by the party's
increasingly centrist policies. This effect can be seen
even more vividly in succeeding municipal elections where
the KKE seems to be slowly increasing its support. Thus
,
the PASOK policy shift alluded to in the previous chapter
turned out to be a well-calculated risk for the time, but
loss of some of the left vote cculd not be avoided.
The election results, however, were not necessarily the
"landslide" that Papandreou has called them. As was evident
in the concurrent European Parliament elections, there was
still hesitancy among the voters. The vote for the
25The main four here were KKE, 10.92X, Party of the
Progressive 1-6%, KKE- Interim, 1.37% and the Party of
Democratic Socialism—Agricultural Party Coalition, .12%.
The latter three received no seats in tne Greek Parliament,
but each received one seat in the European Parliament.
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Euro parliament representatives was more evenly matcned
(PASOK received 10 seats and ND 8 seats, the other six being
apportioned among four smaller parties). [ Ref : 1, p. 40 1] the
message to Papandreou was that there were still a number of
significant voter groups not willing to take the socialist
plunge, especially in the international arena.
Out of the 1981 elections, several general observations
are important. First, this was apparently a concrete
expression of a general political trend in Greece which
began in the 1960* s, rising out of the modernizing forces of
the 1950 f s and 1960 's. The gradual political shift away
from decades of rightist rule had now taken on a certain air
of permanence. Second, it seemed that the gap in the center
of the political spectrum which had opened after years of
political extremism was finally being closed and the radical
right and left were moved out to the political fringes.
Thirdly, the traditional political mechanism had apparently
broken down. Unable to modernize its political structure,
forced to increasingly rely on the old forms of political
patronage, and faced with a modern, grass roots political
machine, ND had succumbed and with it some of the long-
standing assumptions of Greek politics. 26 Finally, there
seemed to be demonstrated a new ideological ingredient in
Greek politics, as people were able to accept the principles
of "change."
It must be pointed out that some considerations served
to bring down ND over which PASOK had little control. Not
the least of these were the worsening economy, with unem-
ployment growing and inflation hitting 25%, and deterio-
rating social dislocation. Indeed, most commentators seem
to agree that Papandreou came to power mainly on the
2*of course some observers would say that the last word
has not yet been written on political modernization and
PASOK has and will revert to more traditional party-voter
clientelistic relationships.
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prospect of change within the domestic realm of economic,
social, environmental and employment issues. Furthermore,
the prospect of "change" per se offered by PASOK had a
certain appeal among Greek voters, many of them being prod-
ucts of the great changes which have taken place in Greek
society since the end of World War II. "Greek voters are
not resistant to change because in post-war Greece, change
has become an integral fact of life." [Ref. 2: p. 93] Thus,
since things were going relatively poorly for the typical
Greek anyway, he might not be adverse to trying something
new or seeking new opportunities. In summing up the trends
represented by the October elections, Jennifer Noyon
comments that:
Papandreou's election was of historic significance for
Greece. The campaign was the first to be fought on
economic and social issues and its results shifted Greek
political equilibrium by legitimizing the left-of-
center. From now on even the conservative parties will
probably give more attention to domestic reform and
social justice and take a more assertive stance on
foreign policy issues. The biggest lesson however, both
domestically and internationally was not to take the
Greek voter for granted. [Eef. 2: p. 93]
This last comment was to become a familiar refrain when
Papandreou talked of international issues.
B. THE POLITICS OF PASOK, 1981-PRESENT
1. PASOK Political Stymie
It is far beyond the sco^e of this thesis to deal
with the vast array of domestic programs and actions which
the PASOK government undertook. Inasmuch as internal
strength, unity, and prosperity all form a firm foundation
for the internal security of the country, these programs and
policies should not be forgotten. Papandreou repeatedly
acknowledged the far-reaching importance of domestic
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strength in pursuing the "national issues," and often
repeated the fact that they were a prerequisite for an
effective foreign and security policy. However, Papandreou
definitely exhibited an incrementalist attitude in internal
reform.
Initial broad questions were in relatively inconse-
quential fields. The more difficult economic and social
problems were found to be more stubborn. He preferred to
support private enterprise on a broad scale, concentrating
on the more critical, strategic industries for government
intervention. It was not until the spring of 1983 that a
"socialization bill" appeared in the Parliament. Government
administration proved to be an equally tough nut to crack,
Papandreou having to admit after one year in office that he
had not achieved what he had expected. Finally, regarding
the unions whom he had regarded as one of the pillars of
democracy, while he had reduced some restrictions initially
and offered the workers considerable increases in wages and
benefits, by 1983 he was reacting -puite strongly against
disruptive strikes, introducing anti-strike legislation for
workers in strategic industries and was calling for more
productivity from the workers tc help stabilize the economy.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the economy
played an increasing role in dictating (perhaps behind the
scenes) the complexion of Papandreou's foreign policy. Ties
with numerous countries were being pursued-- most on the
basis of "businesslike" economic cooperation lacking
specific ideological content. This was especially true of
relations with the Arab Middle Eastern states, selected
states in North Africa and with the Eastern Bloc. Above all
this, though, there was a significant shift in PASOK atti-
tude toward the West, which was decidedly more conciliatory
not only with the Southern European states but also with the
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previously criticized "capitalist imperialists" of Central
Europe. One cannot but imagine that Papandreou kept a
watchful eye on the image Greece presented to the West both
domestically and internationally. As an economist of note,
Papandreou no doubt knew the importance of stability,
internal security and legitimacy for much-needed foreign
capital investments.
2 . PASOK Internal Development
Cne would have expected that once the party was
comfortably in power, there would be considerable desire to
democratize the party and pursue its goals of decentraliza-
tion and popular control. This was to prove as elusive as
governmental decentralization. Papandreou has remained the
central figure and as yet has allowed little questioning of
his leadership. In essence the phrase "PASOK is Papandreou"
still applies in many respects, as many critics and
observers have pointed out.
The "autocracy" of Papandreou was indeed one criti-
cism. A pair of events in the fall of 1982, may serve as
examples. In July a law was introduced which called for a
cabinet reshuffle. A new government, expanded and reorgan-
ized, was formed. As justification for this move, and
apparently in the face of criticism that this reorganization
was done primarily to consolidate Party control and weed out
party members not sufficiently responsive to party wishes,
Papandreou pointed out:
....that the important thing is a restructuring in the
form of a cabinet that would insure complete coordina-
tion and efficiency. As regards the persons, I have
many times pointed out that the PASOK cadre should not
consider themselves permanent either as members of the
party's Central Committee or the Executive Committee nor
as members of the cabinet. [Ref. 3]
177
This was meant as a promise that PASOK would not start back-
sliding into typical Greek bureaucratic entrenchment, but by
some it could be seen as a threat-
Indeed, in the following month, Evstathios
Panagoulis found out what this sort of statement meant for
those who chose to criticize the party policy. Tendering
his resignation in criticism of party policies, he was imme-
diately "struck" from the party by the disciplinary council.
"The Prime Minister and PASOK chairman together with the
movement's Executive Committee, decided that the views Mr.
Panagoulis expressed in his resignation letter undermine the
government's task of change and of the movement." [ Ref . 4]
There was no doubt in this case that Papandreou was in
control, and by expressing disagreements within the rarty,
Panagoulis was allegedly attempting to create a basis for
internal rebellion. Later, in December, Papandreou also
hinted at forces within the party which may be leading
toward some divisive ness. In response he felt it necessary
to reaffirm his role in the guidance of party affairs. In a
joint meeting of the two guidance bodies of the party, he
stated that:
I feel I have been away a long time from my duties as a
member of the Executive Bureau and chairman of the move-
ment. This is why I see my presence today in the joint
meeting of the Executive Bureau and the Executive
Secretariat as the beginning cf my more active partici-
pation in the movement's affairs. [Ref. 5]
Seeing the need for a new organizational campaign,
Papandreou, during this same meeting, set a date for the
long-awaited first party Congress. It was to take place in
November 1983. (The long awaited congress finally took
place in May 1984.
)
It is then the party organization and to a great
extent Papandreou' s leadership style which has maintained
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PASOK's strength, a style which is "marked by assertive,
flamboyant and calcuiatedly ambiguous rhetoric coupled with
caution in action. " [Ref. 2: p. 91] He continues to pursue
his "third road to socialism" 27 refusing to form close links
with any other leftist or socialist movement. Specifically,
he has rejected any connections with the KKE, although this
Greek communist party has continually called for a unity of
the left, and has stated that Japandreou will never be able
to complete his programs without full support and participa-
tion of the far left. As he points out, "...some leader-
ships believe in an obsolete dogma: that without their
presence there can be no change." [Ref. 6] Ke defined whom
he meant by this reference to obsolescence later, growing
more adamant toward the increasing criticism and pressure
being put upon him from the far left. "The KKE," Papandreou
announced, "follows an arteriosclerotic strategy and obso-
lete tactics." [Ref. 7] Papandreou was mounting a counter
attack on those who would conspire to maxe inroads on
PASOK's ideological autonomy. Characterizing the opposition
as trying to hamper PASOK's independence as the only polit-
ical and ideological alternative solution to the country's
problems, he further stated tnat "for PASOK, a mild climate
does not mean political disarmament. .. a mild climate does
not mean slackening the confrontation and the struggle for
declared principles. . .and the vision of social liberation."
[Ref. 7] Papandreou intended to ally the movement with no
one— PASOK was to make no political deals. This may show
some insecurity, but with PASOK's majority and party
27Papandreou defined his concept of Greek "socialism" as
the "third road"— "for PASOK, socialism means a smaller role
for the state and a greater role for the citizens within the
framework of local self-government through the implementa-
tion of decentralization and democratization of worjcers' and
farmers' trade unionsism." To accomplish his economic goals,
incentives are used which are meant to stimulate especially
the small and medium businessmen--" the backbone of the
economy." [Ref. 9]
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control, combined with Papandreou' s continual personal
popularity among the electorate, 28 this insecurity is only
speculation until new elections are held.
C. PASOK FOREIGN AHD SECURITY POLICY, 198 1-PR2SENT
1 . Genera 1 Fore ign Policy
The foreign policy of PASOK, according to
Papandreou's November 22 policy statement before the
Parliament, is as follows:
._i,n policy. Our xirm goal is develop^..
relations on a world wide scale and particularly with
the Balkans. the people of the Mediterranean ana with
Europe— West and East alike—and with the Arab national
[sicj which constitutes a dynamic factor in the course
of the world. This is our firm goal: active contribu-
tion to detente, disarmament and world peace. [Ref. 10:
p. S3]
This policy is formed through two general considerations:
(1) that Greece is simultaneously a state of Europe, the
Mediterranean and the Balkans (a recurrent theme in PASOK
rhetoric) , and (2) that Greece offers its support to any
developing nation in the pursuit of its own national inde-
pendence. In other words, PASOK places Greece theoretically
as a middle man between the third world, the "peripheral"
states and the industrialized countries of central Europe.
looking at the above statement and those that
Papandreou has issued in the past, the question of non-
alignment could be raised. It is notewortny that no where
in the entire policy speech (nor for that matter in the
28 A popularity poll in May 19S2 reported that Papandreou
continued to have about 52£ in favor of the way he handled
matters. This was up from the April percentage (48%), the
main increases were in the older, traditionally more conser-
vative age groups while he lest support among the 17-24
crowd, whicn has formed the mere radical section of PASOK.
[Ref .8]
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PASOX party platform) is there any mention of "non-
alignment" for Greece. The term non-alignment is mentioned
only with reference to the solidarity with those countries
who are struggling against superpower influence and trying
to pursue a nonaligned course. Instead the question of
alignment is moved into the nebulous realm of sone future
dissolution of the two global power forces, and the reversal
of the effects of "Yalta and Potsdam" in dividing Europe.
In other words, Papandreou sees Europe in essence non-
aligning itself, but until that time he intends to base nis
foreign and security relations en the basis of international
reality. Papandreou later acknowledged the limitations of
Greece in referring to his lofty foreign policy goals, "We
know that we are a small country and we have no high views
about the prospects available to a small country." [Ref.
11] One could expect then that Greece, being limited in
real international power, must continue to rely on realistic
options until Papandreou' s view of European Utopia becomes a
reality and the "cold-war" blocs melt away. As early as
November 2, 1931, Papandreou explained in an interview with
a Frencn newspaper that "It is not that we feel tempted to
break ties uniting us with Europe. Greece is of course a
Balkan and Mediterranean country but it is also, and above
all , a European country." [Ref. 12] This view evolved to
where in September 1982, it was reported that in an inter-
view with an Italian paper, Papandreou allegedly said that
"Greece belongs to the Atlantic Alliance." [Bef. 13] While
this could be a simple statement of fact, it is unusual
coming from Papandreou and was reported in the Greek papers
as being a variation of the former Karamanlis aphorism that
"Greece belongs to the West." Finally, in 1983, Papandreou
made the plunge and stated that within the geopolitical
balance as it was established hy the Yalta and the Potsdam
agreements, Greece belongs to the West. [Ref. 14]
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Papandreou' s foreign pclicy since coming to power,
as Noyau has pointed out, has generally two pervasive
aspects: one pragmatic and the ether ideological. The prag-
matic side has to do with economic and political realities.
Papandreou's multi-dimentional contacts with a diverse
number of states— African, Middle Eastern, Eastern European,
western European and even with the United States— all have
definite economic overtones. In the plethora of agreements
that Papandreou has signed with countries of all these
regions, economic cooperation is the key. They have to do
with overseas markets and investments, providing for energy
and new materials and development funds. The EC association
holds particular benefits in the latter respect. But impor-
tant also is Libyan and Arab oil, Balkan trade and elec-
tricity, Soviet oil and gas and the like. All are designed
to support the weak but developing Greek economy.
Secondly, PASOK foreign policy is not devoid of its
ideological and abstract overtones. This side is seen in
the pushing of issues such as disarmament, European unity,
anti-nuclear initiatives and the peace campaign. But these,
too, must be measured with practical benefit:
1. They can enhance Greek security by bringing closer
association with its Balkan neighbors and theoreti-
cally reducing the critical Northern threat.
2. They lend Greece a certain amount of international
prestige, or at least notoriety, which appeals to
the Greek sense of national pride and improves the
party* s public image.
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They allow Greece to pursue tactical maneuver on
3
.
sensitive issues by providing convenient caveats for
relations with the West. Strategic goals can be
upheld while realistic policies can be rationalized
by citing certain presently unreachable pre-
conditions. 2 9
The controlling element of political and economic
pragmatism may be missed by seme analysts as they become
immersed in Papandreou's high-flying rhetoric. Even in the
November 22, 1981 pclicy statement it is evident, however.
Papandreou explained that:
. . . .we will create a Greece which will be nationally
proud, with a national foreign policy wnich will be
independent and multif aceted . We have only one duty:
the national interest. ...Cur foreign policy is: a
policy of peace, a policy of reality, a policy of soli-
darity for the people struggling for their" national
independence.... [Eef.10: pp.S1-3j
This attitude even spills over into Papandreou's views on
the United States--Greece ? s alleged former arch enemy. In
1983, in the context of an an imminent bases agreement,
Papandreou explained that the primary issue was not the
presence of the bases themselves, but their value to the
Greeks. In a particularly conciliatory public tone, he
stated:
We ("the PASOK government] always recognize— otherwise we
would lack realism— that the united States is a great
power, perhaps even the greatest power, and that it has
strategic interests of primary importance in the area.
We know what our strength is and what its limits are.
Consequently, we do not aim f cr confrontation. Our aim
is not to [end the operation of U.S. facilities in
Greece] unilaterally, but in consultation with the
United States, provided it shows the minimum under-
standing and respect for the Greek people's independence
and sovereignty over their territory. [Ref. 15: p.S2]
29Thus Papandreou puts his disassociation with the
Atlantic Alliance within the cencept of the dissolution of
East-West blocs, pulling out nuclear weapons with the
creation of a Balkan Nuclear Free zone, and so on.
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The measure of relations is now a matter of benefit to
Greece. Presumably, the reality of Papandreou's foreign
policy is that as long as Greece's actions do not visibly
violate any principles which must be minimally guaranteed,
then associations may proceed on the purely pragmatic basis
of benefit to the Greeks. 30 It is this basic " Reaipolitik"
outlook which must be taken into consideration when viewing
the PASOK government's foreign and security policies.
2 • The Greek-Europe Connection
As has already been mentioned, Greek foreign policy
under PASOK has demonstrated an increasing association with
the Fest. Supporting this new PASOK outlooK is the evolution
of the Greece-EC relationship. Abandoning its former posi-
tion which called for severance of EC ties, Papandreou has
sought advantages within the European framework.
Immediately after the election, he reassured reporters that
relative to leaving the EC:
We have not reached that point. He are not even asking
for the status of a mere foreign external associate. We
are prepared to remain closer to our partners, but on
different bases which will have to be established with
us. We must negotiate a special status for Greece which
takes its economic characteristics into account. [Ref.
12 ]
This view was reinforced in the iNiovember 22, 198 1 policy
statement. In it he recalled that Greece has an obligation
to fulfill in relation to its accession agreement. However,
he did not totally drop his former ideas about the plebi-
scite on membership, stating that it was, however, the
President's prerogative. He did not push the issue.
30For a good treatment of this idea, see Ref. 16 and
Ref. 2.
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Instead, Papandreou, citing the British example, is
seeking to renegotiate the terms of accession. To this end
he submitted a memorandum asking that the EC consider
Greece's special situation and protlems. This was acknowl-
edged by EC the in June 1982. He has also enlisted the
support of other Southern European countries in forming a
bloc to deal with Mediterranean issues. Placing his poli-
cies toward the EC in the context of a growing North-South
division within Europe, Papandreou's initiative has gained
him some notoriety and has also gained some acceptance
within the community. In speaking to the socialist
Europarliamentarians , Papandreou reportedly explained that:
The time has come for all cf us to think about the
possibility of a rapprochement between East and West
Europe, that when we refer tc North and South relations
we must mean not only relations between Europe and
Africa but also Northern Europe and Southern Europe.
[Ref. 16]
The extent to which Papandreou is prepared to seek
political and practical advantage is indicated by his
assumption of the EC presidency for the period 1 July to 31
December, 1983 and his commitment that, among other issues,
"progress should be made on the issue of complete
Mediterranean programs." [Ref. 17] Papandreou, then, was
attempting to work within the European structure to gain
political and economic advantage. In the case of the
former, he stated his intention of bringing the issue of
Cyprus before the EC and attempting to involve the other
nine more heavily in support of the Greek-Greek Cypriot
position. (See below.) As for the latter, the PASOK leader
has not let EC membership deter him in pursuing active
economic relations outside EC. Most notably, the 10-year
Greek-Soviet economic cooperation agreement signed in
February, 1983, raised some Coinnunity eyebrows.
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D. GREEK SECURITY ISSUES UNDER PASOK.
1 • ±tefense and the Military
It was apparent from the beginning of the PASOK
administration that a strong defense was to receive priority
attention. This had been stated clearly in the party
program. It was reemphasized when, on 21 October, 1981,
Papandreou took over the Defense Minister portfolio himself.
In addressing the military after this action, Papandreou
stated clearly the message to be conveyed;
My decision to take over the National Defense Ministry,
in addition to the prime minister's office, stresses the
great importance I attach to the country's armed forces
and their sacred rcle of safeguarding our national inde-
pendence. [Eef.18]
There are possibly several reasons for this move.
Among them may be the following:
1. To emphasize the importance of defense in deterring
the supposed Turkish threat.
2. To keep close track on the strengthening of the
armed forces and better coordinate this program with
his foreign policy.
3. To be closely involved in military circles and Keep
a wary eye on any political aspirations of its
senior officers.
4. To carry out structural and personnel plans he envi-
sions for the services.
5. To allow himself dual eDtry into the NATO structure,
both as head of state in NATO summits and as Defense
Minister in ministerial and committee meetings,
which would give him double opportunity for polit-
ical maneuver and exposure.
In the November policy statement, Papandreou
outlined in more detail his defense program. The following
points were emphasized:
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Development cf a firm foundation for a strong
1 .
military to deter aggression. Primary emphasis was
to be placed on "strict preparedness and battlewor-
thiness.
"
2. Coordination of foreign policy to support and "guar-
antee necessary military preparedness." In addi-
tion, this coordinated effort was to be pursued
through internal planning and "correct" deployment
of forces (obviously a reference to NATO and the
supposed Turkish threat).
3. Improvement of military infrastructure (materiel
organization, communication, and personnel support)
.
4. Military personnel program reforms, including
changes in officer promotion systems, improved
training and education, greater benefits for
servicemen, etc.
5. Military equipment modernization in conjunction with
diversified procurement sources.
6. Special attention to the development of a modern
Greek war industry and coordination cf other
economic sectors to support its development.
[Kef. 10: pp.S2-3]
These programs have been actively pursued by the
government with some small success. Diversified procurement
has led to such programs as the cooperation in APC produc-
tion with Styr of Austria, procurement of jeeps from
Rumania, and involvement in the European consortium to
produce "Stinger" missiles. Finally, in deciding on an
upcoming major fighter aircraft purchase, he has indicated
that it may be a mixture of U.S. and European products,
although this may not be feasible.
Papandreou has made it clear that in relation to the
military aid connected with the 1983 U.S. bases agreement,
Greece would like development and technological aid for its
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infant defense industries. Greece has also pursued the
development of its own industries but so far with little
impact / except possibly in naval shipbuilding (Greece has
produced and is producing its own missile boats.) Its
expanding aircraft industry now has contracts with European
aircraft industries and with the O.S. for repair of F-'4
engines.
Papandreou's intentions for a strong defense, which
correlate well to his hard-line regional policies, receive
constant attention and priority, even to the detriment of
social and economic goals. As he stated:
A government like ours wants to place health, education,
social welfare and economic development in top priority.
However, we know that all these will be meager hopes and
aimless actions if we cannot secure peace and territo-
rial integrity for our country ... wnich means strong,
war-prepared armed forces that can guarantee both our
borders and peace, because these go together. [Ref. 10:
p.S2]
Eith this in mind Papandreou launched his 10-year defense
plan in March, 1982, which was to be a coordinated effort to
strengthen the defense forces through the year 1991, and
included budgeting goals [Ref. 19: p. SI].
lingering sensitivity about the military and its
historic potential in Greece tc involve itself in politics
partially prompted these measures. Concerns for the
security of the democratic system have led Papandreou to
keep a close eye on the military while attempting to gain
support through his military improvements program. However,
both PASOK and the populace still are nervous about the
military as a result of the 1967-74 junta legacy. In a
recent incident in Athens, the public was quite alarmed when
police and military forces held a night "exercise" in the
city. The government hai to gc out of its way to reassure
the people Also, there have been recurring rumors of plots
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and coup attempts persisting up to the present. Occasional
large retirements from the Army serve to strengthen these
rumors.
Papandreou has maintained a firm policy on this
aspect of military discipline. From the day he took over
the Defense Ministry, he has praised the military for being
the protectors of national independence and has actively
visited military installations around the country, speaking
to the troops directly. This no other Prime Minister has
done to such an extent. However, he has always emphasized
directly to his forces their duty in the following, often-
repeated words:
I would like to assure you that all of you will find me
a sincere supporter of every just and feasible demand,
[and].. .of course, you ail have the right, as Greex
citizens, to have your political affiliation. However,
it is both dangerous and impermissible for politics to
creep into the ranks of the armed forces, which have
only one mission— the sacred mission of defending the
nation. [Bef . 18
]
2 . The Northern Threat
PASOK has guite simply pursued an active policy of
bilateral association with Greece's Balkan neighbors.
Agreements providing for understanding and economic, polit-
ical, cultural and technological cooperation have been
signed with all the Balkan countries (although they are
extremely limited with Albania) . Exchanges of visits among
leaders and ministers are regular occurrences.
Where Karamaniis had tried to encourage Balkan
multilateralism with limited cultural and economic coopera-
tion, Papandreou has launched his campaign for a "Balkan
zone of peace" and a Nuclear-free zone as the context for
intra-Balkan cooperation. That security is uppermost in the
leader's mind was evident from the beginning:
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In the Balkan area, the criterion for oar foreign policy
will be pursuit of firm friendship and constructive
cooperation. The Balkan area has always teen an area
for threats by foreign powers and superpowers. We
believe the special sensitivity of the area demands
creation of a zone of peace so that the Balkans can
become a nuclear-free area, net attached to a political-
military coalition, and we will direct our efforts
toward this end. At the same time, we will strengthen
existing political relations for the purpose of creating
institutions which will guarantee oermanent cooperation.
[Ref. 10: p.S5]
With this effort, Papandreou most likely hoped he
had found a common ground which would bring the Balkans
together and thus drastically reduce the threat to Greece's
border. He also hoped he had fcund a cause which the Soviet
Union could support. In addition, he found a policy which
could bring him international notoriety and v»ithin which he
could bury the sticky issue of nuclear weapons in Greece.
On 16 May, 1983, the formal letter went out from Athens. It
outlined a format of cooperation among "experts' leading to
an eventual summit meeting. Among the countries addressed
(Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Albania)
only Albania rejected the offer out of hand, while Turkey
remained cool but accepting. The other countries were
enthusiastic. As of this writing the outcome of these
efforts is still in question. It is difficult to speculate
as to the reaction of the Soviets. They may take a dim view
of any Balkan cooperation, as they have in the past (espe-
cially during the efforts of the Karamanlis government)
since it could be viewed as leading to more autonomy and
less Soviet influence in the area. On the other hand, .a
Balkan nuclear-free- zone could legitimize the idea of such a
zone in Central Europe, which is a long-standing Soviet goal
and would create acute problems for NATO.
A brief mention should be made here of the PASOK
government's relations with the rest of the Eastern Hoc.
Papandreou has pursued increasing contacts with the ether
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Eastern European countries. Most o2 these relations have
centered on economic cooperation. These contacts have been
made mainly in the light of pragmatic cooperation, pursuing
detente, and establishing linkages among European countries
in line with the PASCK vision of European unity outside of
the military blocs.
With the Soviet Union, contact has been vigorous.
These efforts have built upon contacts begun by Karamanlis
in 1979. Numerous agreements have been signed between the
two countries mainly dealing with economic, cultural and
energy matters. The energy contacts include oil purchases,
gas deals, a hydroelectric project and electricity sales to
Greece. The culmination of this effort came on February 22,
1983, when Papandreou and Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov
signed a 10-year economic trade agreement in Athens.
Although this raised a stir in the West, especially in the
EC, a survey of the provisions of the agreement as reported
shows that it is strictly limited to economic and cultural
matters. In spite of the Soviets' grand rhetoric about
political cooperation and friendship with Greece, Papandreou
kept his views conservative. Re also made it guite clear
that a basis of Greek-Soviet cooperation lay in the
continued support by Moscow of Greece's positions on the
Aegean and Cyprus. And while the agreement looks great on
paper, Papandreou has proved to be a hard bargainer in
respect to the implementation details of the agreement and
in protection of Greek economic interests. Consequently the
agreement has yet to be fully inplemented.
On Soviet foreign policy, the PASGK chairman has
made it cuite clear where he stands. He has unequivocally
condemned the Soviets for the Afghanistan invasion. And
while some Westerners were put off by Greece's refusal to
support sanctions against Poland , Papandreou did, in fact,
strongly condemn martial law in Poland. His position on
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Poland, however, was meant to make certain points, among
them: (1) that he felt that the sanctions would not have the
desired effect on Moscow, would degrade Sast-West relation-
ships and would not help the people of Poland; and (2) he
chose to remind the EC and NATO that while they condemned
martial law and external intervention in Poland, they
supported it in Greece in the past and continue to support
it in Turkey, while they have not taken a firm stand on
Cyprus, suffering under occupation of foreign troops for
nine years. [Ref. 20]
3 . Cyprus
PASOK policy on Cyprus has shown a change from the
previous government. That the Papandreou regime intended to
involve Greece more positively in the Cyprus issue, was
demonstrated by the numerous meetings between the Greek
Prime Minister and Cyprus President Kiprianou. (At least
seven major summits have taken place up until June, 1933.)
In fact, Kiprianou was the first "chief of state" to visit
Papandreou after the election, and Papandreou, in March,
1982, became the first Greek chief of state to visit the
island, a visit which was meant to vividly demonstrate Greek
solidarity with and interest in the problems of the
Greek-Cypriots.
Papandreou' s policy has remained very visible,
outspoken, assertive and unwavering. Some of the main
points of PA30K Cyprus policy are:
1 • Greek National Interest In Cyprus this stems from
two sources: (1) Athens, as the "metropolis of
Hellenism" considers "Cyprus Hellenism as an exten-
sion of our nation [Greece]," which Greece is bound
to support in its time of oppression; and (2)
authority comes from the as yet not officially abro-
gated London-Zurich Agreement of 1959. ("He must
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never forget that Greece is a guarantor power.")
[Hef-21 ]
2- Intercommunal Talks These are rejected by
Papandreou. "The dialogue taking place in Cyprus is
feigned and nonexistent. .. it is a dialogue between
Nicosia and Ankara. ..[ t he latter of] which is pres-
ently there with a ccnsiderable modern military
force and is holding 36.4% of Cypriot territory."
[Ref. 22] Papandreou will recognize the dialogue
solely between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, only on
internal matters, and only after Turkish forces have
been withdrawn. He and Kiprianou (the Greek-Cypriot
leader) have had occasional disagreements on this
point.
3- Internationa lization. Papandreou maintains that the
problem of Cyprus is "basically a question of
foreign occupation." "It has developed into a major
international problem following the Turkish invasion
and occupation of a large part of an independent and
nonaiigned U.N. member state." Therefore, it is
Greece's duty as guarantor to seek international
support for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. This
is the prerequisite of intercommunal talks. [Eef.
10: p. S3]
^ • The Cy_££us Dossier The Greek Prime Minister has
pledged to open the "Cyprus dossier", which means
opening investigations into responsibilities for the
Cyprus affair. "This will happen because I must
confess that irrespective of who then shoulders this
very great historical responsibility, we must
confess that our nation, in order to free itself
from being a culprit, is compelled to proceed with
uncovering the issue." [Ref. 23]
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In pursuing the Greek Cyprus policy, Papandreou has
taker, the initiative whenever possible. Within NATO he has
brought it up in the context of Greece's full reintegration
(as an indication of Turkish aggression) , and in connection
with the Polish and Falklands issues. In 1981, immediately
after the elections, he announced that Greece would double
its aid to Cyprus, to the sum of 2 billion drachmae. He has
made proposals that the U.N. fcrces be increased to replace
Turkish troops as protectors of the Turkish-Cypriot
minority, and for Greece to shoulder the increased financial
burden for the additional forces [Ref. 24]. With this
policy he has also offered the concurrent withdrawal of all
Greek forces from the island should the Turks respond like-
wise. There has also been indication of increasing military
support coming from the Greeks to the Cyprus government. 31
Finally, Papandreou, during his 1933 presidency of the EC,
has brought the matter formally before the European
Parliament and the ministers' meetings [Ref. 26].
A recent initiative in the U.N., sponsored by a
group of non-aligned states, was passed concerning the
Cyprus situation. This was the most comprehensive statement
issued so far. Not only did it reaffirm previous U.N.
resolutions calling for withdrawal of Turkish forces from
the island, but it also dealt with the problem of the former
property holdings of the Greek-Cypriot refugees, making void
all Turkish deeds and claims against them. It appears,
then, that Papandreou' s hard line has made some headway on
the Greek side of the Cyprus issue. It has at least brought
the issue back into focus and reasserted Greece's active and
uncompromising role in its solution. It remains to be seen,
310fficialIy there are 950 Greek national forces on
Cyprus plus a Greek-Cypriot National Guard force of 11,000.
Estimates, however, of the Greek forces go as high as 3,000,
and there are reported indications that there is a "possible
incremental buildup of forces on both sides." [Ref. 25]
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however, what concrete support Greece will be able to give,
particularly in the light of possible Turkish reaction to
Fapandreou's new militancy and greater involvement in the
issue, the policy he has recently dubbed the "new mobility"
on Cyprus.
^ • Aegean issues
The second fundamental Greek security issue under
Papandreou's government and the issue which has received
continual attention is the perceived Turkish threat in the
Aegean Sea region. Papandreou's position has been rela-
tively consistent on this issue also. Never has he wavered,
at least in his rhetoric, from his adamant line that the
issues involving Greek "sovereign rights" in the area, espe-
cially surrounding the islands, are fundamentally non-
negotiable. Common Greek fears, as they had been iterated
in the past, were supposedly strengthened in Papandreou's
eyes by the continual "violations" of the air and seaspace
by the Turks.
With regard to possible negotiations between the two
countries Papandreou has publicly stated that he sees no
need to conduct talks with the Turkish government as long as
it retains its designs on changing the status quo in the
area and as long as it continues the use of military force
in Cyprus. The firm PASOK policy remains that in no context
will the Greek government concede "one inch" of Greek sover-
eign territory whether it be in, on, around or below the
eastern island territories of the 3reek motherland. He has
adamantly stated that he will protect the "land of the Greek
ancestors" at all costs. He lays full blame for the seem-
ingly intractable situation on the revisionist attitude and
designs of the Turks. To emphasize his resolve, he has
travelled to many of the islands and spoken to the people,
reemphasizing his firm security guarantee of the islands.
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In addition to visits to the Dodecanese, he paid a much-
publicized visit to the island of Limnos, which has the
largest military contingent and is a continual source of
controversy between Greece, Turkey and NATO over the problem
of island militarization. In addressing the troops, he
said
:
Exactly when the Limnos issue is acquiring international
importance and dimensions, we are visiting Limnos and
this is the first time a prime minister has visited
Limnos- I really feel a great national emotion. I am
here near the conscripted sons of our people. the armed
.m particularly moved by the existin<forces.... I am ng
we call reconciliat:'
id forces. . . .[ Bef . 39]
unity, what nciliation between the people
and tne armef
In a change of procedure from the policies of the
last government Papandreou has publicly rejected any bilat-
eral discussions with the Turks. Instead, his approach has
been to link the Aegean issues with other issues which
involve the Greek association with NATO and the U.S. The
three most important facets for Papandreou have become the
protection of the pre-1974 status iuo, control of airspace
and seaspace, and the critical preservation of the "balance
of power" in the region. The former two have been tightly
linked to negotiations with and participation in NATO. The
latter has almost exclusively teen linked to the negotia-
tions over the status of the U.S. facilities in Greece. The
connections will be discussed in the appropriate sections
below.
The reality of the Greek-Turkish relationship (to a
great extent consumed by Aegean issues) is apparently not as
confrontational as it may seem. Indications of this can be
seen in occasional references made by the PASOK leader about
possible points or conditions af a Greek-Turkish rapproche-
ment. An example of this was the announcement of a "morato-
rium" between Greece and Turkey after a series of twelve
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meetings between Greek and Turkish lower level ministers.
Announcing the agreement publicly on 22 July, 1982,
Papandrecu explained that:
....a moratorium has been agreed upon with Turkey. As
you know, since this spring [ 1982 j an effort has been
started toward the moratorium. ...I am particularly
pleased about this development. It is truly extremely
simple. Both governments have agreed that over a period
of a few months they will not proceed to make statements
that are provocative or carry out violations that could
undermine the climate, the imperative climate, if there
is to be contact and dialogue around various aspects of
certain issues. [Ref. 28]
Showing his sensitivity on this issue and not wanting to
appear appeasing to the Turks, Papandreou felt the need to
fully qualify the event by saying:
I must stress that nothing over and above this is
provided for under the agreements. In other words,
neither the one side—Greece—nor the other side--Turkey
have in any way altered their positions.... They were
simply efforts to formulate and facilitate the context
of this term
<
the truce, the moratorium.... The exact
context will consist of a discussion of a framework
within which the two countries could, perhaps, move in
order to solve their differences peacefully. I wish to
conclude by stating that there must be no feeling that
the great issues are being solved. ...a climate has
been created which will permit a dialogue. ...[ Ref . 28]
The similarity of this framework to portions of the Berne
Protocol are apparent.
This maneuver, in addition to acknowledging that
there probably would be no progress on the Aegean issues,
which were turning into a prohibitively expensive arms race
between Greece and Turkey, and other Greek contacts with
Turkey were possibly meant to enhance the Greek claims in
the region. It also made cosmetic points for the Greeks in
that they now had a framework within which they could char-
acterize the inevitable Turkish "violations" as all the more
provocative. Papandreou, therefore, did not rule out mean-
ingful contact with Turkey, although this possibility was
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strictly qualified. However, when he was asked by a foreign
journalist, who noticed on this apparent new attitude of
reconciliation toward the Turks, whether the party leader
envisioned a Sadat-style move in the future, Papandreou
answered dryly that he had never cared for the politics of
Sadat.
Thus, while Pasok had taken a firm and consistent
stand on the Aegean issues, the party position apparently
does not leave out a certain flexibility which was missing
in early party rhetoric. Specifically, by linking the
airspace and sea control issues with NATO and the Eogers
Agreement negotiations, there seems to be some chance at
resolution in the future, given certain preconditions.
Also, the increasing dialogue, although usually not played
up, seems to be an integral part of PASOK Turkish and Aegean
policy. It is noteworthy that to date, PASOK has not made
good its former calls for extension of Greek territorial
waters. Neither has it unilaterally abrogated any of the
airspace arrangements made by its predecessor government
which it had so severely criticized previously. It appears,
then, that PASOK intends to follow the line expressed in the
1981 policy statement:
We have clearly explained to Ankara our desire that our
people may live in peace and friendship. At long last,
the two countries must seriously think someday to put an
end to expense [sic] armaments and to use the funds
spent on armaments for health, education and the eleva-
tion of their people's standard of living. But we have
also made it clear that we are not inclined to concede
even 1 inch of Greek territory. The dialogue with
Turkey has sense and can be welcomed in the measure that
it would not concern unacceptable concession of national
sovereign rights as well as of arrangements based on
international agreements which have delegated to Greecejurisdictions or authorities. ...it must be made clear
both to the neighbors and the Atlantic alliance that our
land, sea, and air borders as well as the Greek conti-
nental shelf limits in the Aegean are not negotiable.
They are safeguarded by international agreements as well
as bv international practice. [Eef 10: p. S3]
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5- THE PASOK Government and U.S. Bases
Greek-U. S. relations have been centered around the
negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement which
would replace the 1953 agreement, pernaps amend some of the
hundreds of existing bilateral agreements and clarify the
role of the bases in Greece for the immediate future. As has
been seen in the previous chapter, the PASOK policy
regarding these facilities had been that they should be
unequivocally removed. Therefore, there was some question
and anxiety in the West as to what Papandreou would do to
effect their removal and what the timetable would be. In
the 1981 policy statement the PASOK chairman indicated that
he was not going to take any drastic unilateral moves.
Instead, he indicated that their status would be the subject
of U.S. -Greek negotiations which would start in the first
months of 1982. The negotiations were to take place in
phases. The first phase would set parameters in which
future negotiations would take place. The second phase
would be a political one, in which the definite guidelines
would be worked out, and the third phase would produce the
specifics of the final agreement.
According to 1981 PASOK policy, there were to be
three main considerations for any operation of the bases on
Greek soil, while they were awaiting removal. The three
main considerations were:
1. Ensured Greek control and supervision of the
facilities.
2. Provisions for annual review and abrogation of any
agreements.
3. Proscription cf any activities on the bases which
would curtail Greek sovereign rights or in any way
affect the interests of Greece, either domestic or
external.
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As this position evolved, however, it became more clear.
Papandreou put this into perspective in an interview with a
reporter from Der Spiegel as follows:
[The negotiations ]... that started on 27 October have one
objective only, namely to agree agon a timetable for the
closure of these bases and to rix and conditions for
their operation until then. We do not determine this
unilaterally; we will try to settle the matter, if
possible, through an agreement. But one thing is abso-
lutely clear; if the negotiations do not achieve any
positive results in a period of time still to be deter-
mined, then the bases must disappear. [Ref. 29: p. S2]
Papandreou continually emphasized that the bases, with the
possible exception of the Souda complex which served the
U.S. and NATO-assigned Sixth Fleet, were only serving U.S.
interests. Therefore, during their limited tenure, they
would have to be brought more in line with Greek interests
and security needs. The direction of this reasoning became
apparent toward the end of 1982. In the same interview
quoted above, the persistent German reporter asked
Papandreou directly about the "prise" the U.S. would have to
pay to retain its Greek facilities. The PASOK leader
replied:
There is no question of a leasing fee as in the case of
Spain. What matters in our case is national security
and this must be seen quite practically. ...a vague
statement by the United" States. .. would not be of any
worth to us. A binding guarantee would require a treaty
between Greece and the United States which would have to
be ratified by C ongress. . . b ut this is not realistic.
Arms deliveries are much more realistic. [Ref. 29: p.
S2 ]
This direction became even more clear in a reported state-
ment by the Foreign Minister Kharalambopoulos. In addition
to reassuring the press that Greece was merely concerned
with its national interest and would not unilaterally remove
the bases, he connected this statement with the fact that
Greece receives 80% of its military hardware from the United
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States and would receive $280 million in U.S. military
credits in 1983 [Ref. 30]. It had become clear that within
the discussion of the U.S. bases, the matter of U.S. mili-
tary aid to Greece was to play a significant role. When the
negotiations started up again ir January, 1933, The issue
was made even more clear. Papandreou pointed out that he
was definitely not asking for a "written guarantee" from the
U.S. against "Turkish expansionism in the Aegean," but that
he expected the U.S. to maintain the balance of power in the
region between Greece and Turkey [Ref. 31]. This phrase has
become a code for the supposed equity of military aid in the
region, usually based on the 7:10 formula. Of prohable.
concern to -Greece was the 1980 5-year Defense and
Cooperation agreement signed between U.S. and Turkey, which
brought the ratio of aid to approximately 3.6:10 in Turkey's
favor. Through the leverage of the bases, Papandreou hoped
to change this.
The issue of aid came to the forefront in February,
1983. The Greeks had noted a significant disparity in
President Reagan's 1984 budget request. No matter how
Papandreou calculated the figures, they came up indicating
that there was to be a significant reduction of aid to
Greece compared to that for Turkey. He therefore sent a
letter, released to the press en February 5, which report-
edly read as follows:
Mr. President. the proposals °f the U.S.
Administration to the U.S. Congress in reference to the
program for economic and military aid for the 1984
riscal year have created, as expected, profound dissat-
isfaction among the Greek people.
I wish to stress that my government's concern has
increased as a result of the fact that the U.S.
Administration appears to be drawing away from the long
practice established by the 1973 amendments to the 1961
law ol foreign aid which provides for the preservation
of the balance of power in the Aegean. At the same
time, it directly links the amount of aid to Greece with
the results of the negotiations being conducted for the
signing of a new agreement for defense and economic aid.
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The Greek government cannct ignore the fact that if
the balance of power in the area is not preserved, then
the already fragile stability in our area will be
disrupted, with unforeseeable conseq jences.
As you are aware, this fact creates a climate which
does not help the negotiations for the signing of a new
defense agreement and which could have negative reper-
cussions on the relations between our two countries.
[Ref. 32: p. S1]
Papandreou further clarified his intentions by stating that
he specifically "insisted" on maintaining the 7:10 ratio.
He indicated that since the bases did not serve Greek inter-
ests directly, they fell under the provisions of Article 28,
paragraph three of the 1975 Greek Constitution which linked
aid to the preservation of the Aegean balance. The Greek
government figured the aid to Turkey to be $930 ail lion,
while the Greeks were to only receive $280 million. The
figure for Turkey was calculated by including all aid--
military credits, military direct aid and economic aid.
This was to be matched by the U.S. to preserve the "gualita-
tive and guantitative" balance at a 7:10 ratio. [Ref. 32]
The response by the U.S. President was to indicate that a
request had been submitted to Congress which would, in the
event of the signing of an agreement, increase security
assistance levels to Greece by $220 million. This would
raise the Greek total to about $500 million, about 7/10 of
the military portion of Turkish aid.
A final set of requirements for the bases agreement
was unveiled at the same time. Some of these had to do with
secret or sensitive information and information sharing.
The Greek position was that all intelligence information
gathered by the U.S. facilities was to be shared with the
Greek military but that sensitive information was not to be
shared with Turkey. Finally, the specific method of opera-
tion of the bases, the legal status of the U.S. personnel
and specific methods of control were to be agreed upon,
which would include the possibility of curtailing operations
in the event of a national emergency. [Ref. 32: p. S2]
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Papandreou came under increasing criticism from some
of the more leftist elements as an agreement with the U.S.
apparently drew near. In the newspaper, I Xa t h i me r i n i , an
editor pointed out that it was now time that Papandreou
would have to deal directly with the public, he would not be
able to cover up his actions with "victorious verbalism.
"
"On the contrary, the outcome of these two unresolved issues
[U.S. bases and the EC] will be interpreted as confirmation
by the Greek socialist government of our country's permanent
ties with the West and interpreted as Papandreou's return to
the path of the West." [Kef. 33: p. S3~\ The sentiment was
further expressed with numerous demonstrations calling for
the closing of the bases. Although Papandreou nad appar-
ently become more flexible on the issue, it was possible
that his constituency was still thinking in terms of his
former rhetoric— that he was perhaps about to become a
victim of his own former policies. Sensing this, he was
repeatedly obliged to clarify his position. His statement
to a reporter from the Berliner Zeitung was typical of his
reasoning:
The overwhelming majority of the Greek people have said
no to the bases. The government also says no. However,
there are differences between the two nos; the agreement
cannot be implemented immediately. ... We seek neither
confrontation nor conflict with the United States. He
simply want the United States to understand that the
Greek people are their own masters. They will allow the
bases, but only for a short time now. That is a ques-
tion of principle and the Greek Government will not
yield on this. [Ref. 34: p. S 12
]
These sentiments were echoed in the Greek press.
Early in the morning on July 15, 1983, an agreement
on the status of the U.S. bases initialed by the Greek and
U.S. foreign ministers. After briefing the government and
the opposition, Papandreou, in a joint Greek-U.S. broadcast
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explained the provisions of the agreement. 32 In his state-
ment, Papandreou declared that with the signing of the
agreement, "We [PASOK] keep the contract of honor with the
Greek people. At the same time, we believe that critical
national interests are served in the best possible manner."
[Ref. 35: p. S2]
The provisions of the agreement can be divided into
six major sections:
1. TIMETABLE The agreement is to have a restricted
five-year duration. Since it must go into effect by
the end of 1983, this means that the latest the
bases would remain in Greece is December 3 1, 1988.
At the expiration of this five-year period, there is
a 17-month dismantling period. The Greek government
is also required to give notice five months in
advance of the agreement expiration date as to
whether the agreement is to be terminated.
Apparently, if this notice does not come, then the
U.S. will assume that the bases are to remain in
operation.
2. NATO CONNECTION The agreement disconnects any asso-
ciation of the bases with NATO interests. They are
not to be considered NATO bases nor are they consid-
ered as serving mutual defense interests of the two
countries. This accomplishes two aims: (1) that the
agreement can be abrogated at any time without
deference to any NATO requirements whereas under the
1953 agreement Greece did not have the right to do
32The official text was to te released pending an accep-
table translation which would be approved and signed by both
parties. This originally was to happen within 15 days, but
apparent difficulties especially in rinding mutually accep-
.gned finally on sept<
•ess on the following (





The agreement was ratified by
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this, and (2) that the new agreement will not be
tied to any NATO financing scheme thus eliminating
the need for the Greeks to share in the expenses of
their operation.
3. CONTROL The rases are tc be only used for defensive
purposes and therefore cannot be used (theoreti-
cally) for possible U.S. activities in the Middle
East or anywhere else the Greeks deem improper or
counter to their international interests. There is
therefore strict control over the kind of activities
as well as the use of their armaments. The Greek
government has the. right to suspend activities of
any kind on the bases in time of national emergency.
4. U.S. AID By the agreement the Americans are committed
to grant military aid to Greece in return for the
use of the bases. Amounts are to be determined on
the basis of upholding the balance of military power
in the Aegean, and the agreement can be abrogated if
the Greeks determine that the U.S. has upset the
balance in. favor of Turkey. The figure mentioned,
$500 million, represented 70% of the military aid to
Turkey.
.
This was presumably to set the precedent,
although the word Turkey was apparently stricken
later from the agreement in the process of
"translation."
5. STATUS OF FORCES The status of U.S. military forces
assigned to the bases was to be put more in line
with other NATO countries. Extraterritoriality
privileges for the U.S. troops were to be severely
limited and the Greek authorities would give up
legal jurisdiction over them only in very special
circumstances.
6. SUPERCESSION The 1953 U.S. -Greece agreement is
superceded by the new agreement upon its signing.
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This is to include the major portion of the "secret
appendix" to the former aggreement. Some of the
former 108 individual agreements were either abol-
ished or amended, and they were all to come under
review in the future. Specific new operating proce-
dures are to be developed for each of the major
bases. New economic agreements are to take the
place of the old arrangements which would reportedly
include direct compensation by the U.S. for their
operation.
Papandreou presented this agreement to the people in
the following general terms:
....the signing of this agreement constitutes a historic
step in safeguarding our country's national indepen-
dence, in establishing the principle that— irrespective
of the size of power of countries—Greece is an equal
member of the internatic.onal community. [ Eef . 35: p. S4]
The Soviet Union seemed to agree that this was the case and
in a communique congratulated the government for its strong
anti-U.S. -stand. The Greek left, particularly the commu-
nists, were not thrilled by the announcement and asked
Soviet sources to retransmit the message thinking that a
mistake had been made, and questioning its authenticity.
(The same message was retransmitted.) In Ankara the reac-
tion was belligerent, and it informed the U.S. that there
must not be any direct or indirect allusion to Turkey in the
agreement. [Ref. 36] What is most striking about the new
agreement is that it seemed to finally fulfill the provi-
sions of the agreement on the bases negotiated by the
Karamanlis government in 1976. Papandreou had succeeded in
perpetually linking the issue of aid to the longevity of the
bases, but had accepted certain political risks in doing so.
This action could now be held up by the slowly growing far-
left opposition as a qualified sell-out of Greek interests.
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PASOK was bound to see its further left branch begin to
erode in the future, as continuing pressure from the people
demanded more "freedom from the U.S. imperialists." It is
ironic that Kharilaos Florakis, Leader of the KKE, turned
Papandreou f s former rhetoric against him and called for a
national referendum on the issue [Ref. 35: p. S6 ].
6 • Nu_c_le_ar Weapons in Greece.
The issue of NATO/U.S. nuclear weapons stored in
Greece has been linked in the past to several issues.
Specifically, PASOK tended to include them with their argu-
ments concerning the bases and the U.S. violation of Greek
domestic and security interests. They therefore often
called for their removal and on more than one occasion
stated that they would be removed when PASOK came to power.
A significant shift has taken place on this issue since the
election of 1981. It is significant to examine this sepa-
rately since the issue affects several other security
issues. Not only does the issue have to do with their pres-
ence under what Papandreou has called total American
control, but they also have to do with the general NATO
issue and with more general foreign policy issues, particu-
larly in the Balkans. This seems to be a ^uite clever
maneuver, and solves several ccnflicting policy problems at
once
.
With regard to the bases, by taking the nuclear
weapons away from this issue, Papandreou was allowed more
flexibility for negotiation while he could simultaneously
expound on his anti-nuclear, anti-missiles and Balkan and
Mediterranean "zones of peace" policy. Furthermore, since
Greece remains within the NATO structure, the existence of
nuclear weapons, supposedly for NATO use against Warsaw Pact
forces, at present does not caase a policy contradiction as
they did when Greece withdrew from the NATO military inte-
gration in 1974.
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Instead, PASCK has linked the issae of the with-
drawal of nuclear weapons from Greece with the issue of the
3alkan nuclear free zone proposal. (See above.) In the
November, 1981, policy statement, Papandreou told the newly
elected deputies that:
....as a first step toward specific geographic areas,
the government proposes creation of a nuclear-free zone
in the Balkans. Greece, after the necessary consulta-
tions, will be the first to implement, and in a very
short time, this principle for withdrawal of nuclear
weapons from its territory. [ Ref . 10: p. S5]
The actual reaning of this policy has been ambiguous during
the past two years. At one time it will be interpreted that
Greece will take the initial step to show good faith and
strength of interest in creating the nuclear-free zone. At
other times it is interpreted that the withdrawal of the
weapons is contingent on the establishment of the zone and
the removal of weapons such as may exist from other Balkan
countries.
Probably the best interpretation of the PASOK
nuclear weapons policy is that since the Soviets could
destroy Greece with SS-20 missiles (and many other delivery
systems) located in the USSR, the question of nuclear
weapons in the Balkan area is immaterial defensively.
However, it seems that Papandreou uas been hesitant to
renounce the weapons unilaterally for he may fear that this
would send the wrong signal to both the Atlantic Alliance
and to Moscow. (This is seen in the light of the well-known
general proposal from the Soviet Union that it would agree
not to use nuclear weapons against any country which would
unilaterally renounce the weapons on its soil. This
proposal was specifically directed to Greece shortly after
the election of Papandreou.) Most likely, with the new
U. S/KATO intermediate range weapons being deployed in Europe
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and with certain types of older weapons becoming obsolete
and falling within the October 1983 NATO decision to with-
draw 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe, Papandreou would
prefer to avoid the issue for a while to see whether the
U.S. might decide to pull them cut of Greece anyway.
7 . NATO Integration
It appears from the preceding sections that
Papandreou has embarked on a very interesting policy devel-
opment program especially in the realm of security issues to
segment his policies in discreet packages. This is true of
the issue of NATO integration also. While the former party
policy seemed to call for definite reassessment of the Greek
association with NATO and specifically that Greece would
lean toward total withdrawal if the Cyprus issue was not
brought to a favorable conclusion it appeared that now the
issue had been narrowed down to the renegotiation of the
Eogers agreement which had brought Greece back in in 1981.
In his 1981 policy statement, Papandreou toned down his
previous rhetoric which hinted at a supposed NATO-U.S.
conspiracy against Greek interests. ' Instead, he firmly
placed the Greek position withir the concept of the dissolu-
tion of the two opposing blocs in i]urope--i.e. , until such
time as the blocs disappeared, the practical thing to do was
to stay with NATO, but only under terms favorable to Greece.
The actual text is interesting in that it points out some
new characteristics of the new Papandreou tendency to sepa-
rate the issues. First, the statement makes no mention of
NATO being the instigator of the events of 1967 and 1974.
Instead it merely states that NATO "supported" the junta,
which to a limited extent it did. It also states that "NATO
did nothing to intervene to stop the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus," which has seme truth to it, since NATO did not
overtly threaten Turkey with reprisal. Host uncharacter-
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istic, was the fact that there was no mention of the U.S. in
conjunction with NATO, which was the standard line formerly.
[Ref. 10: p. S4] In surveying the statements concerning
NATO, it is apparent that since the election there has been
a separation of issues: The United States is associated with
the bases and the Aegean "balance of power," and NATO is
associated with the renegotiation of the Rogers agreement
and the Aegean sovereignty issues.
As there are two general divisions of NATO, the
military and the political, so Greek-NATO relations can be
viewed. The first consideration, that of military defense,
has specifically been linked with the Greek-Turkish issues
of the Aegean. These of course are most generally spawned,
in Papandreou's view, by Turkish aggressive designs en Greek
territory. Accordingly, Greek proposals for participating
fully in the NATO military structure deal exclusively with
the perceived Turkish threat. Papandreou's first desire is
that NATO endorse his view that the overriding threat to
Greece comes from the East not from the North. He brings
this idea up at every chance possible and it has been the
object of considerable discomf crture during NATO minister-
ials where Papandreou's proposals are always met with coun-
teraccusations from Turkish ministers. The often repeated
Greek position is that in return for the full participation
of the country in the alliance, NATO should guarantee all
borders from aggression from all sources.
The specific details of the Rogers agreement negoti-
ations focus on the issue of control over areas which Greece
considers "sovereign." With the agreement of 1980 the
outstanding issues of Greek-Turkish disagreement as to
command and control have been objects of discussion. The
Greek side maintains that until Greece is guaranteed full
control over Aegean airspace and seaspace or until a reason-
able compromise can be found, the Rogers agreement remains,
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according to the Greeks, in abeyance. In a May, 1983 press
conference, Papandreou first dealt with the question of
control of the airspace. His views were quite clear:
The Rogers a gree me nt. .. contains paragraphs which appear
to create the possibility of very different interpreta-
tions by Greece in relation to Turkey.... [It] envi-
sages the establishment of a headquarters in Larisa
whose area of operations control is to be determined.
These are practical issues. We maintain that this area
includes the entire Aegean airspace that was covered
before 1974. To a great extent, this coincides with the
Greek Flight Information Region [FIfl]. No government,
and certainly [notl ours, shculi question the right of
control of the Aegean operational area by the Greek Air
Force. [Ref. 37: p. S5]
The prime minister then clarified the Larisa headquarters
issue by stating that as long as there is no agreement
within NATO that the demarcation line for Greek airspace
control which is acceptable, the headquarters will not be
established, and "the Rogers agreement is inactive at this
point." [Ref. 37: p.S5]
The Greek ministry of National Defence interprets
the issue of Aegean sea control "differently" than NATO
officials and the Turks:
We do not accept what is called the task force.
...There will be further consequences. When exercises
are prepared in the Aegean, in almost all cases these
exercises are being prepared by NATO in order to create
precedents in favor of Turkey and against Greece. Under
these conditions we cannot participate in common exer-
cises. Therefore, my reply is that to a great extent
the Rogers agreement is inactive.
Basically the issue can be resolved if the following
happened: Either Turkey withdraws its claims in the
Aegean, or NATO ceases to support the Turkish claims in
the Aegean. At present, I am not hopeful of either
happening. [Ref. 37: p. S5]
In accordance with these views, the Greeks have pulled out
of numerous exercises in the past two years, notably in
October and November, 1982 and in February, March and
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October, 1983. A particularly sensitive issue between the
Greeks and the Turks relative to the exercises is the mili-
tarization of the island of Limnos. The Greek, side demands
that the island be included in the exercises since it is of
strategic importance to them. Turkey, however, rejects this
idea since they feel that it wculd be tantamount to admit-
ting to the island 1 s militari2ation. This issue is not
novel, however, for the same arguments and the same pull-
outs were prevalent during the former Greek administration.
It is perhaps in the second aspect of the NATO
structure, the political side, that Papandreou has had the
most effect. While the issues of the Rogers Agreement are
relatively constant, Papandreou' s personal style within the
NATO political structure has changed the Greek image drasti-
cally, sometimes to the irritation of the other members. A
good example of Papandreou' s attitude and its effect was
demonstrated in the December , 1 9 £1 NATO ministerial, which he
attended as Greek Minister of Defense. It was the first
ministers meeting to fail to produce a final communique.
Since the Greek Prime Minister insisted that some language
be included recognizing the Greek eastern threat, the
required unanimity was never reached. Some observers saw
this as an embarrassment to the body. However, Papandreou
saw it differently. In a speech to the Greek press in
Brussels, he stated his position and gave an indication of
what was to come:
The Greek position clearly presented Greece's defense
problem to international opinion and was incorporated in
NATO's records [the minutes of the meeting]. The Greek
delegation is proud of the position it maintained at the
Brussels meeting. Now, the entire alliance understands
question or our country
[Ref. 38: p. C3 ]
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Similar issues presented themselves at the December, 1982,
ministerial. Although NATO Secretary General Luns tried to
play down the Greek position, Papandreou was again vocal
about his recording of reservations in the decisions of both
the joint communique of the Nuclear Planning Committee, his
expression of the "Greek position" in the Defense Planning
Committee and the fact that Greece had reserved its support
for several paragraphs in the ministerial final communique,
notably on the Euromissiles. He stated that Greek "reserva-
tions were general and our positions have both consistency
and continuity through our policy in support of detente,
peace and disarmament. ...Papandreou stressed that Greece
now has a viewpoint, something that the alliance was not
accustomed to, and that was time it did [sic]." [Ref. 39]
The Greek position on NATO membership essentially
turns on two issues: the special relationship Greece seeks
with the renegotiation of the Rogers agreement, and the
political forum and notoriety that Greece seeks in trying to
become an "equal" among its European partners. At present,
for purely pragmatic reasons apparently, Greece remains with
NATO and no longer speaks of either full-scale exit from the
organization or non-alignment.
8. Summary.
In surveying the information presented here one
would begin to see what an Economist writer was referring to
when he titled his article about the Greek Prime Minister,
"Mr. Papambiguous. " Other columnists have criticized the
new Greek government saying that the only real"change"
brought in by the PASCK party was the change in party poli-
cies. There are several conclusions to be drawn from this
information. First, despite the liberal rhetorical virtu-
osity of the party's leader, he has based his policies on a
realistic assessment cf Greece's problems and its situation
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within the theater international environment. Indeed, it
may he that Papandreou's real virtuosity has been in his
ability to flexibly use his authority to posture himself to
the greatest advantage possible, within the realization that
Greece is a small country; is net, at least for the present,
economically strong; is in the first stages of development
in many areas; is therefore using what limited power it has
available to secure its position. One would be forced to
admit that in the face of perceived danger, it could be
extremely detrimental to show signs of weakness. It is
probably to a great extent true that Papandreou believes
that Greece was and is still threatened by Turkey and he has
shaped his security policy accordingly.
Also, in the foregoing, one detects a strong element
of political pragmatism and finesse. Papandreou has been
able to use his popularity and his strong party control to
subtly manipulate the issues to his greatest advantage. Ke
has managed to encapsulate and separate the issues to give
himself greater capability for political maneuver. By
dividing up the issues in this manner, he may appeal to all
practical and ideological issues in isolation and therefore
with greater effect. In encapsulating the nuclear weapons
issue in the nexus of Balkan relations and detente; the
Aegean frontier issues with NATC; the bases issue with U.S.
aid; and the Cyprus issue with the (J.N. he has somewhat
deftly disentangled these issues so that he may seek a real-
istic posture concerning them. This is perhaps Papandreou's
most significant political contribution so far and it has
apparently brought results.
There is another side of this flexibility which must
be pointed out here. Papandreou, who is now sitting in the
top seat looking out rather than standing in the square
looking in, is now faced with a dilemma. It is a dilemma of
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how to reconcile his ideology with tne realities of govern-
ment, and even more difficult new to reconcile his political
hyperbole (so effective while striving for power and a habit
hard to break) with the necessity of pulling together broad
and at some times divergent views within the party. He must
accept that in trying to juggle the center and left ends of
his party toward the middle, he is going to lose supporters
here or there. Given the present lingering generally
cautious views toward the Soviets and their KKE representa-
tives of Marxism-Leninism, the possible losses to the commu-
nists may not be too serious. However, to try to hang on to
the far left could be disastrous were New Democracy able to
create for itself a more centrist image.
But there is a third part to this dilemma, and this
may well be the most harmful tc Papandreou and Greek polit-
ical stability. This is the potential that PASOK, by moving
toward a more incremental approach on domestic issues, by
continually hedging on "national Issues," by claiming
tactical necessity for its policy diversions, and by
softening his anti-West line, may become victim of its own
policies. While Papandreou initials agreements with the
U.S., the demonstrators continue to march outside the bases
and the Chamber, continuing to chant the old PASOK slogans.
As Papandreou continually must deal realistically with the
Greek situation, his leftist opponents may start picking up
some of the old PASOK slogans for themselves One must now
recognize that perhaps the true concern for Western policy
makers is, and formerly should have been, not what will
happen with PASOK in power, but what is the future general
direction for Greece. The trends to increasingly shorter
tenures for Western governments and the increasing diffi-
culty in governing in the face of increasing international
and economic problems, are accentuated in Greece by the
tradition, yet to be broken, of single-leaier parties and
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governments. For a country wrestling with the problems of
modernization within an aging globai system and feeling
strains both from within and without, each election and each
change of government becomes critical. Each successful,
peaceful change in Greece points to increased stability and
viability of the maturing state.
In summing up the policies of PASOK in power, one
author has noted the following:
Pragmatic considerations have, to date, prevented
serious disruptions in Greece's foreign relations.
...In Athens, party supporters regret that Papandreou'
s
ideas have been ' mismter jreted as rigid policy
prescriptions. They believe that Greece's allies are
uncomfortable dealing with a man of vision who openly
declares his support for a nonpolar world, a unified
Europe, a nuclear-free Balkan zone, and a neutral
Greece. The fact that he proclaims these goals does
not, for PASOK officials, mean they will be realized in
the near future. Papandreou has no intention of harming
his country's national interest, and will pursue only
those policies that protect Greece in the immediate as
well as in the long run, in their analysis, fkef. 25: p.
22]
In the end, perhaps his assertiveness, coupled with his
impeccable nationalistic rhetoric, have brought him more
success than might have otherwise occured. At least he has
been able to preserve the Greek sovereign status quo in a
cloudy international climate. Of coarse, the deciding
factors in preserving the Greek state from turmoil will
probably be largely economic. All programs hinge on this
and unfortunately the Greek economy is extremely sensitive
to the international economic situation. Nevertheless,
Greece has come through one of the most momentous periods of




Considerable analysis of the details of Greek political
and security issues has already been accomplished within the
previous chapters. It remains, however to take a broad
overview of the principal issues examined in order to relate
them specifically to the questions proposed in the introduc-
tion. In this section, the general policy trends are
surveyed for the entire ten-year period. As an important
example, the issue of the United States facilities in Greece
is covered in more detail. Finally, the findings are
considered from a broader conceptual point of view.
A. THE ISSUES
1 . "Northern" Issues
A survey of the policies of the Greek governments
with regard to the Eastern bloc nations (Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union) shows a single trend. From the break in
1974 in the officially strong anti-Communist policy of the
dictatorship, relations have steadily been improved through
efforts of both the New Democracy governments (ND) and
PASOK. In recognizing the legitimacy of the Communist Party
in Greece, Karamanlis, in 1974, paved the way for the estab-
lishment of official relations with the Eastern bloc. Cut
of security and economic considerations, Karamanlis pursued
an active foreign policy with the Balkan states to reduce
tension along Greece's northern borders and expand exchange
of mutually beneficial goods and services. His efforts
culminated in his attempt to create intra-Balkan cooperation
on the economic level, with the hope that Balkan unity could
be improved. He was also the first Greek head of state to
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pay an official visit to the Soviet Union, a visit which
established the bases for Greek-Soviet cooperation and
economic exchange.
Papandreou, who cultivated relationships with the
Eastern Bloc early during the formation of his party, has
continued this trend. He has kept up active relations with
the Soviet Union and has expanded economic cooperation
between the two countries. He has been very active in
seeking agreements with most of the Eastern European coun-
tries and has. particularly focused on the continuation of
improved intra-Balkan relations, which have culminated in
his appeal to unite the region under the concept of a
"Balkan Nuclear Free Zone."
In general, then, there is no noticeable change in
the facts of Greek-Communist tlcc relations. They have been
continually developing within the frameworx. of mutual advan-
tage. This can be seen as the result of a political outlook
which has taken Greece into the era of "detente" relations
with the East which are now on a par with those of many of
its European allies. It is reasonable to expect these rela-
tions to continue and not be greatly influenced in substance
regardless of right or left trends in Greek politics, given
no dramatic change in the world situation. It is natural
for Greece to turn economically to the countries of Eastern
Europe and to the USSE for trade. Beset by trade problems,
and having difficulty competing with the more advanced
Western European economies especially in a period of general
economic difficulties, exploring all advantageous trade
routes is essential. One must also not disregard the polit-
ical advantages accrued from Greece's openings to the East.
Primarily, it diversifies Greek foreign policy, making it
appear less dependent on one side within the world commu-
nity. This enhances the appearance of progress toward true
independent state maturity desired by both parties as an
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ultimate goal for Greece. Secondarily, it gives Greece
policy options which can also be used to possibly influence
Greek- flestern relations and give Greece a stronger
bargaining position on important GreeK issues.
2 • The Cy_p_r us Issue
There can be no doubt of the importance of this
issue to all the parties involved—part icularly Greece and
Turkey. Both have made it central in thexr dealings with
the Western Alliance, with the U.N. and in other interna-
tional issues. Cyprus has been the catalytic event which
opened this recent era in Greek politics and finding a solu-
tion to the problem has become central in the security poli-
cies and relations of both parties. This is not to say,
however, that it is the most volatile issue in the region.
Father, it has become symbolic of the problems which Greece
perceives as existing within NATO, with its relations with
the United States, and the contentious issues in the Aegean
Region. It was the seriousness of the issue which caused
Greece to drastically alter its position within NATO. It is
its continued existence which has become elementary in all
Greek foreign policy dealings and has become axiomatic in
the formation of Greek security policies. There can be no
difference perceived between the general goals of either
party relative to this issue, only differences in the
approach to the solution of the problem. Both parties have
been equally emphatic about the need to end the partition
and loth have sought support from any ^uarter they deemed
might be productive. It can be generally said, then, that
Cyprus, being a representation of some of the problems in
Greek-Turkish-NATO relations, will remain continually on the
top of the foreign and security policy agenda regardless of




If Cyprus has become symbolic of regional conflict,
the Aegean Sea issues have become the concrete facts.
Arising out of the events of 1973-74, the continual conten-
tion between Greece and Turkey over the issues has become
basic to foreign and security policy formation for both
Greek parties. Both Greek parties have identified the prin-
cipal security threat to Greece as coming from the East
(Turkey) and have colored their dealings with all actors
within the area on this basis. They have both seen the
"threat" in the Aegean as being one of primary national
importance. They have both considered it an issue of terri-
torial sovereignty of Greece's eastern island territories
and the rights which are associated with them which Greece
attempts to protect. They have both categorically stated
that Greece is not prepared to make any concessions to
Turkey on the territorial issues or on airspace, seaspace,
or defense control in the area.
4. NATO and U.S. Relations
The relationship of Greece to NATO and the 'Jnited
States has been the subject of much consideration since the
events of 1974. This probably has much to do with the
changes which have taken place in East-West relations since
the founding of the alliance and the ensconcement of the (J.
S. as one of its primary security guarantors. In the light
of diminishing perceptions of an immediate and dangerous
threat from the Warsaw Pact which has begun to more and mere
characterize the peripheral regions of the alliance,
regional issues for Greece have appeared more important for
its security. The tendency has been to see the superpower
balance as more of an abstraction while regional issues have
become more concrete. Thus, Greece has questioned its rela-
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tionship with NATO and sought tc readjust it to try to meet
its own perceptions of Greek security requirements. Thus,
we have seen that the allegedly more pro-West government of
New Democracy pulled Greece out of the military command of
NATO for six years. It spent the interim trying to renego-
tiate the position of Greece within the alliance, so that it
would take into consideration what Greece saw as its over-
riding security concerns. lull integration was never
achieved and the situation has not changed since the change
of government. Thus, while PASOK has always been vocally
against the NATO alliance, it has not taken any steps to
completely sever the Greek-NATO ties. Rather, Papandreou
continues to represent his country within the alliance and
is attempting to build a new "special" relationship with the
alliance which will take into consideration wnat Greeks
perceive as their special security needs. Despite the at
times acrimonious rhetoric against the alliance and the
United States, both of the parties have remained generally
aligned with the West, have sought solutions to their prob-
lems through the use of the general alliance framework and
have never completely rejected the notion that attachment to
the West, given present circumstances, seems to still be the
best policy for the country.
5. 0. S. Military Facilities in Greece
It might be assumed by someone who follows the
political action in Greece that there have certainly been
some serious effects on this issue arising out of the 1981
change of government. It is generally assumed that the New
Democracy government was pro-U.S. and from the sometimes
caustic anti-American rhetoric of Papandreou one would
assume the opposite from his party. This issue, then, can
serve as a good central example of the effect of the polit-
ical environment on one of the central security/foreign
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policy issues in Greece. By comparing the documentation of
the agreements negotiated by the respective governments / the
difference should be apparent. For this purpose, I will use
the statement of "Principles to Guide Future United
States-Greek Defense Cooperation" (State Department press
release, April/ 1976) negotiated by the Karamanlis
Government with the U.S. Department of State preparatory to
a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the
two countries (which never materialized). This will be
compared to the text of the "Agreement of Defense and
Economic Cooperation" between the U.S. and Greece, which was
negotiated early in 1983 and signed by the Papandreou
government on September 9, 1983. (These two documents are
included as Appendix A and Appendix B to this thesis,
respectively.
)
The concept expressed in the first lines of each
agreement indicates that there is no thought of a patron-
client relationship between the two countries, but that the
agreement is based on mutual advantage. Both agreements
emphasize that, for purposes cf this relationship, Greece
and the U.S. are equal partners. The major conceptual
difference here is that the 1976 agreement links the opera-
tion of the bases to the functioning of NATO while the 1983
one affirms the independence of the U.S. -Greece relationship
from any other considerations. Both agreements state that
the installations shall be under a Greek commander. The
difficulties in this arrangement due to the nature of the
activities on some of the facilities have been worked out in
the 1983 agreement by assigning specific authorities to the
base commander and providing for a consultative procedure
for control and review of the functioning of the two contin-
gents on each facility. Thus, the later agreement essen-
tially conforms to the general trend throughout the NATO
area that bases formerly belonging essentially to the U.S.
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now come under national control of the hosts and the U.S.
forces nave a tenant relationship. Both agreements affirm
the concept that the operations and activities of the bases
are strictly under the control and limitation of the Greek
Government and in n o case will they be allowed to carry out
missions which are net agreed to specifically by the Greek
government. Both agreements have provisions for the employ-
ment of Greek personnel, although the 1983 one does not
mention any specific ratio where the earlier one insisted of
a minimum of 50£ Greek manning. While the earlier agreement
insisted on full sharing of intelligence data collected on
the facility, the 1983 agreement limits Greek access to
these facilities and does not specifically deal with infor-
mation sharing. In regards to general administration, the
earlier agreement simply stated that operation of the facil-
ities would be in the hands of the Greek commander and was
not qualified. In the later agreement, the GreeK contingent
was given specific duties as far as perimeter protection and
the rest of the authority was tempered by the operation of a
council which would represent hoth sides to determine the
administration of certain portions of the facility. Also,
all activities and provisions specifically set forth in the
annex to the 1983 agreement were left open for renegotiation
with procedures specifically set up for this purpose. As
for the expiration of the agreement, it was the intent of
both governments to have the ability to review and renego-
tiate the agreements periodically. There are obvious advan-
tages in this, especially since both agreements are linked
to economic and defense aid from the U.S. to Greece.
However, the earlier agreement was to have only a four-year
term with provisions for its termination at an earlier date.
The later agreement has a five-year duration period with an
additional seventeen months given for removal of U.S. forces
if the agreement is terminated at the end of this period.
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There is no specific provision for the early termination of
the later agreement except for the national emergency provi-
sions under which the Greek government can cease all opera-
tions on the facilities as it sees fit. (This Joes not mean
withdrawal.) Finally, both agreements mention military
assistance as being part of the relationship between the
U.S. and Greece, meaning that Greece receives military aid
as a result of the agreement. However, the 1976 agreement
included a figure, $700 million, in the form of grants an 1
loans which became the source cf the famous 7:10 aid ratio
which was supposed to balance Greek and Turkish military
capabilities in the Aegean Regicn. The later agreement does
not mention any specific ratio of aid vis-a-vis Turkey nor
does it stipulate that any of the aid be in the form of
grants. It does, however, outline broader a. S. -Greek
economic cooperation is developing the Greek defense
industry. Both agreements undertake to define the activi-
ties which are approved on each of the facilities. The 1983
agreement went further to define a new status for the United
States and associated forces assigned to the facilities.
However, although Papandreou has continually inveighed
against the "extraterritoriality" of American troops in
Greece, the 1983 agreement merely brings their status in
line with the status of forces in other NATO countries.
Indeed, except in special or severe circumstances, the U.S.
authorities continue to exercise quite a bit of control over
their troops.
In general, it appears that perhaps the agreement
envisioned by the "ccnserva ti ve" New Democracy government
was perhaps more strict than the one put into effect by the
PASOK government. This distinction is even more vivid when
one considers that in later negotiations between the Rallis
New Democracy government and the U.S., reporters attributed
the breakdown of negotiations in mid-1981 to the fact that
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the U.S. could not agree to some of the Greek demands, which
reportedly included a provision that the agreement could be
abrogated by the Greek government at any time, that the
facilities would be under the unqualified control of the
Greek commander, and the U.S. formally accept and include
the 7:10 Greek-Turkish aid ratic in the agreement. [Ref.- 1,
p. 80]
It therefore appears that, despite his rhetoric, Papandreou
entered the negotiations with a very pragmatic attitude,
with the intent of trying to get the best possible deal for
Greece given the situation, and did not let his anti-U.S.
rhetoric figure in his negotiating stance. Instead, the
present agreement essentially provides for the needs of both
countries in an atmosphere of cooperation. It may be that
some of the recently more outspoken anti-Americanism of
Papandreou is partially a screen to placate the far left in
light of the continued existence of the U.S. facilities in
Greece. Couloumbis sums up the realities of the bases nego-
tiations in several succinct statements. Talking about the
bases negotiations under the Karamanlis Government, he
points out that "...for Greece, a bases agreement with the
Untied States remained the most important available
bargaining chip that it could link to other important objec-
tives such as re-entry into NATO (on acceptable terms) and
the U.S. aid balance to Greece and Turkey." [Ref. 2, p. 113]
Later, speaking of Papandreou' s policies, he points out that
"on the most vital issue as far as the United States is
concerned, the maintenance and continued operation of U. S.
bases in Greece, Papandreou also adopted an approach that
was built upon the Rallis government's position....
Papandreou's main concern has been that the bases be used to
mutual advantage, that Greece would retain enough control
over them..., and that future operations of these bases would
be linked to modernization of Greece's defense establishment
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in a fashion that would not disturb the military equilibrium
in the Aegean " [ Eef . 2, p. 149]
B. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
It has become apparent from the data presented in this
thesis that a survey of the policiss over the last ten years
indicates that there has been little concrete or drastic
change resulting from the change from an alleged "rightist"
government to one said to be "leftist." Indeed, it seems
that generally, the parties, irrespective of their ideolo-
gical heritage or programs, have generally seen fit to
modify their positions on the basis of some other force.
Thus, we have a New Democracy government, generally consid-
ered to he pro-West and right-viing, withdrawing its troops
from NATO , threatening the closure of U.S. facilities in
Greece, establishing firm and long-lasting relations with
the Eastern Bloc, and generally taking a non-conservative
attitude with regard to its security policies and relation-
ships. On the other hand, we see the leader of PASOK move
from being a violently anti-West, far-left oriented ideo-
logue in opposition, to a position of authority. I office,
he has adopted positions essentially comparable to those of
his predecessor, preserving the basic Western orientation of
the country, pragmatically using the available resources to
achieve advantage for Greece without destroying any of the
basic structure of its foreign or security policy. To
account for this, there must te another force within Greek
policy formation which transcends political ideologies and
governs policy practices, disregarding political labels and
leading the party practices to converge on a central nation-
alist, Western-oriented track.
The concept I find useful here comes from the political
scientist Roy Makridis. When he speakes generally of the
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Greek political situation, he attempts to deal with a
concept he labels the "Mediterranean Profile." [Eef. 3, p.
2] Referring to the characteristics of the nations of the
Mediterranean littoral, he describes the instability and the
problems of development of the nations which are in the
midst of the modernization process. To study this develop-
mental profile, according to Makridis, one needs to evaluate
the process and progress of modernization from two basic
angles, economic (associated with social) , and political.
Although these two are intricately interrelated, it is the
latter which is of interest here. Makridis is thinking
mainly of internal political matters when he further divides
the political modernization concept into three basic divi-
sions: " (1) participation and participatory mechanisms
including the formation of national and integrative polit-
ical parties, (2) the development of rational governmental
and bureaucratic structures, and (3) regime- acceptance--
legitimacy. " [Ref. 3, p. 3]
However, when one is considering security policy in
relation to internal politics, which essentially deals with
how the specific country relates to its international polit-
ical environment, these divisions take on additional
meaning. For a country in a developing stage and not self
sufficient, the establishment and maintenance of participa-
tory mechanisms and participation in the extra-national
community and the further development of policies which will
integrate it into the larger community in a manner which is
acceptable both to the domestic perceptions of the country's
role and to the realities of the international system,
become imperatives in the maturing process of the state as
member of this community. Penniman's second point applies
more to the process of internal change with which the two
major parties have been struggling. The maturation process
in Greece has meant the modernization and rationalization of
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the governmental structure, which has lagged far behind
internal social and economic reality. It is precisely the
resistance to change of these governmental institutions
which was partially responsible for the downfall of the New
Democracy government and is proving difficult to change for
PASOK. On the other hand, it is precisely these institu-
tions which the policy must coordinate with and secure.
However, it has been shown, I believe, in the last ten
years in Greece, that with the destruction of the far-left
after the civil war in 1949 and self-destruction of the far
right rfith the fall of the jurta in 1974, that Greece is
generally in a new stage of political development. The
political center has become the predominant force and the
source of political power. It is this mass of opinion which
I believe best expresses the slow movement toward maturity
of a state. It can be seen as a broad belt moving upward on
a graph, toward which policies tend and toward which the
political parties gravitate if they wish to maintain the
support needed to survive in a democratic society. In the
past, non-democratic forces basically prevented the fulfill-
ment of this process, and thus created the typical insta-
bility and praetorianism of developing nations. However, it
appears that no nation can remain static, and basic movement
toward a mature, stable state definition continues to occur.
For the developing nations, this movement expresses itself
internationally as well as internally as mutual acceptance
of and by the domestic and international regime or what
Makridis labels as legitimacy. It is this concept which
speaks most strongly to the present Greek situation.
Each country develops and matures at its own rate.
However, in the "free world" a pattern seems to be consis-
tent and almost unavoidable. It appears that Greece has
gone through many of the common stages, that of colonial
subjugation, of revolution, of monarchy and dependence, of
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chaotic centrifugal political developments, of dictatorship
and finally of consensus. It is this last stage in which I
believe legitimacy becomes most important. It is in this
stage where the country tries to become a truly independent
actor and in which it is imperative in a democracy to have
the majority support of the people. Thus the developments
of the last ten years show not the former political acro-
batics of Greek politics but a trend toward the attempt to
complete the final stages of state legitimization. Thus we
see leaders, disregarding their apparent political differ-
ences, attempting to accomplish the same general goal. The
need of the modernization process in Greece appears to be
political stabilization, elimination of the dependency which
frustrates the desires of the populace, and securing for the
state a legitimate, respected a rd secure position within the
world community. Thus pragmatism dictates that the leaders
of Greece guide the country frcm being acted upon to being
an actor in the international community. This requires that
Greece be integrated with international regimes while main-
taining the political and economic strength to stay viable
as an entity. It is, then, this drive for national legiti-
macy that I believe is behind the policies of Greece and
forms the basis for its security policy, not the programs of
the party ideologues. Bounds of legitimacy have been set
within the areas of both domestic and international toler-
ance, and while rhetoric may occasionally exceed these
bounds for political expediency, it is politically dangerous
to proceed outside these vague limits in action. Thus, we
have seen that there is a central tendency within Greek
politics which matches policy formation and which is
dictated by external and internal political, economic and




The political changes that have taken place in Greece
since 1974 have at times been cause for alarm within Western
and U.S. policy making circles. Indeed, the most recent
pronouncements of the Greek Prime Minister have caused a
small uproar within the alliance and have done considerable
violence to United States public perceptions of Greece as an
ally. One therefore naturally questions the direction in
which Greece may be heading. It has been the purpose of
this study to explore in detail the political developments
in Greece as they relate to the formation of Greek security
policy and therefore the Greek role within the Western
political and security regimes. It has been found that
despite the at times hyperbolic rhetoric coming from the
leading politicians in Greece, their domestic political
support seems to be coming from the political center. This
is a sign of a trend toward political stability within a
country which has in the past been plagued by every manner
of political chaos and exploitation. It is apparent that
the true political extremes of right and left have been
relegated to a peripheral role. The two major parties have
vied for the center votes and have sought to maintain their
support by following very similar policies regarding impor-
tant facets of Greek internal and foreign policy.
It is therefore apparent that of greatest importance is
not the proclaimed ideologies of the parties in question but
their actions in trying to move Greece into the modern era
as an independent and legitimate actor. The overriding
forces of nationalism, independence and development are
characteristic of countries which are trying to shed their
former client or protectorate status and move toward playing
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an equal role within the international environment, while
expressing the needs and desires of a populace which is
rapidly pushing toward modernization. The basic needs of
this stage of development have been perceived by the polit-
ical structure, and it has begun to respond. The positive
result is that Greece is apparently maturing into a stable
democratic state, responsive tc the needs of its people and
aware of the international forces which must be considered
in the formation of its policies. The unfortunate side of
this development is that it has met with difficulties
arising from unresolved conflicts within the region which in
the Greek perception continue to threaten the integrity of
the state, and from problems cf economic development which
are aggravated by the so-called Aegean arms race. This has
caused the policies of Athens to diverge at times from these
of its allies, and has resulted in tense relations between
Greece and the United States.
The fact remains, though, that in defense planning no.
critic or commentator has ever denied the strategic impor-
tance of Greece to the West and to NATO. As yeremis points
out, "If Greece were lost to NATO the implications to the
Alliance would be serious:— the continuity of defence in the
Southern Region would be disrupted, --the defence of neigh-
boring countries would become v untenable, --the Middle East
would be isolated frcm the West." [Ref. 1, p. 72] Indeed/
while even most Greek commentators admit that Turkey may be
overall even more important to the Alliance, the defense of
that ally would be much more difficult if Greece were lost
to the West. If Greece were to sever its relationship with
the West, the results would be unpredictable for both the
NATO alliance and for the general stability of the Balkan
region. What has been shown by this study, however, is that
this eventuality is highly unlikely, barring other major
chanqes in the international situation. Even Prime Minister
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Papandreou, at times extremely critical of the United States
and NATO, predicates any drastic change in the Greek-West
relationship on the unlikely eventuality of the total disso-
lution of the East-West division in Europe. It is therefore
apparent that we can expect no drastic changes in security
relations with Greece or in Greek security policy. What
must he realized, however, is that NATO was formed during
considerably different circumstances than exist today and
that Greece acceded to the alliance under vastly different
internal and external conditions. What we must expect,
then, is that no state can remain static and that its poli-
cies and relationships must change with other aspects of its
development. It is therefore apparent that Greece is not
trying to destroy its relations with the West but to change
them to coincide more with domestic and international prior-
ities and realities. The political change in Greece there-
fore has not been the crisis that some foresaw. What is
apparent from this study of the past ten years of Greek
policy, is that Greece seeks to deal with what it perceives
as the realities of its existence while seeking the most
benefit for Greece. It therefore seejvs redefinition of the
relationship with its allies and within the European commu-
nity which will take into consideration special Greek prob-
lems and needs. This seems to follow the pattern of the
growing North-South debate which has begun to have effects
within Europe.
To those who fear the dissolution of the alliance and
the impending fall of Europe, perhaps this study is instruc-
tive. Greece, for all its vacillations, remains tied to the
NATO alliance, Athens is represented in the EC and continues
to play an active rcle in the organization, Greece still
retains strong defense ties with the United States, the
military facilities of the United States now operate under a
new agreement with the Socialist government and Greece has
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taken no drastic action to force a solution of the Aegean
Sea and Cyprus issues hut has rather relied upon the U.N.
and other negotiations to try to solve the problems.
Indeed, it is probably an indication of the strength and
success of NATO that Greece has felt secure to pursue its
national and regional interests to such an extent. If
Greece is to remain a strong member of the Western commu-
nity, then, given the present international situation , it
must foresee an advantage gained by this association in the
amelioration of regional and internal issues.
For the United States I believe that this study has made
its policy course more clear. It is apparent that it is not
necessarily beneficial to dwell solely on political rhetoric
or react too strongly to political ideologies. It is prob-
ably more important to attend to the underlying forces
within a country— those forces which are trying to lead the
country into the modern age as an independent actor wnich
can provide for the needs of its people and play an impor-
tant and productive role in the international community.
For Greece this means the reduction of the perceived threat
from its ally Turkey, a diminution of the perception of fear
for the sovereignty of it Aegean island territories, the
solution to what is thought of as the unjust derogation of
the rights of the Hellenic community in Cyprus and the
alteration of the national status of that country. Finally,
the course must be toward a policy which aids in the
strengthening of the country economically and politically
with sufficient attention to assistance which would insure
the further development of a stable economy and government.
These are the imperatives of Greek policy and Greek security
revolves around thera, not around the superpower concerns of
global bipolar politics. The apparent stalemate in the
global balance of power has made other concerns come to the
fore within the various regions. Predicated on the general
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stability of the glotal balance, regional concerns must be
taken into consideration. We must realize that we cannot
expect a small, developing country such as Sreece to have
the same priorities for policy formation as a large devel-
oped country like the United States. However, we can expect
that our allies will also show some sympathy for the priori-
ties we must consider in formation of our policies. In the
final analysis, if the basic needs of each country and the
basic priorities were better understood and put into proper
perspective, it would be simpler to form a more mutually
beneficial relationship. This study has shown that behind
the actions of the various governments of Greece in the past
ten years, there has been a consistent set of national
priorities based on national aspirations and perceptions
which have determined the concrete policies (those put into
practice) . It is this level which must be considered in
forming our policy toward Greece.
In a recent report to the United States Senate Committee
on Foreign relations, it was stated that the central issue
in the continuing viability of NATO is:
whether , under today's conditions, the alliance will be
able to accommodate U.S. and European differences in a
way that rehabilitates NATO's role as the coordinating
mechanism for Western security policies. The answer
will depend in part on how well the United States and
the allies understand the factors that lead to policy
and perceptual differences. Any new consensus which
fails to acknowledge that there are fundamental differ-
ences will be doomed to obsolescence. ...[ Ref . 2, p.1]
This same report continues by pointing out that it is impor-
tant to understand that "divergent perspectives are not the
product of malicious intent or irrational reactions. They
derive from profound and, to some extant, immutable factors
over which leaders on either side of the Atlantic have
little control." [Ref. 2, p. 29] This is , of course, refer-
ring to underlying realities within the nations. It is not
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to say that the double standard between political rhetoric
and actual policy, such as is exhibited in Greece ^uite
often, is not ultimately dangerous. It can create undesi-
rable imperatives where the leaders become victims of their
own rhetoric in order not to lose an artificially generated
support based on false perceptions. This has and continues
to be a particularly persistent problem among Western allies
and cannot but weaken relations.
It has been the intent of this study to point out
exactly this fact and serve as a basis for consideration of
possible alternatives in Greek- American relations. It has
been shown that the security policies of the Greek govern-
ments have in practice shown consistencies based on the
realities of the Greek situation— domestic, regional and
international. It is these basic developmental needs which
must be attended to (by allies and Greek leaders) if a mutu-
ally beneficial relationship between Greece and its allies
is to be continued. One would expect that, were more assis-
tance brought to bear on the underlying sources of economic,
political and territorial threat perception, Greece could
divert more of its attention to more long-term security
considerations.
In summary, this study has provided a great deal of
specific information on the basic security policies of the
two major Greek political parties, New Democracy (1974-81)
and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK,
1981
-present) . It has shown that despite the apparently
great divergence of ideologies which some observers like to
point out, there has essentially been a confluence of policy
which has corresponded to the general preferences of the
populace in its perceptions of priorities for Greece. It is
instructive that this seems to indicate a political matura-
tion which tends toward political centrality and tends to
preclude arbitrary policy formation.
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Finally, as was mentioned in the introduction of this
thesis, to get an accurate perspective on the totality of
the security issues discussed, one would be forced to
consider them from other points of view. This of course is
the major dilemma of the United States and NATO in policy
formation-- that the regional actors tend to mirror each
other in their needs and policies. However, the general
findings of this study are applicable to many diverse situ-
ations and locales; that is, in forming policy one must
search for the deeper concerns and forces which motivate
policy formation in democratic countries. To deal with
these is to provide meaningful assistance and build lasting
and secure relationships, to ignore them is to risk disaf-
fection and pave the way for growing difficulties and
dilemmas and ultimately policy failure and crisis—similar




STATE DEPAETMENT PRESS RELEASE NO. 180
DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE ON PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE
FUTURE UNITED STATES-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION, A£ril 15
,
1976. 3 3
The Governments cf Greece and the U.S. will complete as
soon as possible a new defense cooperation agreement to
replace the 1953 U.S. -Greek military facilities agreement
and other related agreements. The U.S. Government will
submit this agreement to Congress for approval.
II. The new agreement will be designed to modernize the
U.S. -Greek defense relationship reflecting the traditionally
close association between the U.S. and Greece and the mutu-
ality of their defense interests in the North Atlantic
Alliance.
III. This new agreement will define the status and set
forth the terms for operations of military installations in
Greece where U.S. personnel are present. It will be similar
to the U.S. Turkish agreement and will embody, inter alia
the following principles:
(1.) Each installation will be a Greek military
installation under a Greek Commander.
(2.) The installations shall serve only purposes
authorized by the Government of Greece. Their activi-
ties shall be carried out on the basis of Mutually
agreed programs.
33The text is taken from An rex K, United States Mil itar yInstallati ons and Objectives in the HeJiIerranean. Report
for fHe SuIcoMittee on Europe and th"e fridale East of the
Committee on International Relations. 95th. Congress, 1st.
Session, March 27, 1977, p. 87. (Not Original Format.)
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(3.) There shall be participation of Greek personnel
up to 50% of the total strength required for agreed
joint technical operations and related maintenance
activities and services cf the facilities and there
shall be provisions for the training of such personnel
for this purpose.
(4.) Ail intelligence information including raw data
produced by the installations shall be shared fully by
the two Governments according to mutually agreed proce-
dures. A joint use plan fcr the U.S. forces communica-
tions system in Greece shall be agreed upon.
(5.) The agreement shall remain in effect for four
years and there shall be provisions for the termination
thereof before its expiration, as well as for its
renewal.
(6.) Within this framework there shall be annexes to
this agreement covering each major installation (Nea
Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion), the U.S. element at the
Hellenikon Greek Air Base, as" well as annexes dealing
with status of forces (SOFA) and command and control.
(7.) The annex covering Souda Bay will te a revision
of the 1959 Souda Bay agreement. Meanwhile it is
understood that U.S. operations at this airfield will
be in accordance with the 1959 agreement.
(8.) It is understood that, pending the conclusion of
the new agreement within a reasonable time, U.S. opera-
tions now being conducted from facilities in Greece,
which serve mutual defense interests, will be allowed
to continue.
IV. As an integral part of the new defense cooperation
agreement, provision will be made for a four-year commitment
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to Greece of military assistance totaling 700 million
dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. This commitment
will be designed to further develop the defense preparedness




GBEECE-ONITED STATES DECA, 8 SEPTEMBER, 1983
AUTHOR'S NOTE:
This is reprinted frcm the text sent to the author directly
from the U.S. Department of State. Format is similar to
the original but not an exact duplicate for typographical
reasons.
AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AflEBICA AND. THE GOVERNMENT gj THE
HELLENIC REPUBLIC
ARTICIE I
The parties intend by this Agreement to restructure
their defense and economic cooperation based on their
existing bilateral arrangements and multilateral agreements,
and in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and
full respect for the sovereignty, independence and interests
of each country.
ABTICLI II
1. In the furtherance of the purposes of this
Agreement, the Government of the Hellenic Republic author-
ises the Government of the United States to maintain and
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operate military and supporting facilities in Greece (herei-
nafter referred to as the facilities) and to carry out
missions and activities at these facilities for defense
purposes in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement. These facilities, missions and activities shall
be those identified and described under the Annex to this
Agreement.
2. The major items of equipment, arms and ammunition
located at the facilities shall be identified tc Greex
authorities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Any
expansion, change, modernization or replacement thereof
which will alter the mission capabilities of such facilities
shall be subject to the prior concurrence of the Government
of the Hellenic Republic.
3. The missions and activities authorized by this
Agreement and its Annex include the performance of technical
operations at the facilities. Such technical operations and
related activities shall be manned by United States
personnel.
ARTICLE III
1. The status of the United States forces, members of
the force, members of the civilian component, and dependents
shall be governed by the "Agreement between the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their
Forces: and related bilateral arrangements between the
Governments of the Hellenic Re'public and the United States
of America.
2. Members of the force, members of the civilian compo-
nent, and dependents shall be recognized to have this
capacity only upon being officially announced to the Greek
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authorities, who will issue special identification cards
signed by the competent Greek authorities.
ARTICLE IV
1. The Government of the Hellenic Republic shall assign
Greek personnel to each of the facilities. The senior Greek
official so assigned to each facility shall be designated as
the Greek representative. The Sreek Representative will
exercise command and control of Greek personnel, and the
premises used exclusively by them, at each facility. The
Greek Representative shall be responsible for liaison and
coordination with appropriate Greek authorities to include
those responsible for the security of, and maintenance of
order on, the perimeter of the facility. The Greek
Representative will be responsible to report to the Greek
authorities on the implementation and observance of the
provisions of this Agreement relating to the facilities.
2. The Commander of the United States forces at each
facility shall exercise command aud control over the
facility and personnel of the United States assigned
thereto, including their equipment and material and the
premises used by them, and shall provide for the security
and safety thereof.
3. The Greek Representative and the Commander of the
United States forces shall, as required, report through
their respective authorities to the Joint Commission estab-
lished pursuant to Article VI of this Agreement and submit
any questions or differences concerning interpretation or




1. With the exception of national cryptographic (code)
rooms, and Greek E epresentati ve shall have access to all
areas where technical operations and other 'Jr. ited States
activities are performed shall be on a non-routine basis and
in accordance with agreed procedures.
2. The location of national cryptographic rooms and
classified areas will be identified by the two Parties, and
any change thereafter will be as mutually agreed.
ARTICLE VI
A joint Commission will be established to deal with and
to resolve if possible any question or difference which may
arise concerning the interpretation and implementation of
the Agreement. Any issue no resolved shall be dealt with by
the two Governments.
ART1CLS VII
1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be in derogation of
the inherent right of the Government of the Hellenic
Republic under international law to take immediately all
appropriate restrictive measures required to safeguard its
vital national security interests in an emergency.
2. In the event that, in the view of the Government of
the Hellenic Republic, such an emergency exists, the appro-
priate Greek and United States authorities shall immediately
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enter into communication concerning such measures. This
process of communication shall not derogate from the right
referred to in paragraph 1.
ARTICLE VIII
In accordance with the purposes of this Agreement, and
consistent with its constitutional procedures, the United
States shall assist in the modernization and maintenance of
Greek defense capabilities through the provision of defense
support to the Government of the Hellenic Republic. Such
United States assistance shall also be guided by the prin-
ciple set forth in United States law that calls for
preserving the balance of military strength in the region.
ARTICLE IX
1. The Governments of the Hellenic Republic and the
United States will seek opportunities to cooperate in the
research, development, production and procurement of appro-
priate defense materiel as well as in the related logistic
support. Both Parties undertake to encourage joint invest-
ment in the aforementioned areas and to devote particular
attention to promoting new cooperative projects and recip-
rocal procurement of defense materiel.
2. For this purpose the Government of the United States
shall assist the Government of the Hellenic republic in
mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing and research,
development, production, maintenance, repair and moderniza-
tion of defense materiel and equipment in Greece and at
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assisting the Hellenic defense industry, and will encourage
new defense production projects and two-way trade in defense
materiel.
3. Both Governments intend to facilitate the mutual
flow of defense procurement for their armed forces, aimed at
assuring a long-term equitable lalance in their exchanges.
4. The Governments will permit the sale of defense
equipment produced under license, co-production agreements
and/or joint development projects to allied countries and to
appropriate third countries, subject to the prior written
agreement of the government that made available the defense
articles or technical data.
5. Acquisition of items of defense equipment developed
or produced by either Party shail be on the most economical
terms and based on competitive contracting procedures, and
based on agreed procedures for defense industrial coopera-
tion.
6. The Parties shall promptly develop a framework
agreement to facilitate the achievement of the purposes of
this Article.
ARTICLE X
The two Governments, considering the relationship
between defense capability and economic growth and
stability, will exert maximum efforts to develop cooperative
economic, industrial, scientific and technological relations
between the two countries, including mutually agreed United




1. Procedural and implementing arrangements called for
under this Agreement, as well as such other arrangements as
the Parties deem necessary for the purposes of, and other-
wise consistent with, this Agreement, shall be addressed by
the Parties, through the Joint Commission as appropriate.
2. All terms and conditions relating to the use of
facilities under arrangements existing as of the date of
entry into force of this Agreement shall, to the extent
consistent with this Agreement and its Annex, continue in
force until modified or terminated by agreement, through the
Joint Commission as appropriate. Previous bilateral
arrangements related to the purposes of this Agreement shall
be submitted at the initiative of either Party to the Joint
Commission for review and mutual consideration. This
process of review will be completed within one year of the
signature of this Agreement. If necessary this period can
be extended by the Parties.
ARTICLE XII
1. This Agreement shall enter into force no later than
December 31, 1983 upon an exchange of notes between the
Parties indicating that their respective constitutional
reguirements have been satisfied. This Agreement is termi-
nable after five years upon written notice by either Party
to be given five months prior to the date upon which termi-
nation is to take effect.
2. The Government of the United States shall have a
period of seventeen months commencing of the effective date
246
of termination within which to carry out the withdrawal of
United States personnel, property and equipment from Greece.
All terms and conditions pursuant to this Agreement shall
apply during such period.
Done in Athens, this 8th day of September, 1983, in
duplicate, in the Greek and English languages, both texts
being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT CF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA
(signed)
ALAN D. BERLIND
Charge d'Affairs ad interim
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
(Signed)
YIANNIS P. CAPSIS
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
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ANNEX
IN IMPLEMENTATION OP THE DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
A- 4£iicle I of the Agreement
This annex is pursuant to Article XI of the Defense and
Economic Cooperation Agreement (hereinafter referred to as
the Agreement) and shall enter into force and remain in
force contemporaneously with the Agreement.
B. Article II of the Agreement
1. Consistent with the purposes of the Agreement and purs-
uant of Article II thereof, the Government of the United
States is authorized to maintain and operate the military
and supporting facilities currently used by the Government
of the United States under existing arrangements, as identi-
fied below:
a. Nea Makri Naval Communications Station Complex,
consisting of : Headguar ters, support and operational
complex at Nea Makri; transmitting site and microwave
reflector at Kato Souli; and water facilities at
Marathon.
b. Iraklion Communications Station Complex, Crete,
consisting of: Headquarters, support and operational
complex at Gournes; transmitting site at Hani Kokkini;
and water facilities at Ma Ilia.
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c. Souda Air Base, Crete, consisting of: Headquarters,
support and operational complex (including the naval
communications detachment)
.
d. Hellenikon Air Base, consisting of: Headquarters,
support and operational complex at Hellenikon Airbase;
dependent educational facilities at Bari and Glyfada
and child care facility at Sourmena; exchange facili-
ties, including annexes at Glyfada and Kastri, adminis-
trative offices at Argyroujoiis and warehouse and open
storage areas at Aegalecs; commissary facilities,
including commissary store at Neos Kosmos, warehousing
and cold storage areas at Pireaus and administrative
offices at Glyfada; contracting offices ad
Argyroupolis; and Military Transportation Terminal
facilities at Pireaus.
e. Nodal Communications Sites, consisting of:
Facilities on Mount Pateras, Mount Parnis, Mount
Hortiatis and Mount Ederi, and on Lefkas- Island.
2. Pursuant to Article II of the Agreement, the Government
of the United States is authorized to carry out, at the
facilities identified above, the missions and activities
currently being carried out under existing arrangements, as
identified below:
a. Nea Makri Naval Communications Station Complex
- Communications for command and control and
administration primarily for United States
forces in the Mediterranean region.
- Supporting administrative, communications
(intra-and extra-station) , and logistic activi-
ties.
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b. Iraklion Communications Station Complex
- Communications and scientific research and anal-
ysis and communication of data.
- Supporting administrative, communications
(intra- and extra-station) , including local
AFRTS present services, and logistic activities.
c. Souda Air 3ase
- Operations, maintenance and support of United
States maritime Patrol Aircraft.
- Operations, maintenance and support of airborne
logistic support missions.
- Use as a carrier aircraft divert airfield.
- Storage, maintenance and assembly of preposi-
tioned mine stockpiles.
- Storage and maintenance of conventional
munitions.
- Communications
- Supporting administrative and log-istic
activities.
d. Hellenikon Air Base Complex
- Operations, maintenance and support of airlift
and logistic support, including associated
terminal facilities.
- Stationing, operations, maintenance and support
of United States liaison aircraft.
- Operations, maintenance and support of
reconnaissance aircraft and conduct of technical
ground processing.
- Communications, including ARFTS present
services.
Administrative and logistic support.
e. Nodal Communications Sites
- Operation and maintenance of ground-to-ground
and ground-to-air relay communications.
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- Administrative, communications (including
television relay at Ederi) and logistic support.
3. Flight activities associated with the military and
supporting facilities shall te in accordance with the
Technical Arrangement dated November 17, 1977.
C. Article III of the Agreement
1. Status of forces arrangements between the United
States and Greece shall be implemented in the same manner
and spirit with which such arrangements are generally
applied by States Party to the North Atlantic Treaty.
2. With respect to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction:
a. The Hellenic Republic recognizes the particular
importance of disciplinary control by the United States
military authorities over the members of the force and
the effect which such control has upon operational
readiness. The competent Greek authorities, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article VII, paragraph 3
(c) of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, will there-
fore except in cases they consider of particular impor-
tance to them, in conformity with their sovereign
discretionary right, give expeditious and favorable
consideration to the waiver of their criminal jurisdic-
tion upon request of the United States forces.
b. Requests by the United States authorities for a
waiver by Greece of its criminal jurisdiction shall be
processed in accordance with the following procedures:
(1.) A request shall be presented within a period
of thirty (30) days from the date the United
States military authorities become aware of the
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initiation of crimirai proceedings against an
accused, to the Joint Commission extablished under
Article VI of the Agreement.
(2.) The request snail be reviewed by the Joint
Commission which shall submit a recommendation to
the competent Greek authority within fifteen (15)
days from the submission of the request.
(3.) The competent Greek authority shall bake a
decision on the request within thirty (30) days of
receipt.
(4.) If Greek authorities do not waive their
jurisdiction, the case will be given preferential
treatment to complete the judicial proceedings in
the shortest possible time in accordance with
Article VII, paragraph S (a) of the NATG Status of
Forces Agreement.
3. With respect to custody of members of the United
States forces:
a. The provisions of Greek law pertaining to pretrial
detention or requiring confinement of the accused shall
be discharged until the conclusion of all judicial
proceedings by a duly executed certificate of the
United States military authorities assuring the appear-
ance of the member of the force before the competent
Greek judicial authorities in any proceedings that may
require the presence of such person.
b. When a member of the force has been convicted by a
Greek court and an unsuspended sentence to confinement
is adjudged, the United States military authorities
shall maintain custody over the accused in Greece until
the conclusion of all appellate proceedings.
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4. With respect to the definition of civilian component:
a. The term "civilian component" as defined in Article
I, paragraph 1 (b) of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, which may include dependents, shall also
mean employees of a non-Greek and non-commercial organ-
ization who are nationals cz or ordinarily resident in
the United States and who, solely for the purpose of
contributing to the welfare, morale or education of the
force, are accompanying those forces in Greece, and
non-Greek persons employed by United States contractors
directly serving the United States forces in Greece.
The number of positions for personnel to be accorded
the status of members of the civilian component by
virtue of this paragraph shall not exceed twenty-five
(25) more than those established as of June 1, 1983
without the express consent of the Government of the
Hellenic Republic. Such personnel shall not be consid-
ered as having the status of members of the civilian
component for the purpose of Article VIII of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement.
b. Resident documents or work permits shall not be
required for the employment of members of the civilian
component in connection with the facilities.
5. With respect to labor provisions:
a. For each facility or activity, two schedules of
positions shall be established, one for Greek personnel
and the other for United States personnel, reflecting
the number of positions under each category as of June
1, 1983. Any changes in excess of 3% to the propor-
tionality reflected in these schedules will be mutually
agreed upon by the two Governments.
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b. Pursuant to Article IX, paragraph 4, of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, the standards contained in
Greek labor legislation regarding conditions of employ-
ment and work., in particular wages, supplementary
payments and conditions for the protection of employees
as applied in the private sector, will be observed with
respect to Greek nationals employed in Greece by the
United States.
6. With respect to personal tax exemptions:
Kith respect to Article X, and in accordance with
Article I, paragraph 2, of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, members of the force and of the civilian compo-
nent shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar charges
in Greece on the ownership, possession, use, transfer
amongst themselves, or transfer by death of their tangible
movable property imported into Greece or acquired there for
their own personal use. One motor vehicle owned by a member
of the .force or of the civilian component shall be exempt
from Greek circulation taxes, registration or license fees,
and similar charges.
7. With respect to contracting:
The United States forces may award contracts to commer-
cial enterprises for services or construction projects in
Greece. In accordance with its laws and regulations, the
United States forces may procure directly from any source;
however, they shall utilize Greek contractors to the maximum
extent feasible for the performance of construction
projects.
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8. In accordance with Article XI of the Agreement, it is
the intention of the Parties to conclude a unified technical
arrangement which will incorporate the provisions set forth
in this Annex and modernize previous agreements and prac-
tices concerning the status of the United States forces in
Greece.
D- Article IV of the Agreement
The responsibilities of the appropriate Greek authori-
ties for the security of, and maintenance of order on, the
perimeter of the facility stipulated in Article IV (1) of
the Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with agreed
procedures. The liaison and coordination responsibilities
of the Greek Representative under that Article shall include
liaison and coordination with customs, law enforcement,
labor, immigration and municipal officials. .
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E. Articl e V of the Agreement
The agreed procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall include case-by-case authorization by high
Greek authority, identification and appropriate clearance of
the individual, proper protection of the information gained
during access, and prior notification.
Z- Article VI of the Agreement
1. Both parties shall designate military and diplomatic
representatives to the Joint Commission.
2. In addition to such other functions as may be mutually
agreed, the Joint Commission shall receive information from
the Greek Representatives and the Commanders of United
States forces at the facilities; address any guestions or
differences concerning interpretation or implementation
these officials may submit; and transmit agreed guidance to
these officials through the respective Greek and United
States chains of command.
£. Article IX of the A greement
The long-term equitable balance in the mutual flow of
defense procurement for the armed forces of both
Governments, referred to in paragraph 3, shall take into
consideration the relative technological level of such
procurement and be consistent with their national policies.
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Done in Athens, this 8th day of September, 1983, in
duplicate, in the Greek and English languages, both texts
being equally authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITEE STATES OF AMERICA
(signed)
ALAN D. BERLIND
Charge d'Affairs ad interim
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC
(signed)
YIANNIS P. CAPSIS
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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